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Calvin and Calvinism
26
Aug

Aquinas: God Does Not Will Evil

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism   in Divine Permission of Sin

Aquinas:

1)

Article 9. Whether God wills evils?

Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): “Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.” Therefore God wills evil things.

Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): “Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): “Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.” But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Objection 3. Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God’s will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): “No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.” Therefore it is not by God’s will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.

I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (5, 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

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26
Aug

Bullinger: God Does Not Will Evil

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism   in Divine Permission of Sin

Bullinger:

Furthermore as the wise man gives counsel: seek not or search not for things that are greater & harder then thou art able to do. And such things as are commanded thee of God, those devoutly consider of, and be not curious in many of his works, for it is not needful that thou should behold his secrets with thy eyes. For many have been deceived and confounded through their own vain persuasion. And he that loves danger shall perish therein. Wherefore the best & plainest way is to believe that God is just, and to confess that he wills not that which is evil, much less does evil. For when as he forbad man the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he would not doubtless that man should be eating transgress the law and due.

For David says: “Thou art not that God whom wickedness pleases, and with whom the evil are familiar, thou hatest all them that work evil.” And Solomon says that God made man good, but men entangle themselves with infinite questions: and the same Solomon says, God neither made death nor destruction, neither is delighted with the death of the living. For God created man unto immortality, and made him after his own image, but through the envy of the devil death entered into the world.

But if these and other such like places of Holy Scripture come to any man’s remembrance, namely that GOD hardens the hearts, blinds the eyes, gives up unto a reprobate mind &c., the Christian reader must consider that God does all things justly, and that he does wrong to no man. Saint Paul in this controversy puts back men’s objections in these words, “what art though O man that reasonest with God? shall the work say to the workman that made it, ‘why hast thou made me so?’” As though it were not lawful for the Potter of the same lump of clay to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? And David says: “God is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works.”

Henry Bullinger, Common Places of Christian Religion, (Imprinted at London by Tho. East, and H. Middleton, for George Byshop, 1572), 48-49.

Question 23. Predestination

Article 1. Whether men are predestined by God?

Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s predestination is done away.

Objection 2. Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (22, 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.

Objection 3. Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the “purpose to take pity [miserendi]” [See 22, 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.

Objection 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 2:12): “Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God.” Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Romans 8:30): “Whom He predestined, them He also called.”

I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (22, 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Question 12, Article 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

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Bullinger:

We must not here carefully and curiously search and dispute, whether all men be drawn by God, or whether faith be given only to a few? And albeit thou see that all men believe not, & even those which daily hear the word of God to withstand it, yet thou must not despair nor say: these therefore do not believe (the which indeed is true) because they are not of the number of the sheep of Christ, and therefore peradventure I am not elected also, nor shall be endued with faith by God, what shall it then profit me to hear sermons? But rather we must comfort ourselves with the most sweet promises of God’s hand. For the Lord says, “I will not the death of a sinner, but that he be turned and live” [Ezek. 18.]. And Peter says, “that God is patient toward us, and would not  have that any man should perish, but that all should repent” [ 2 Pet. 3.]. And Paul says, the Scripture says, “everyone that believes in him, shall not be ashamed. For there is no distinction, either of Jew or Greek.  For there is one Lord of all, rich unto all that call upon him” [Rom. 10.]. Therefore let every man be of good hope, that God in time, will give faith unto him also.

Henry Bullinger, Common Places of Christian Religion, (Imprinted at London by Tho. East, and H. Middleton, for George Byshop, 1572), 144-145.

22
Aug

Zwingli on God’s New Covenant with the Human Race

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism   in God who Covenants

Zwingli:

And the reason why he made the promise was none other than because of blessedness could not come to us, however much we toiled and sweated, while the fall of the first parent had not been atoned for. But when Christ, slain for us, appeased the divine justice and become the only approach to God, God entered into a new covenant with the human race, not new in the sense that he had only just discovered this remedy, but because he applied it at the right moment, having prepared it long before.

Exposition and Basis of the Conclusions or Articles Published by Huldrych Zwingli,  (PA: Pickwick Publications, 1984)  2:224.