Muller:

1) The printing of a second edition to this volume has not involved as many alterations and additions as the second edition of the study of theological prolegomena. Still, there are a series of changes that ought to be noted beyond the addition of a subtitle, "The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725," to all volumes in the project. In the first place, I have refined the argument of this volume in a few places and have eliminated various typographical errors that were found in the first printing of the book. I have also rearranged materials in several places and entirely recast some of the sections, particularly by the addition of collateral referencing in the apparatus–in part in order to demonstrate two of the sub-themes of the entire project, namely, the placement of the Salmurian theology within the boundaries of confessional orthodoxy and the congruence of English Reformed and Puritan theology in its dialogue with the continental Reformed. Richard A Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2002), preface to the second edition, 2:15.

2) On the one hand, the hypothetical universalism of the prior decree is juxtaposed with the particularity of the absolute covenant with the elect, emphasizing the full sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction but adumbrating its limited efficacy; on the other hand, the hypothetical universalism of the covenant is juxtaposed with the particularity of the subsequent decree, emphasizing the universality of the call of the gospel but also indicating the divine purpose underlying limited human response.

This pattern has major implications for understanding the Salmurian soteriology. It indicates a covenantal or federal continuity with Reformed predestinarianism that has been left unexamined in discussions of hypothetical universalism. Against Moltmann’s assessment, it offers an element of the Salmurian theology that presses it away from rather than toward Arminianism; and against Armstrong’s thesis, it demonstrates the point, recognized even by seventeenth-century opponents of Amyraldianism like Francis Turretin, namely, that views of Cameron and his Salmurian successors were not heresy and, like it or not, were consciously framed to stand within the confessionalism of Dort. In the specific case of Cameron’s covenantal thought, it ought to be understood not as a protest against various developments in Reformed theology but rather as an integral part of the rather fluid and variegated history of early Reformed covenantal thought. Richard Muller, “Divine Covenanters, Absolute and Conditional: John Cameron and the Early Orthodox Development of Reformed Covenant Theology,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 17 (2006), 36-37.

3) “There were also bitter battles among the Reformed – over Cocceian theology, over the espousal of Cartesian principles, and over the various teachings of the Academy of Saumur, over the soteriology of Richard Baxter, and over various responses to the Socinian denial of an essential or ad intra divine attribute of punitive justice. On none of these issues, however, did the Reformed churches rupture into separate confessional bodies or identify a particular theologically defined group as beyond the bounds of the confessions, as had been the case at the Synod of Dort. Amyraut was, after all, exonerated by several national synods in France, and the debate over his “hypothetical universalism” did not lead to the charge of heterodoxy against others, like Davenant, Martinius, and Alsted, who had, both at Dort and afterward, maintained similar lines of argument concerning the extent of Christ’s satisfaction.¹⁰⁴ The Westminster Confession was in fact written with this diversity in view, encompassing confessionally the variant Reformed views on the nature of the limitation of Christ’s satisfaction to the elect, just as it was written to be inclusive of the infra- and the supralapsarian views on predestination.¹⁰⁵ Amyraut, moreover, arguably stood in agreement with the intraconfessional adversaries like Turretin on such issues as the fundamental articles of faith.¹⁰⁶

Even when it was censured in the Formula Consensus Helvetica, the Salmurian theology was not identified as a heresy but as a problematic teaching that troubled the confessional orthodoxy of the church: the preface to the Formula specifically indentifies the faculty of Saumur as “respected foreign brethren,” who stand on the same “foundation of faith” but whose recent teachings have become a matter of grave dispute. The Formula consciously refrained from any reference to Cocceian theology, despite the desire of a few theologians to censure this variety of Reformed thought as well.¹⁰⁷ Nor, indeed, did the adoption of a modified Cartesian philosophy by thinkers like Heidanus, Burman, or Tronchin take them beyond the pale of orthodoxy. This is not to diminish the controversies or to claim that Cocceian federalism, the Salmurian theology, and the rise of Cartesian tendencies among the Reformed did not place enormous strains on orthodoxy – nor does it ignore the fact that the critical techniques of Cappel and the adoption of Cartesian principles by various Reformed thinkers pointed toward the beginning of a new era in which confessional orthodoxy would fade.” [Source: Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 1:76-77.]

4) 1″Whereas, therefore, some distinction can be made between various lines of development within Reformed orthodoxy, such as between the Swiss orthodoxy of the line of Turretin and Heidegger and the Academy of Saumur, between the northern German Reformed of Bremen or the Herborn Academy and the rather different approach of Franecker theologians in the tradition of Ames, between the Cocceian or federalist line and the Voetian approach, between the British Reformed theology of Owen and that of Baxter, or between the British variety of Reformed theology in general and the several types of Reformed teaching found on the continent, there is no justification for identifying any one of these strains of Reformed thought as outside the bounds of Reformed orthodoxy or as not evidencing the characteristics of Reformed scholasticism. Voetius and Cocceius obliged the same confessions–and Voetius could identify several lines of Reformed thought on, for example, the work of Christ, including that of Crocius and the Saumur theologians. He disagreed with these thinkers but did not set them outside of the Reformed Confessions.¹¹⁴ Turretin, similarly, indicates his disagreement with the Saumur theologians on various issues, but consistently identifies them as Reformed and as “our ministers.”¹¹⁵ Owen and Baxter acknowledged each other’s theologies as belonging to the same confessional tradition. Owen, moreover, thought highly of Cameron and Amyraut on such issues as the divine justice and the doctrine of the Trinity — at the same time that he abhorred elements of the teaching of Twisse and Rutherford, both of whom stood closer to him than to the Salmurians on the issues addressed in the Formula consensus Helvetica. All of these branches of the Reformed tradition stood within the boundaries established by the major national confessions and catechisms of the Reformed churches.” [Source: Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 1: 79-80.]

[Note: See also Muller’s other comments on Amyraut, along with other versions of non-speculative hypothetical universalism.]

_________________

¹⁰⁴Cf., e.g., John Davenant, A Dissertation on the Death of Christ, as to the Extent of its Benefits, trans., Josiah Allport (London: Hamilton, Adams and Co., 1832); also note Davenant’s On the Controversy among the French Divines of the Reformed Church, concerning the Gracious and Saving Will of God toward Men, in ibid., pp. 561-569, where Davenant indicates his differences with Cameron.

¹⁰⁵ See Benjamin B. Warfield, The Westminster Assembly and its Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931; repr. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981), p. 56.

¹⁰⁶Moyse Amyraut, De mysterio trinitatis, deque vocibus ac Phrasibus quibus tam Scriptura quam apud Patres explicatur, Dissertatio, septem partibus absoluta (Saumur: Isaac Desbordes, 1661), pars I (pp.3-5); see below, 9.1 (A.2; B.2) and see the description of the treatise in PRRD IV, 2.2 (D.2). Also note Amyraut, A Treatise Concerning Religions, in Refutation of the Opinion which accounts all Indifferent. Wherein is also evinc’d the Necessity of a particular Revelation and the Verity and preeminence of the Christian Religion (London: M. Simons, 1660).

¹⁰⁷Formula Consensus Helvetica, praefatio, in Niemeyer, Collectio confessionum, II, p. 730. Also see Martin I. Klauber, “The Helvetic Consensus Formula (1675): An Introduction and Translation,” in Trinity Journal, 11 (Spring 1990), pp. 103-123 (a useful history which, unfortunately omits the preface of the Formula from its translation); and note the remarks of Schaff in Creeds of Christendom, I, p. 486.

¹¹⁴On Voetius’ and Cocceius’ confessionality, see in particular the approbatie of both the Utrecht and Leiden faculties in Zacharias Ursinus Schat-Boeck der Verklarigen over den Nederlandtschen Catechismus, uyt de Latijnshe Lessen van Dr. Zacharias Ursinus, op-gemaecht van Dr. David Paraeus, vertaelt, ende met Tafelen, &c. Verlicht, door Dr. Festus Hommius, nu van nieuws oversein … door Johannes Spiljardus, 2 parts (Amsterdam: Johannes van Revensteyn, 1664), fol. A4, r.-v.; and on Voetius approach to Crocius and Saumur, see his Problematum de merito Christi, pars secunda, in Sel. Disp., II, p. 252.

¹¹⁵Turretin, Inst. theol. elencticae, IV.xvii.4; XII.vi.3; XIV.xiv.6. [That is: Institutes, 1:395-6; 2:206; 2:457-458.]

Turretin:

The Reprobate not denied all of God’s Grace:

VI. The negative act includes two: both preterition, by which in the election of some to glory as well as to grace, he neglected and slighted others (which is evident from the event of election); and negative desertion, by which he left them in the corrupt mass and in their misery. However this is so to be understood: ( that the are not excepted from the laws of common providence, but remain subject to them; nor are they immediately deprived of all God’s favor [Latin: gratia], but only of the saving and a vivifying (which is the fruit of election)… Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:381.

Common grace and temporary faith:

II. The reasons are (1) saving faith differs from temporary faith in origin and foundation. The former flows from the special grace of election when it is called “the faith of the elect” (Tit. 1:l); which is given only to those who are called according to his purpose (kata prothesin), Rom.8:28) and were ordained to eternal life (Acts 13:48). On the contrary, the latter depends upon common grace which bestows even on the reprobate certain blessings: not only external and temporal, but also spiritual and initial gifts (although not saving) as a testification of a certain general love and to increase their guilt on the supposition of their contumacy. Hence Paul , speaking of the apostasy of Hymenaeus and Philetus, says, “Nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure” (2 Tim. 2:19), i.e., not on this account does the faith of true believers waver, being built upon the immovable foundation of the election of God. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:588.

Grace taken away from Saul:

Yea, there are many things from which his penitence and perseverance can be inferred. (1) From the memorable promise made to David concerning him (2 S. 7:14, 15), as the type of Christ, which threatens him sinning with stripes, but does not take away grace (contrary to what was done to Saul). Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology 2:609.

Sufficient Grace given to the Reprobate:

Distinction between
sufficient and
efficient grace.

I. Among the various distinctions of the grace employed in calling, that is the most common by which it is distributed into sufficient and efficacious (which gave rise to this question). Something must be premised concerning it that it may be evident in what sense it is proposed by our opponents and rejected by us, as in a sound sense it can be admitted by us.

In what sense it
can be admitted.

IV. Still we do not deny that in a certain sense the division can be admitted if a sufficiency, not absolute and simple is meant, but a relative sufficiency both with regard to external means and internal illumination for a knowledge of the truth and temporary faith (Heb. 10:26; Lk. 8:13) and for conviction and inexcusability (anapologian, Jn. 15:22). But for conversion, we recognize no sufficient grace which is not equally efficacious.

Statement of the
question.

V. The question does not concern any kind of grace or help which can obtain in nature as well as in grace. For it is certain that God has nowhere left himself without excuse (amartyron) towards men in whatever state. Nor can it be denied that a convincing and coercing light can often be granted to the heathen by which they are restrained from many wickednesses and enormous crimes; and that the reprobate mingled with the elect are favored with the external preaching of the word and sometimes an internal illumination of mind by which they mourn over their sins and congratulate themselves at least for a time concerning the word admitted, as appears in the temporary. But the question here concerns salutary help and grace, sufficient for conversion.  Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2:510 and 511.

Special Grace effects civic virtues:

FIFTH QUESTION: VIRTUES OF THE HEATHEN

Whether the virtues of the heathen were good works from which the power of free will to good can be inferred. We deny against the papists.

Occasion of the question

I. This question arises from the preceding. In order to the show that strength for good survives to the free will in a question. state of sin, the papists use the common example of the heathen who strove after virtue above others or were distinguished for illustrious deeds (whose virtues they deny to have been sins, deserving the disapprobation of God, but rather consider good works, meriting favor). Thus the Council of Trent: “Whoever says that all works done before justification, in whatever way done, are truly sins, or deserve the hatred of God, or that the more earnestly one strives to dispose himself to grace, so much the more seriously he sins, let him be anathema” (Session 6, Canon 7, Schroeder, p. 43). Bellamine endeavors to prove “that man can without faith, with special help and even without it, perform some moral good, if no temptation presses (“De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,” 5.9, 10 in Opera [1858], 4:391-98).

II. However we say two things. First, although we confess that some good can be found in these actions (as to the external honesty of the act commanded by God and which therefore cannot but be good), still we deny that they can be called properly and univocally good works as to the truth of the thing and mode of operation (to wit, internal rectitude of heart and intention of the end). We assert with Augustine that they were nothing but “splendid sins.” Second, whatever good or less evil they performed, was not owing to their own strength, but to God’s special help.

III. The former may easily be gathered from what has been already said. Since it has been shown that the inability (adynamian) of the sinner to good is total and Scripture ascribes it to all without exception, it is evident that no works truly good can be performed by the unrenewed man.

IV. This is still further strengthened by the conditions of a good work. Three things are altogether required for a good work. First, on the part of the principle, that it proceed from a heart purified by faith (Acts 15:9), because whatever is not of faith is sin (Rom. 14:23) and is displeasing to God (Heb. 11:6); for “unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure; but even their mind and conscience is defiled (Tit. 13). Second, on the part of the form or mode, that it be done according to the law of God, not only in the external work, but especially with the internal obedience of the heart which the spiritual law of God requires from sinners (Rom. 7:14). (3) On the part of the end, that it be done to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31). It is certain that the virtues of the heathen are defective in these three particulars. For in reference to the principle, they could not proceed from faith or a clean heart (of which they were destitute); so as to the mode, they had no internal and spiritual obedience; and as to the end, no direction to the glory of God (since they struggled for their own advancement and glory). Now a good work is from an entire cause, but an evil work from even a single defect.

V. The Athenians are said to “worship (eusebein) the,unknown God” (Acts 17:23). Not as if with a true and saving worship they adored the true God, but according to opinion (kata doxan) because they supposed they offered a true worship to the true God although unknown. Thus by an admirable accommodation (synkatabasin), the apostle strove to gain them over to Christ by tempering his rebuke with praise. He did not simply call them “too superstitious” (deisidaimonesterous), but “as too superstitious” (hos deisidaimonesterous) that he might not seem too harsh. Thus he does not say simply “ye worship” (eusebeite), but “ye ignorantly worship” (agnoountes eusebeite) to prove the vanity of their worship, that no one might accuse him of flattery.

VI. As the moral actions of the heathen are not sins per se (and as to substance of the work), but by accident (and as to the mode of operation) in the essential conditions (on account of the various defects mentioned before); not on that account is it better to omit than to perform them, lest we sin (but the defects should rather be corrected and supplied). What are of themselves sins forbidden of God should be omitted; but what are only accidentally such from some defect of circumstances should not be omitted, but corrected.

VII. Earthly reward does not prove true virtue and a good work because it is only of perishable things which God bestows promiscuously upon the reprobate and the elect. This is a remarkable proof of the divine justice, to teach how much true piety pleases him when he not only remunerates true virtues by eternal rewards, but also the images of virtues by temporal blessings not on account of the adhering depravity, but on account of the apparent external good (in order that even unbelievers may have nothing to complain of concerning the justice of God).

VIII. Since the humiliation of Ahab (1 K. 21:27,28) was dissembled and hypocritical (from fear of punishment rather than from love of virtue), it could not per se be pleasing to God. Nor did God grant to him an absolute remission of the punishment before threatened, but only some delay; not in order to testify that the external humiliation of the wicked king was accepted by him, but to show to others what is to be expected by one seriously and heartily repenting. The repentance of the Ninevites cannot be reckoned among the works of the heathen, since they are said to have repented at the word of God and from the operation of faith in God (which is expressly ascribed to them, Jn. 35; Mt. 12:41).

IX. Whatever, moreover, was done by the Gentiles in reference to this subject (by which they were made no better than others, but at least less evil) does not prove remaining strength for good in their free will because not even this could be done without God’s special help. If some were more observant than others of justice and goodness; if some excelled in learning, genius, fortitude, justice and temperance and other virtues (as among them Aristides was celebrated for justice; Scipio for continence; Socrates for wisdom; Alexander for bravery; others for other virtues), these are not to be ascribed to their better nature, but are to be recognized as the gifts of God who gives some over to their own lusts, but restrains the depravity of others from breaking forth. Nor were the heathen themselves ignorant of this, who acknowledged that “virtues are inspired only by the divine breath,” and “there never was a great man without divine inspiration” as Plato frequently says and Cicero after him (cf. Cicero, De Republics 3.3 and 6.8 [Loeb, 16:186-87, 260-61; De Natura Deorum 2.167 [Loeb, 19:282-831). Reason itself also persuades us. For why should the sons of heroes be so degenerate? Why should twins be so unlike? Why should those enjoying the best education become savage beasts? The cause, therefore, of this difference is to be sought only in the providence of God. While it permits some to sink with impunity into every enormity, it restrains and represses others as with a bit that they may not rush into the same unbridled license with others. Hence they are not common gifts of nature, but special graces of God dispensed variously to men (inasmuch as he knows that it conduces to the preservation of the universe).

X. Whatever knowledge of God is found in the heathen cannot be considered a good work because if they confess with the mouth, they deny him in their works. They had a knowledge of God, but held the truth in unrighteousness, neither glorified him as God (i.e., they did not truly know him). This was the height of their crime-being unwilling to acknowledge him of whom they could not be ignorant, and forming for themselves innumerable gods in place of the one God (whom they could know from his works). Well, therefore, are they called atheists by the apostle (Eph. 2:12) with their own crowd of gods because they were ignorant of the existence of the true God and of his will towards us. So the Lord gave them indeed a slight taste of his divinity that they might not offer ignorance as an excuse. He has-driven them at times to say some things by the confession of which they themselves might be convicted; but they so saw what they saw as by no means to be directed by the sight to the truth, much less to attain it. It is like the flashing of lightning at night, surrounded by which the traveller sees far and wide for a moment, but so evanescent that he is again involved in the darkness of night before he can move a step-so far is he from being prospered in his journey by such a help.

XI: fhis was the constant opinion of Augustine which he often established against the Pelagians: “True virtue exists in no one who is not righteous; and no one is truly righteous who does not live by faith. Moreover, who of those who wish to be considered Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or even thou alone perhaps among them, would say that the just man is enslaved by the devil?” (Against Julian 4.3 [I?] [FC 35:181; PL 44.7451). And elsewhere: “However highly the works of unbelievers may be extolled, everything which is not of faith, is sin” (On the Proceedings of Pelagius 34 [NPNFl, 5:198-99; PL 44.3411). So Prosper, a disciple of Augustine: “Without the worship of the true God, even what seems virtue is sin, nor can anyone please God without God; and he who does not please God, whom does he please except himself and Satan” (The Call of All Nations 1.7″ [ACW 14:34; PL 51.653-541). And in his precious little book Camn de Ingratis: “Every virtuous deed is a sin, unless it rises from the seed of true faith; it becomes a source of guilt, and its barren glory heaps up punishment for itself” (16.407-409 [trans. C.T. Huegelmeyer, 19621, pp. 66-67; PL 51.117). Whoever wishes more on this question should consult Jansen Augustinus where this entire argument is fully and satisfactorily discussed (‘De statu naturae lapsae,” 3,4 [164011964], pp. 429-678).

XII. Now this is the nature of free will in a state of sin. But how it is constituted in the moment of calling and in the progress of sanctification will be treated of in the proper place (with the favor of God). May the Father of mercies grant that, seriously acknowledging our nothingness (oudeneian) and inability (adynamian), we may learn to depend entirely upon him and to ascribe all our salvation to his grace, saying with the psalmist, “Not unto us, 0 Lord, but unto thy name be all the glory” (Ps. 115:l). Amen. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:683-685.

On Aristides, c.f., Calvin, On love to the reprobate or specific reprobates, entry #4; and on “special grace,” see Calvin on Common and Special Grace.

[To be continued]

Turrretin:

VI, Now as this calling springs from a threefold principle, so it obtains a threefold end. (1) It springs from the authority of a legislator who has the right to prescribe to man his duty. (2) It springs from the goodness and grace of a Lord who does not cease to bless the creature (although unworthy and guilty) by showing him the way of salvation and showering upon him various blessings. (3) It springs from the justice of a Judge who wishes to convict the stubborn and rebellious and to render them without excuse. Hence a threefold end flows. The first is the prescription of duty that he may know what God demands from him and what he owes to him (namely, to believe and repent). The second is the promise of blessing on the condition that he knows what God has determined to give to believers and penitents. The third is the detection of the wickedness of the heart (Lk. 2:35) and its inexcusability (Jn. 15:22), its stubbornness being supposed, so that both the man himself in his conscience and others may really know that the vengeance of God against that servant is just (who while he knows his master’s will and ought to do it, still neither does nor wishes to do it, Lk. 12:47). Turretin, Institutes, 2:505.

C.f., Turretin on God’s desire.

a’ Brakel:

1) Grace can be defined as being a perfection of God’s character which has no relationship to an object that is, who God was and would be even if there were no creature; namely, a compassionate God who would be capable of manifesting His benevolence to creatures apart from any merit. Grace can also be considered relative to creatures in the manifestation of undeserved benevolence. Concerning the grace of God we distinguish between grace as a gracious gift, or grace or gracious receipt. Gratia gratis dans (grace as a gracious gift) relates to God’s perfection as being the fountain from which all His benefits issue forth. “For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on Him, but also to suffer for His sake” (Phil. 1:29)! “There is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works” (Rom. 11:5-6); “Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 3:24). Gratia gratis data (grace as a gracious receipt), relates to the received benefits themselves. This is true for common grace of which unconverted persons are the recipients to which Jude referred, “Ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness” (Jude 4). This is also true for saving grace which is frequently referred to as the gifts of grace (cf. Rom. 5:15-16; 6:23; 11:29). The following texts speak of this: “Through the grace given unto me” (Rom. 12:3); “That ye might have a second benefit” (2 Cor. 1:15);”For this is thank worthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully” (1 Pet. 2:19). Both perspectives of grace, that is, grace as a gracious gift and grace as a gracious receipt, are often conjoined in the Pauline benedictions. “Grace to you and peace from God our Father” (Rom. 1:7); “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you” (1 Cor. 16:23). Wihlemus a’ Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, trans., by Bartel Elshout, (Ligonier, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publ., 1992), 1:124-125.

2) Evasive Argument: God bestows external blessings upon many because of correct, external behavior. This can be observed in Ahab, the ungodly king of Israel. “Seest thou Ahab humbleth himself before me? Because be humbleth himself before me, I will not bring the evil in his days: but in his son’s days will I bring the evil upon him.

Answer: It is one thing to maintain that God, by his common grace and in certain situations, bestows external blessings upon the ungodly. This we readily admit, for, “The LORD is good to all: and His tender mercies are over all His works” (Psa. 145:9). Wihlemus a’ Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, trans., by Bartel Elshout, (Ligonier, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publ., 1992), 1:459.

3) (1) There must be a distinction between the gift of grace and the given grace. The gift of grace is the goodness of God, the fountain from whom proceeds all the good which a man receives. Given grace refers to the benefits which man receives, has, and possesses. Concerning the gift of grace we read, “For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on Him, but also to suffer for His sake” (Phil. 1:29). Concerning given grace we read, “For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully” ( 1 Pet. 2:19).

(2) Grace is either common or special. God bestows common grace upon all men by granting them temporal benefits. “Nethertheless He left not himself without witness, in that He did good, and gave us rain from heaven” (Acts 14:17). To this grace also belongs all the good which God bestows all who are called, by giving them the Word–the means unto repentance and salvation. “For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men” (Titus 2:11). In addition to this, God generally gives illumination, historical faith, convictions, and inner persuasions to almost become a Christian (cf. Heb. 6:4-6). Wihlemus a’ Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, trans., by Bartel Elshout, (Ligonier, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publ., 1992), 2:215.