Walker:

Quest. How could God who is infinite in goodness willingly suffer sin to enter into the World, which is a thing so hateful to him?

Answ. He suffered it in his wisdom and goodness, not out of any pleasure, which he takes in sin, or any evil, or in the destruction of his creatures, but because by his omnipotency he can out of evil bring greater good, than any, which is lost and forfeited by sin. For by hating sin he shows his holiness, by punishing it his justice, by redeeming his elect from it, his mercy, free grace, and goodness, by the evils which his elect do undergo for their trial and correction, and the misery and torment which they see inflicted on reprobates, they are made more blessed in the fruition of God and his glory at last. And as a man who was never pinched with hunger, and pain of sickness cannot so fully know the goodness of health, nor so sweetly taste and relish his meat; so without sigh and sense of evil we cannot so fully know nor so sweetly enjoy our own happiness, nor so perfectly rejoice and glory in the fruition of God and all his goodness.

Quest. If sin comes to pass by the will and providence of God, how is God excused from being the author of sin?

Answ.. Very well, for the bare willing and permitting of a thing, makes not him who willingly permits it the author and cause thereof. To make God the author of sin, or any way guilty of it, there are three things required. First, that God do command, counsel, or persuade men to commit sin. Or secondly, that he move, incline, or stir them up to it. Or thirdly, that when he willingly permits and suffers it, and is able to hinder it, he be bound by some law or bond of duty (as men are) to hinder it to the utmost of his power, and in no case to will it. But God’s will has no law besides itself; as he is supreme Lord of all, so he may will or not will where he pleases. He is bound by no law to restrain men from sin. He may have mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he may leave to be hardened. Neither does God command, counsel, or persuade any man to sin by his Word [Rom. 9:18.], but has given a law to the contrary, by which he forbids sin under pain of death. And never did he tempt, move, incline, or stir up any to sin. Therefore, he can neither be the cause or author of sin [Jam. 1:13.], n o any way partaker in the stain and guilt of it.

Quest. But does God’s providence meddle any more with sin, but only to permit it willingly and wittingly?

Answ.. Yes certainly, God by his providence does hinder and limit sin, that it does not break forth in all wicked men, nor prevail to the utmost extremity. He does also order and dispose the sins of the wicked to his own glory, and the good of his elect. He made the fierceness of Pharaoh and Sennacherib turn to his honor, fame, and praise, and the treachery of Judas in betraying, and the cruelty and malice of the Jews, in murdering Christ, he turned the redemption of the world, and the salvation of elect in Christ, by his overruling power and goodness. George Walker, The Key of Saving Knowledge, Opening out of the holy Scripture, the right way, and straight passage to Eternal life (London: Printed by Tho. Badger. 1641), 27-30. [Some spelling modernized; marginal references cited inline; and italics original.]

Wodrow:

The conference itself stands thus: "At Paris, Agust 2, 1623, in the of Dr. Arbald, physician, in presence of the Rev. Mons. Mestrezat and Drillincourt, ministers of Paris, De Courcelles, and Dr. Arbald, a friendly conference was held betwixt the Rev. and learned Mon. Cameron and Mon. De Courcelles, minister of Ambien, upon severall weighty subjects relating to the saving grace of God in Christ, and its reception. The last defended the opinions of the Remonstrants; and the first, those of the Anti- Remonstrants. They first setled their order and method of proceeding, with the state of the questions to be handled. Curcellaeus, in the first room, asked Mons. Cameron, What he held to be the object of predestination? whether man to be created (creabilem), or created but in puris naturalibus (as they speak), in his pure natural state? or if he held it to be man as a sinner, as having broken the covenant of nature? or, lastly, whether it was man, guilty, indeed, of breaking the covenant of nature, but embracing the covenant of grace, that is, repenting and believing? Mr. Cameron answered, by distinguishing the decrees of God as to man’s salvation, into two decrees, or two members (according to our way of conceving) of the same decrees: the one about the giving of salvation and eternall life; the other about giving of faith, quhich is the condition of the new Covenant. The last decree he termed, our election to Christ, (ad Christum); the first, our election in Christ. The object of the first decree, he said, was man believing and as believing, which Curcellaeus willingly went into; the object of the last, he said, was only man as a sinner. This Curcellaeus granted also, upon the supposition of such a decree. This distinction Cameron proved from Eph. i. 4, 5. The first decree he founded on, chosen in Christ–the second on, our being predestinat to receive the adoption of children; and quhen Curcellaeus objected, that the last expression of the apostle, v. 5, might be exegeticall of the first, Mr. Cameron showed the absurdity of this sense, that it would really be to make Paul to say, as he elected us, quhen he elected us. Mr. Cameron further explained this distinction of the decrees, by asserting that God has a double schesis and relation to man in this matter; one as a just and supreme judge sitting upon a throne of justice, pronouncing sentence from the law and gospel. In this respect he pronounces these and these only just, who, being in themselves sinners, by faith are made members of Christ, the fidejussor or surety. The other is that of the Supreme Rector of the world preparing an object to himself, which he does by effectuall calling us to Christ. In the first schesis, God considers none but as they are members of Christ, that is, believing, and determines they shall be saved. By the second schesis, he decrees to bring severall to the fellowship of Christ by faith; and of this decree its impossible that man believing can be the object. For, said he, the decree of election to Christ, is not in Christ, nor the decree to faith, is not in faith. But of the other decree, man repenting and believing is the object. But lest this condition of faith might seem, both in the decree and its execution, to exclude children, Mr. Cameron restricted it to the adult who only could believe; but then, he added, infants wer saved as appendages (appendices) of their parents, pertaining to the Covenant. And to illustrat this, he cited Aristotle, in his Ethicks, putting the question, whether the children of citizens wer to be reckoned citizens, and enjoy their priviledges, when commonly those are only esteemed citizens who can take an oath of fidelity to the prince, and fill up their duty to ye prince and their fellow-citizens; yet children, by reason of their nonage, are uncnpable of either. . . Curcelleus acquiesced in Mr. Cameron’s opinion, concerning the decree of giving salvation and life; but delayed the approbation of the decree of election to Christ, and to faith, as what would fall in afterwards; and, next, asked Mr. Cameron’s opinion of the object of the decree of reprobation. He ansvered, that followed pretty clearly from what he had said as to the decree of election, to wit, all that are not members of Christ, that is, such as do not believe and repent–quhich generall expressions, he said, comprehended both such as rejected the grace of Christ, offered most clearly in the gospell dispensation; and those who, although they never heard the gospell preached, yet, being invited by a more sparing and darker grace of the Redeemer, to repentance and seeking after God, because of their contempt of the long-suffering, patience, and goodnes of God, richly testifyed to them, will be numbered with the rejecters of the gospell, as unbelieving and impenitent, by Him who, searching their hearts and reins, certainly knows them to be of the very same temper, and that, although the gospell offer had been made to them, they would still have remained impenitent and unbelieving, unless he himself had wrought that in them which he had decreed not to work, and only works in the elect. Robert Wodrow, Collections Upon the Lives of the Reformers and Most Eminent Ministers of the Church of Scotland (Glasow: Edward Khull, Printer to the University, 1845), 2: 183-184, 185. [Spelling original, italics original; and underlining mine.]

[Note: What Cameron says here is identical in sentiment to that of Twisse here. Cameron and Twisse are mirroring the ealier Reformed distinction of predestination to salvation and predestination to faith. The former is a conditional decree, the latter is an absolute decree. At no point in this distinction is Cameron being novel or heretical.]

Introduction:

The following is an copy of a letter from Festus Hommius, one of two official secretaries at Dort to John Cameron. The context of the letter relates to a written dispute between John Cameron and Simon Episcopius, the Arminian. As part of their discussion, Episcopius accuses Cameron of having a Pelagian view of regeneration on account of Cameron’s idea of regeneration, Briefly stated, Cameron held that the Spirit works primarily through the mind by enlightenment and persuasion, to which the will follows in what the mind comes to delight in. In his own defense, Cameron appeals to the fact that he is in total agreement with the doctrines of the Synod of Dort, and, indeed, when Dort was in session, Cameron had sent his own “theses” to Festus Hommius. Hommius then wrote back to Cameron, and far from condemning his ideas, validated them as Orthodox.

For my purposes here, I will reproduce Wodrow’s opening comments and then the letter from Hommius:

Episcopius in his letter next charges Cameron’s opinion, as not only condemned by these Synods, but as being a mixture of Pelagianisme and Manicheanisme. That his opinion is Pelagian, he says, appears from this–that he menteans the objective revelation of the Divine will alone; that sole swasion, or a moral notion and agency, is sufficient to regeneration, without any immediate internal grace impressed upon the will, quhich he says is Pelagius’ very errror condemned by the 4th canon of the African Council. That he chimes in with the Manicheans, he would prove from this consequence, quhich he takes to be Mr. Cameron’s opinion, That both good and evil actions are necessarily done; quhich the fathers generally condemn as the Manichean error. The rest of Episcopius’ letter is spent, in essaying to fix these things on Cameron, and removing the objections that Cameron advances in his own defence:

Mr. Cameron makes large and pointed Answers to this heavy charge, in all the branches of it. I must referr the reader to the book itself, He denyes the charge, and supports his denyall by facts and arguments. As to his opposition to the canons of the Synod of Dort, he answers, he agrees perfectly with them ; and adds, during the Synod’s sitting, he sent his Theses to the learned Festus Hommius, who on the matter presided in that Synod; and, by his return in a letter to Cameron, dated March 17, 1620, he approves of his Theses. That learned man says to Mr. Cameron,

Your gift to me last winter, quhen the Synod was sitting, was most acceptable. It was deteaned sometime, and came to me a litle before the forraigne divines left us. I delivered your letters as directed. I cannot tell you the sentiments of our forraigne brethren upon your book, because they wer just upon the wing. Our divines who have read it, are highly satisfyed with the singular learning and acuteness God hath given you, for the edification of his church; and rejoice in your succeeding the learned Gomarus, and congratulate the Church of France on this, reckoning you most worthy of that office. Indeed, it seems to offend some, that you make man’s conversion to be by mere moral swasion, since that appears to differ very litle from the Remonstrants’ opinion; but when the explication you have added to that was pondered a litle more closely, they soon saw that you differ as much from the Remonstrants, as heaven from earth. As for myself, I have observed nothing in your book which departs from the sound doctrine, and even that lately declared by our Synod. And I admire your dexterous, solid, and clear handling of a very difficult subject. I embrace with both my arms the friendship you offer, and rejoice that God favours me with the favour of worthy men. I hope for the fruits of what you offer frequently, for the benefit of our churches.

He sends his kind respects to Mons. Du Plessis, Reformatarum Ecclesiarum columni et ornamento” Bouchereau and Capell

Mr. Cameron recons Hommius’ opinion may be almost reconed that of the Synod of Dort.

Robert Wodrow, Collections Upon the Lives of the Reformers and Most Eminent Ministers of the Church of Scotland (Glasow: Edward Khull, Printer to the University, 1845), 2:204-206. [Some reformatting; spelling original; italics original; marginal side-header not included; and underlining mine.]

Ross:

XCI

Though God loves all men, yet saves not all men, he loves them, because he made them, he saves them not, because he willed it not: he could not in justice will all men’s salvation, seeing man by his voluntary injustice deprived himself of salvation. He loves his own image, but hates that which defaced his image, he loves the man, but hates the sin, and if it were not for sin, he would not punish man. Lord, thy love to man is unspeakable, in that thou saves some, and thy justice is unsearchable, in that thou saves not all. I cannot blame thy justice, but my sins, that caused my misery. I cannot brag of my merits, but of thy goodness, that moved thee to mercy.

XCII

God hates the sins of man, because he loves his own justice with the love of complacency.¹ He hates the miseries of man., because he loves man’s welfare with the love of amitie,² but by accident he loves the death of wicked men, because he hates the works of iniquity. Thus it is natural for God to hate evil, as it is to love himself, and as impossible for him to love evil, as it is to hate himself. Alexander Ross, A Centurie of Divine Meditations Upon Predestination and its Adjuncts (London: Printed by James Young, 1646), 96-98. [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; marginal notes cited as footnotes; and italics original.]

___________________________

¹Amor benovolentiæ.

²Amor amicitiæ.