Calvin:

Some thus render the word adm, adam,–”As the covenant of man have they transgressed it,” transferring it to the genitive case, “And they have transgressed the covenants as if it was that of man;” that is, as if they had to do with a mortal man, so have they despised and violated my holy covenant; and this exposition is not very unsuitable, except that it somewhat changes the construction; for in this case the Prophet ought to have said, “They have transgressed the covenant as that of a man;” but he says, ‘They as a man,’ etc. But this rendering is far from being that of the words as they are, ‘They as men have transgressed the covenant.’ I therefore interpret the words more simply, as meaning, that they showed themselves to be men in violating the covenant.

And there is here an implied contrast or comparison between God and the Israelites; as though he said, “I have in good faith made a covenant with them, when I instituted a fixed worship; but they have been men towards me; there has been in them nothing but levity and inconstancy.” God then shows that there had not been a mutual concord between him and the Israelites, as men never respond to God; for he sincerely calls them to himself, but they act unfaithfully, or when they have given some proof of obedience, they soon turn back again, or despise and openly reject the offered instruction. We then see in what sense the Prophet says that they had transgressed the covenant of God as men. Others explain the words thus, “They have transgressed as Adam the covenant.” But the word, Adam, we know, is taken indefinitely for men. This exposition is frigid and diluted, “They have transgressed as Adam the covenant;” that is, they have followed or imitated the example of their father Adam, who had immediately at the beginning transgressed God’s commandment. I do not stop to refute this comment; for we see that it is in itself vapid. Calvin, Commmentary, Hosea 6:7.

Here are the essential lines from Cameron:

Accordingly, ther are two kinds of decrees, one of them requires a condition, the other not. Those may be termed conditional, and the last absolut. Upon the first sort depends justification, and so that requires necessarily faith and repentance. On the last sort hangs effectuall calling, and that requires no conditions and dispositions. . . . The first decree, then, is to restore the divine image upon the creature, in a way wherein the rights of justice may be safe. The second is to send God’s Son into the world to save every one who believes in him, that is, are his members. The third is to render men fit and able to believe. The fourth is to save those who believe. The first two are generall, the last two speciall and particular. In our method of considering things, the principall are before the less principall. . . . But all this is to be understood as spoken of God, in a way accomodated to the infirmity of the human mind.

Essentially there are two kinds of decrees. The first two are conditional general decrees, and the second two are absolute particularist decrees. For Cameron, Amyraut, and Davenant, et al, conditional decrees were always subsumed under the revealed will of God. Conditional decrees never refer to ineffectual absolute or secret will decrees. For example, see Davenant on the meaning of conditional decrees here or here for more examples and explanations.

This now helps us to understand Amyraut:

21. And whereas they have made distinct Decrees in this Counsel of God, the first of which is to save all men through Jesus Christ, if they shall believe in him; the second to give Faith unto some particular Persons: they declared, that they did this upon none other account, than of accommodating it unto that Manner and Order, which the Spirit of Man observeth in his Reasonings for the Succour of his own Infirmity; they otherwise believing, that though they considered this Decree as diverse, yet it was formed in God in one and the self-same Moment, without any Succession of Thought, or Order of Priority and Posteriority.

The first decree there corresponds to Cameron’s conditional decree, and the second to his absolute decree.

So where does that lead us? It leads us to the fact that this “ordering” is in no way comparable to the standard infrar- or supralapsarian ordering.  In both of those the standard orderings there is a string of absolute decrees; eg to create, permit the fall, election, to send the Son (for the elect), etc.

When folk like Warfield juxtapose the standard infra or supra ordering over and against Cameron’s or Amyraut’s, they are engaging in a simple category fallacy, comparing apples with oranges, or chalk with cheese as we say in Australia.

The two types of orderings should not be set side by side as if they are univocal orderings with the same univocal concept of decree.

And further, the Cameron-Amyraut order is purely set out as perceived from the human point of view, the ordo historia. We “see” creation, fall, and the public work of Christ (including “incarnation”), but we see” election and salvation as effectually enacted and applied to believers, after the fact. But such “after the fact” seeing is “secondary” to our starting point, which is creation, fall, and redemption, ie the public work of Christ.

This confirms my thought all along, that Amyraut’s detractors so framed his language to suggest that there were absolute decrees, what we today call the decretive will, being conditioned by the actions of men.  In effect, ineffectual decretal volitions. But this is not what Cameron and Amyraut were saying at all.

Further, Warfield in his chart on the plan of salvation is just plain wrong in his wording of the second decree as being, “Gift of Christ to render salvation of all men possible.”¹ That smacks of an absolute decree and does not mirror Cameron or Amyraut’s version at all.

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Cameron:

1^st letter,

All your reasons . . . are taken from the authority of one of the greatest of men, and the retractation of another from the nature of God, and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. As to the two first, I am exceeding sorry that these two persons, one whereof hath justly ye greatest reputation of the Church, and the other highly esteemed by you for his piety, aprove what such as either deny Christ’s satisfaction or turn it to nothing, make the great foundation of their cause: and if we yield this, they have what they would be at, and ye horrour of the evil nature of sin which the Holy Ghost works in the soul, is turned to smoak. But I come to the other two reasons. Its said, that God loves not things because they are good, but every thing is good because loved of God. At this rate, God loves not himself because he is good, but he is so, because he loves himself. If this be absurd, the absurdity will hold in everything that is a branch of the Divine image: for if God, by a natural and immutable propension, loves himself, the same way must he love his image, and both with a natural love. And you yourself have demonstrat this point: only you would notice, that in some things the Divine image shines, as he is God, and yet in them there is no likenes to his justice. And these are undoubtedly, if persons, either approven or disapproven by God: or, if they be actions, they may be commanded or forbidden, without any difference. But then God can neither condemn the innocent nor approve the guilty, nor discharge love to himself, or commend or command the hatred of himself. Hold fast this–let no arts and sophisms drive you from it. Fix all ye powers of your soul here, if you would know what horrible evils have filled mankind by the loss of God’s image. Again, they say, God is free, and may make of his own what he will. But dare they extend this to God’s denying himself? And what is so much his own as himself? Or can he destinate the innocent to eternal pains? But this they say is not what God will ever pleese to do–(ei non libet). Indeed, I say also, it can never please him, because contrary to his nature. The liberty of God, then, either depends on his nature or upon his hidden wisdom, the reasons of which are far above our reach. This last is very clear, in things which are not repugnant to his Divine nature–as to creat the world or not, to conserve it or not, to permit sin or not. The guide of such actions is mysterious infinite wisdom, to which, the reason of the difference is perfectly obvious, which nevertheless cannot be known by us. Thus, that God makes a man sunk in sin either a member of Christ or not, is a secret of Divine wisdom: but that God punishes a sinner, out of Christ, is from plain justice, and we can tell the reason of it, as also why he absolves a person who is in Christ, which is an effort both of justice and mercy. But to make a person the object of compensating justice, or permitting that he is not, is merely voluntary. Yet if one be not the object of compensating justice, for God to consider him as if he were so is against the nature of things, till the impedement be removed. Would you have an instance? The object of compensating justice is a righteous person. God therefor makes us so, before he compensates. To make a man righteous is merely voluntary, but to compensate the righteousness is not merely voluntary; for its contrary to the Divine nature not to love a righteous person: and if he love him, he will compensate him. Thus the object of punishing, and vindictive justice, is a sinner. To hinder or not hinder sinning is perfectly free [to God:] but it can never be free to God (save on the taking away of sin) not to punish the sinner, since he cannot lye, and he is faithfull to his threatnings as well as his promises. From hence we may understand that liberty which results from the Divine nature, [which] is perfectly free to take away, or not to take away the impediment; but the impediment not being removed, I cannot allow that the same freedom can be in God. And yet God is not astricted thus by any other laws than those of his own nature: but from these he neither will, nor can depart. Will you or any other person think that God will revock the damnatory sentence, till the cause of the condemnation be removed? or that the cause of condemnation can ever be removed without a satisfaction? Now, that damnatory sentence is decreed from eternity against the sinner, and promulgat to Adam in time. Its necessary then, that it should continue fixed and firm, till its cause be removed. Canot you perceive how frivolouse their argument is, The person who can remove the impediment by a satisfaction, or not remove it, can also, while the impediment stands, doe the same without any satisfaction on sin: the doing this is ye same as to ye matter with ye removing the impediment? Let me add another thing. There are two kinds of Divine actions–one, wherof there is no cause without God. In these, liberty is directed by wisdom. There are others, the cause of which is without God. In them the Divine liberty is directed or circumscribed by the Divine nature. For instance, the punishing of sin hath its cause without God, and therfor is directed not by the mere will of God, but by his will proceeding from his nature. Lastly, its false which they say, that the imputation of the righteousness of Christ is merely voluntary; since God, according to his nature, cannot but impute Christ’s righteousness to him who is represented by Christ. If I pay you a summ of money in the debitor’s name, is ther not here a real imputation? For what is it, in the debitor’s name, for you to accept and receive that money, but to impute ye accepted money to the debitor? Its a contradiction then to say, Christ satisfyed for all men. God imputes this satisfaction only to some. How then does the Scripture say, Christ satisfyed for all? Just as the reward is proposed and appointed to all that strive and run in a race: and yet that is bestowed upon none but him that wins the race. I noticed to you, if I remember, that there is a twofold mercy in God–an antecedent, from which the gift of faith comes, of which Paul speaks, Rom. 9: and the exercise of this is undoubtedly free. The other, consequent, by which God justifyes those to whom he gives faith, which is an act of justice as to Christ, though as to us it’s mercy. This is not meerly voluntary in God. If we will speak then, properly, we must say, Christ satisfyed only for such as believe on him, since these are only his members. As then Adam infected only his own by sin, so Christ abolishes sin only in his own: and none are his but such as believe in him. Observe what I say. Faith makes you a member of Christ, but faith would not save you unless Christ had satisfyed for you. These are two acts very distinct–the ingrafting in Christ by faith, and the imputing Christ’s righteousness to him thus sinned in Christ. The first is merely voluntary, but not the second. What, you will say, is not faith given because of the merit of Christ? Truly, faith is given you that you may participat of the merits of Christ. The death of Christ therfor, is properly the final cause of faith. Whence then, say you, is faith? Just, in my opinion, from the same spring from which God redeems mankind by the blood of Christ, without which, or some other satisfaction, of which I can have no notion, the wordle would have perished, that is, God’s good pleasure. To what you adduce from 1 Tim. 2, 4, I answer, prayers for the salvation of others are either absolute, as when we pray against the sworn enemies of the Church, or for the elect and the Church: or, hypotheticall, for the conversion or conservation of this or that person in the faith. And thus I argue, that in that way, we are to pray for the salvation of particular persons, the same way God wills the salvation of all. But we are to pray for particular persons conditionally: therfor, conditionally, God wills the salvation of all. You err widely if you think you can pray for all in faith absolutely, since ther is not one single promise in ye Bible for the salvation of all; and without a promise ther can be no faith. If you think that God wills equally the salvation of all, without any condition: this is quite wrong, to say no worse. Can you once think that, what God absolutely wills, he again does not will? This is a contradiction. Or cannot do? That is blasphemy. If then God wills absolutely that all shall be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, he will certainly bring this about. But that he does not. The Scripture describes antecedent love to us, as that which hath some degrees–the first of which is, that Christ is given both to Gentiles and Jews, with this condition, that they believe in him. These are expressed in ye Scripture, by every creature, all flesh, the world, in opposition to ye nature of the Jewish Church, which was not Catholick, but restrained to that nation. This degree is spoken of, John 3, 16, as if we should say, the King of France so loved the Parisians, that he pardoned the penitent. Here I understand all the Parisians; and yet I assert that priviledge absolutely to none of them, but only to such as come up to ye condition and penitently ask pardon. In respect of this degree, God is said to give Christ, for ye life of ye world, and to will the salvation of all, as he calls all to penitence, some by the law of nature, others by his written law, others by the gospell. Therfor, here God is said to will all men to be saved, as he calls them to the knowledge of the truth, and because he calls them, and wills they should live piously, and commands so. From the 2d degree of antecedent love, God gives faith. This appears from that celebrated place, ‘No man cometh unto me but he whom my Father draweth;’ and in this respect, Christ is said to be given for the elect only, and that he wills only to save them. God does multitudes of things which to us may seem to be repugnant, but they are not so. We, little creatures, because we cannot fathom what God does, endeavour to take them in among the things we can fathom and know; but these being finit and limited, represent only parts of the Divine way, and very obscurely too. From hence come the seeming repugnancys in what God does–just as if you were looking with dim confused eyes to the parts of the human body, all their harmony would appear to you disharmoniouse: and yet it would be reasonable to you, consciouse of your own weakness, to conclude, that though at present they appeared thus to you, yet really things are not so. Cited from, Robert Wodrow, Collections Upon the Lives of the Reformers and Most Eminent Ministers of the Church of Scotland (Glasow: Edward Khull, Printer to the University, 1845), 2: 92-96; dated, Bourdeaux, Dec. 1610. [Some minor reformatting; where applicable, Wodrow’s interpolated comments removed; spelling original; bracketed inserts original; italics original; marginal notation not included; and underlining mine.]

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Cameron:

This matter stands thus in my view. In God, ther are two kinds of perfections and propertys, (I speak after our narrow way of considering God,) from which as many kinds of actions proceed. Ther are some divine perfections and propertys, wherof the actions or excercises require not only ane object and matter upon which they are to work, but also certain qualitys and dispositions. For instance, the divine justice and mercy. For justice, whether vindictive or remunerative, not only goes upon a person, but a person so and so affected and situated; vindictive supposes sin, remunerative according to the law supposes a person free of sin. Again, mercy, as it pardons sin, requires in its object faith and repentance. Ther are other propertys or perfections in God, quhich,¹ in the excercise of them, either require no object at all, or, if they suppose an object, yet they do not require any conditions or qualifications, such as the divine power and wisdom, quhich displayed themselves in the creation of the world. These did not suppose, but made their object. And in the restoration of a fallen world, although those perfections have an object,–man dead in trespases and sins, or rather the actions coming from those, for example, the effectuall call,–those perfections and actions do not require any condition in the object, but they constitute the condition and qualification in the object, to wit, faith and repentance. From quhich it is plain, that those last kind of actions are merely and every way free, en no condition or qualification is required in the object, but quhat² is wrought and given; and God may do them, or not do them. The first kind of actions, indeed, are in God free; but not so, but [that is, as if] God certainly must do them. That is, God could creat or not create the world, restore a fallen creature or not restore him. But when he exerts justice or mercy, its necessary ther be some conditions and qualifications according to which he must proceed. Accordingly, ther are two kinds of decrees, one of them requires a condition, the other not. Those may be termed conditional, and the last absolut. Upon the first sort depends justification, and so that requires necessarily faith and repentance. On the last sort hangs effectuall calling, and that requires no conditions and dispositions. But then the divine propertys, actions, and decrees of the last kind subserve, as it wer, to the propertys, actions, and decrees of the first kind, and prepare and constitute their object. And the propertys, actions, and decrees of the first kind are taken up about the object already constitute and prepared for them. The first decree, then, is to restore the divine image upon the creature, in a way wherein the rights of justice may be safe. The second is to send God’s Son into the world to save every one who believes in him, that is, are his members. The third is to render men fit and able to believe. The fourth is to save those who believe. The first two are generall, the last two speciall and particular. In our method of considering things, the principall are before the less principall. The generall ones are prior to the speciall and particular. Since, therfor, the restoring of the divine image, in a consistency with justice, is the principall thing, I have given it the first room. And since it may be considered two ways, generally, so that if one would say, God wills to restore the human race in a consistency with justice, he tells the thing, but not the manner of it–or more specially, as if any should say, God willeth, by his Son crucifijed and raised from the dead, to restore the human race, then he not only signifyes the thing, but the manner of it; yet because this is a speciall designation of the thing, it comes in the second room to be considered in God. The third and the fourth decrees are not only speciall, but have a relation to individuals and single persons, and yet not without an order. For God considers man first as believing, and then as to be saved; and therefore in the decree faith is before salvation. The third decree, then, to make men able and fit to believe, goes befor the fourth. But all this is to be understood as spoken of God, in a way accomodated to the infirmity of the human mind.

Cited from, Robert Wodrow, Collections Upon the Lives of the Reformers and Most Eminent Ministers of the Church of Scotland (Glasow: Edward Khull, Printer to the University, 1845), 2:179-181. [Spelling original; formatting original; bracketed inserts original; and footnotes mine.]

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¹Archaic form of “which.”

²Archaic form of “what.”