Archive for the ‘Divine Permission of Sin’ Category

23
Jun

Hermann Rennecher (1550 b.) on God’s Willing Permission of Sin

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

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Rennecher:

To Predestinate therefore is, to purpose and determine something with ones self, that it should have a being, before such time that it be, or do anything: and withal, it is the setting apart, and ordaining of that thing unto some certain end. This belongs not peculiarly only to God himself, but also ought to have relation to every wise and prudent man, which before he take in hand to bring to pass any thing, is wont seriously and advisedly to have some consultation, concerning the end for which he will bring that thing to pass. But when this is attributed unto God, it is also very large, and is extended generally unto all creatures, which God from everlasting by his certain decree has ordained and disposed to this or that use and end before they were created. But here, when we speak of mankind, and their end, this word of predestination is to be referred unto that deep and hidden counsel of God, by which he has from everlasting, before the foundations of the world were laid, decreed to create mankind in true holiness and righteousness according to his own image. And that this is so, that Scripture witnesses in many places, and the event itself confirmed it by experience of the deed done. The second degree of predestination is, whereby God in his most just and most wise judgment determined to permit and suffer that mankind should be tempted of the devil, and should also fall into sin and eternal destruction.

Here it is inserted a certain digression of the fall of our first parents, which, although they consented unto the serpents persuasion by their own proper and voluntary will, and so fell from God, yet this their falling away, was not altogether without God’s eternal purpose. Chap. 6.

As God from everlasting did foresee and ordain all other things, so among these, this fall of mankind, in the person of our first parents, and all other evils which followed and flowed from thence. So that he was willing to suffer, and not to hinder this fall, that it might be done by others, and not by himself: otherwise, it had been even as easy for him to have kept our first parents from falling, as it was to create them. For look how easy it is for him to do that which he wills, so easy likewise is it for him to hinder that which he wills not, as Saint Augustine says [lib. Corrupt., & grat. ca. 56.]. Neither was it any injustice in him, but altogether just, in that he did not keep them from falling, but suffered them to be overcome by the serpent’s persuasion, and so to fall into eternal death.  For God was not bound unto them that he should preserve them and keep them from falling, because he did not promise it. Nay, God was not bound unto them, to create them according unto his own image, because he is a most free agent, therefore, much less was he bound unto them, to save them from falling. Yea, our first parents of their own voluntary and free-will, without any constraint, did treacherously fall away from God, and so falling away, did infect both themselves, and all their posterity with sin, and made them liable unto eternal destruction.

But God not unwillingly, but willingly permitted them to fall; otherwise, if anything, though never so little, could be brought to pass, God not being willing thereunto, then God should not be God. Our first parents therefore in regard of themselves, did that which God would not have, but in respect of the omnipotence of God, they could by no means do it. Wherefore it is not to be doubted, but that God does righteously, in suffering those things which are done so wickedly, as Saint Augustine says [Lib. De corrupt. & grat. capit. 100.] And although God do suffer this or that evil action to be committed and not hinder it: yet for all that, he does not himself bring to pass that evil, nor allow of it. But good things which are conformable to his heavenly wisdom, those he foresaw from everlasting, and decreed to bring to pass and effect them. Therefore God by himself is the first cause, and the only effecter of these things, because that good things spring and flow forth out of the power of his divine providence, as out of the only fountain that is never dried up. But evil things, although God also foresaw them from everlasting, and knew that they would come to pass, yet he himself, neither approves them, nor furthers them, nor helps them, nor brings them to pass directly, but by his just judgment suffers them to be committed and done by others. Therefore God is not to be counted as the first cause and effecter of them, but Satan himself, and man’s free-will do begin them and end them. So that Satan and wicked men are the true and proper causes of evil. All things therefore whatsoever are done, although they be done by God’s providence, from which nothing can be exempted, yet some of them are done, his providence permitting, appointing and directing them to their proper ends.  Therefore all evil and wicked deeds whatsoever, are committed and done, God’s providence not effecting, but suffering them, because that God decreed not that he would himself effect them from everlasting, but because he decreed to suffer, and not to hinder them to be done by others. So that God not unwillingly, but willingly suffered our first parents to sin. They therefore which attribute unto God a permission, which should be contrary to his will, they deny him to be omnipotent. For he that permits anything to be done, which by no means he would have done, surely he is not of such power, as to let and hinder that which he would not have done. Therefore what things soever God suffers to be done, he suffers them willingly, for nothing can be possibly be done, if he be unwilling, or against it. Hence it follows not, that God allows and approves sins in themselves, as they are things simply evil and contrary unto his will, but rather he hates them with his whole will and nature, and (except he mercifully pardon them) he revenges and punishes them with eternal torments.

Herman Renecher, The Golden Chayne of Salvation (At London: Printed by Valentine Simmes for Thomas Man, dwelling in Paternost row at the Signe of the Tablot, 1604), 22- 25.   [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; marginal references cited inline; and underlining mine.] [Note: Rennecher’s continuing discussion on divine permission is also worth reading.]

26
May

Sin and Permission in the The Hungarian Confessio Catholica (1562)

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

1)

Concerning Hardening, Blindness; How God
Is Said to Deceive and Punish Sin with Sin

Hardening, blindness, and deceit is sin because of the cause for which they occur; that which hardens and blinds with regard to men and devils, however, is sin, as is said in Ephesians 4; at other times, however, it is the punishment for sin.

We say in three senses, however, that God hardens and blinds, i.e., punishes by means of evil things former offenses with later ones. First is when He deprives men of His own light, wisdom, grace, and heavenly gifts. When, however, God withdraws from men that which is His own, darkness of necessity follows light, and ignorance, blindness, and

hardening follows wisdom; when the sole cause of punishments remains, the guilt of punishment follows, as it is said in Job 12. He withdraws their hearts and mouths from princes (cf. vv. 20, 24).

Furthermore, He is said to harden when He does not soften; does not enlighten men, but leaves them in their darkness. Thus it is said in Isaiah 6 and 63 (Rom. 6, 7). And thus the Spirit of the Lord left Saul (Lombard, Book 2, Sentences).

Third, by leaving men to themselves, He gives them up to the devil, that author of every error and evil, and gives them into the hands of sin, subjects them to the Law of men (Amos 3; Isa. 45; Matt. 13). When afterwards, men are the slaves of sin, they are inclined only to evil and led by Satan. They are falsely in error, therefore, who say (with Pelagius) that God punishes and hardens permissively.

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28
Jan

Henry B. Smith (1815-1877) on Divine Permission of Sin

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

Smith:

2.  The permissive and efficient will of God. This is the distinction made all through the history of Calvinistic theology down to the time of the Hopkinsian school in New England. God permits the morally evil and effects the good. In respect to sin, He for wise reasons simply determines not to prevent it, all things considered. The efficient will of God has respect to what God directly produces through his own agency. The importance of this distinction is, that we cannot logically or rationally or morally conceive that God would directly produce by his positive efficiency what He forbids. Accordingly we must employ some milder term than efficiency with respect to the relation of God to moral evil, and the term selected is permission. This may not be the best, but it is well to retain it until we get a better.

Henry B. Smith, System of Christian Theology, 2nd ed., (New York: A.C. Armstrong and Son, 1884), 31. [Underlining mine.]

Truman:

Obj. 17. But it may be that God has decreed to, and so will, condemn me, do what I can.

Ans. Abhor such an opinion or thought. This, all sides disown: The utmost that is pretended by any moderate men, about this we are now speaking, is, “That there is a positive Decree to permit some to undo, or not hinder them from thus undoing themselves.” And this I shall not deny, but with them, that are better able to judge, to consider (since such conceptions help our understandings, that our imperfect notions may be in some measure rationally consistent), whether it be necessary to conceive, and so to affirm any such positive Decree to permit, whether a conception of a mere negation of a will in him to hinder, not a decreeing to hinder, be not enough: For you use to found this positive decree not to hinder, upon his fore-sight of what men would do if not hindered; now if they would do it without, and antecedently, to such a positive decree, what need is there? Nay is it not to conceive a vain positive act, to affirm such a positive decree to permit that which men would do without such a positive decree to permit, if he do not positively decree to hinder? But to let this pass, and suppose such a positive decree (he giving men means enough, and more than enough) not to go any further in hindering them from going in their impenitency.

How comes it about, that men make stops and exceptions about the decrees in God in reference to their soul-concernments, and never make such questions about them in other concerns, wherein learned men that differ about these things, seem better agreed about positive decrees? Men plow and sow, and never question whether God has decreed, whether there shall be any increase. When yet God has reserved to himself a liberty here, and may, for any thing they now, blast all their corn, and does sometimes (and therefore decreed it), notwithstanding their good husbandry. Yet none here says, “I will plow or sow: for if he have decreed a good crop, I shall have one, if not, I shall not have it.”  But this satisfies men here, “Though God, it may be, will blast all, do what I can; yet God uses to succeed diligent endeavors. But here, in the case in hand, you have far more reason to be consistent, for God has reserved to himself here no liberty to blast at all. All agree in this, that none shall fail, or not find who heartily seek, and so continue, nor shall so choose and pursue this better part, and miss of it: “He that comes to him, he will in no wise cast off.”

All agree, that there are no decrees but what are well consistent with the truth of those promises, and all notions of decrees really inconsistent with such promises are false. As also all those notions of decrees that are not consistent with his threatenings as he “He that repents not, shall perish.” But one may perceive how it comes about, that men fly to decrees here, and not in worldly concernments, but have a mind to go in their sins, and would fain find out some excuse for their sloth, and to lay the fault on God that they perish.

But it would be a wiser, and easier course, “To be making your calling and election sure,” than be making objections from such things as you do not understand, to hinder you. You in vain expect to be carried to Heaven, or to escape Hell without diligent endeavors of your own. Had those now in Heaven, continued while they were here on earth to make such objections, so as to be by them hindered from giving up themselves to the obedience of faith, if they had never come there.

Joseph Truman, A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency (London: Printed for Robert Clavel; and are to be sold at the Sign of the Peacock in St. Pauls Church yard, 1675), 205-208.   [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; italics original; and underlining mine.]

Marbeck:

1)

PERMISSION

Of God’s permission or suffering.

We must note, that when either the Scriptures or Fathers, do seem God to be the cause of sin, this word permission is not there so to be added, as though only he suffered men to sin, and by his providence or government, wrought nothing as concerning sins. Indeed, he lets  [prevents] them not, though he can, but uses them, and shows in them his might, and not only his patience, which thing Augustine understood right well; and disputed against Julianus, he confuted that sentence, where it is said, that God suffers sin only according to patience, and proves that his might is also thereunto to be added by the words of Paul, who wrote unto the Romans: “if God by much patience has suffered vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, to show forth his anger, and to make known his might.” And undoubtedly there are many things in Holy Scipture, which cannot always be dissolved by the word of permission or patience. “For the heart of the king is said to be in the hand of the Lord, so that he inclines it, whether soever it pleases him.’” And Job testifies that it was so done as God would. But as touching sin of the first man, when yet nature was not vitiated and corrupted we grant that the cause thereof came from the will of Adam and suggestion of the Devil, and we say that God permitted it, because he might have withstood and let [prevented] it, he would not do it, but decreed to use that sin, to declare his Justice and goodness.

Pet. Mar. upon Judg, fol. 167.

Iohn Marbeck, A Book of Notes and Common Places, collected and gathered out of the works of diuers singular Witers, and brought Alphabetically in order (Imprinted at London by Thomas East, 1581), 808. [Some spelling modernized; square bracket inserts mine.]

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