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Letham:

God’s Decree (WCF 3-5; LC 12-20)

Morris comments accurately what these chapters follow naturally from what has gone before, particularly in view of the Arminian controversy that had brought the decrees of God into dispute.1 God’s plans must have been formed from eternity, he agrees, and must Include all things and events; moreover, his supreme will carries them into effect.2 By placing the decree of God close to the beginning of the Confession, the divines signaled that theology is to be a God–centered enterprise. This is in keeping with the great ecumenical creeds, which focus on God the Holy Trinity, the work of Christ, and the church and sacraments.3 ‘This placement was definitely not a principle from which the rest of theology was logically deduced; we discussed the anachronistic nature of this now-discredited argument in chapter 6. The Assembly’s stress on God’s decree was greatly needed at a time of threatening instability, such as England was in during the 1640s. Nothing was certain. The institutions of state were in turmoil, the country was at war with itself, and no legal church existed. The foundations were shaken to their core. Yet in the midst of all this, God was working out his sovereign purposes to his glory and the good of his elect people. In the end, his kingdom would triumph, his church would be preserved, and his elect would be brought home to glory.

The Westminster Confession of Faith refers to the decree of God in the singular, while the Catechisms have the plural. Discussion occurred in the Assembly on this question. There was opposition to the Arminian division into separate decrees. Others raised the question of whether a commitment on such a matter should be put into a confession of faith. Morris thinks of the decrees–as the covenants–as many to our apprehension, while one in the sight of God.4 The single nature of the decree, he suggests, fosters the idea that its execution is irresistible; it is balanced by chapter 5 on providence, where God is said to govern ordinarily in accordance with the nature of second causes, which takes account of the introduction and permission of sin.5

Debates on chapter 3, including the proof texts, occupied parts of twenty days and were “extremely searching and very comprehensive.”6 Robert Baillie referred to “long and tough debates.”7 The committee report followed the Irish Articles closely. Debate focused on two main issues. The first and relatively less important was the question of God’s permitting the fall of man. It had to do with whether, as the committee reported, it happened by “the same decree” as that of election, and, if so, whether the phrase should be included in the Confession. Debate occupied two sessions (S520 M 20.10.45 and S521 TU 21.10.45).8 Lazarus Seaman urged its inclusion; “great debate” would follow its omission, since the Arminians distinguish the decrees and from this arises all their “odious doctrine.” Rutherford, on the other hand, urged caution. While all agree that God decrees both the end and the means, and while it is probably one decree, it is doubtful whether such a statement should be included in a confession of faith, he urged. Certainly, if a proof was produced to establish the point, he believed the Assembly would be glad to hear it. Whitaker significantly (in view of the debate of the next few days) pointed out that “our conceptions arc very various about the decrees,” yet he did not know why the phrase should be left out, since it is the same decree in reference to time, since they an: all “simull & semel.” Gillespie wanted the freedom of each man to “enjoy his own sense.” Reynolds argued strongly against inclusion: “Let us not put in disputes & scholasticall things into a confession of faith,” Besides, he added, from our perspective they are different decrees. Seaman continued to be adamant for inclusion, again citing the Remonstrants for making two decrees concerning election. While Calamy supported Reynolds (“I desire that nothing be put”), Palmer to the contrary insisted that “it will be worse to leave it out.” Meanwhile Gillespie pointed out that in the order of nature God’s ordaining man to glory preceded his decree to permit the fall. In the end, the phrase was left out. However, the chapter avoids any idea that these decrees are separable by casting its title in the singular–“Of God’s eternal decree”–and reaffirming the point in 3.3 by viewing both predestination to life and foreordination to death as aspects of this one “decree.”9 However, LC 12 speaks of God’s decrees in the plural, as eternal acts of God’s will. It could be argued that the: plural signifies the variety of things decreed by God, while the singular refers to the unity of his purpose, but there is no evidence that this is how the Assembly saw it. wisely comments that the Assembly was after a generic Calvinism rather than any particular variety of it.10

The most significant differences emerged during the debate on the statement, “Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only” (WCF 3.6). The most vivid discussion occurred in S522 W 22.10.45 through S524 I; 24. 10.45,11 although debates continued until S3.1 0.45.12 The leading opponent of the clause was Calamy. His position, as accurately describes it, was hypothetical universalism. In S522 W 22.10.45, he insisted:

I am farre from universall Redemption in the Arminian sence, but that that [sic] I hould is in the sence of our devines in the sinod of Dort; that Christ did pay a price for all, absolute for the elect, conditionall for the reprobate, in case they doe beleive; that all men should be salvabiles, non obstante lapsu Adami; that Jesus Christ did not only dy sufficiently for all, but God did intend in giving of Christ & Christ in giving hin1selfe did intend to put all men in a state of salvation in case they doe beleive.13

Reynolds was incredulous that Calamy was not differing from Arminius and the Remonstrants, since his proposal supposed that salvation was conditional on a response they could not perform and which God never intended to give them. However, Calamy proceeded to distinguish his position from Arminianism: Arminians say that Christ paid a price placing all in an equal state of salvation. “They say Christ did not purchase any impetration.” Calamy insisted his views “doth neither intrude upon either [the] doctrine of speciall election or speciall grace.” His point was that Arminianism asserted that Christ simply suffered; all people are in a potentially salvable situation, so that any who believe will be saved. In contrast, he himself believed that Christ’s death saves his elect and grants a conditional possibility of salvation to the rest. Seaman, supporting Calamy, argued that the views of the Remonstrants were irrelevant; what mattered was the truth or falsity of the case. Calamy, he insisted, was talking not of a salvability in relation to man, but to God; he has so far reconciled himself to the world that he would have mercy on whom he would have mercy. Palmer probed closely, wanting to know whether Calamy understood this of all people. Calamy’s rather limp reply was “de adultis” (of adults).

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The following is a review by Richard Muller on Jonathan Moore’s book English Hypothetical Universalism: John Preston and the Softening of Reformed Theology. Moore is fairly good in his examination of Preston, Ussher and Davenant, but he dreadfully mischaracterises Kimedoncius, Vermigli, and others.

Muller:

This volume offers a detailed and finely argued exposition of the view of redemption expressed by John Preston both in his various writings and in his testimony at the York Conference in 1626. Where Moore clearly advances the discussion of both the York Conference itself and of early seventeenth-century British theology is in his clear identification of Preston’s teaching, together with that of several major contemporaries (notably John Davenant and James Ussher), as a form of hypothetical universalism, namely, the doctrine that Christ so died for the sins of the human race that, if all would believe, all would be saved. What Moore nicely shows is that the Reformed side of the debate was somewhat variegated, including hypothetical universalists as well as those who denied universal redemption and that previous analysis of the theological debates in early seventeenth-century England too simplistically identified the parties in debate as either Arminian or Calvinist. In effect, Moore resuscitates an issue recognized in the seventeenth century by Davenant, Baxter, and others, and noted with reference to the Westminster Assembly by Alexander Mitchell that there was an indigenous hypothetical universalism in British Reformed theology. Moore’s study, however, for all its excellent work on Preston and the York Conference, embodies two significant problems concerning perspective on and context of the materials examined. First, there is an underlying systematizing thread in the argument of the book that leads to claims that do not ultimately bear scrutiny concerning the interconnection of specific doctrinal formulations. Particularly in his review of William Perkins’ doctrine, Moore contends that Perkins’ supralapsarian predestinarianism together with his federalism “drives” him toward the conclusion of particular redemption, namely that the all-sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction yields no hypothetical offer of salvation to all people. However, particularism was hardly the exclusive characteristic of supralapsarian federalists. There is also a clearly particularist formulation concerning Christ’s satisfaction in the work of Perkins’ contemporary, Gulielmus Bucanus, who tended toward an infralapsarian doctrine of predestination and was no federalist. Similarly, a later Reformed orthodox thinker such as Turretin, a convinced infralapsarian and, although party to the two-covenant schema but not a federal theologian in the strict sense of the term, taught a clearly prticularistic doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction.

Moore also underestimates the presence of non-Amyraldian or non-speculative forms of hypothetical universalism in the Reformed tradition as a whole and thereby, in the opinion of this reviewer, misconstrues Preston’s position as a “softening” of Reformed theology rather than as a continuation of one trajectory of Reformed thought that had been present from the early sixteenth century onward. Clear statements of nonspeculative hypothetical universalism can be found (as Davenant recognized) in Heinrich Bullinger’s Decades and commentary on the Apocalypse, in Wolfgang Musculus’ Loci communes, in Ursinus’ catechetical lectures, and in Zanchi’s Tractatus de praedestinatione sanctorum, among other places. In addition, the Canons of Dort, in affirming the standard distinction of a sufficiency of Christ’s death for all and its efficiency for the elect, actually refrain from canonizing either the early form of hypothetical universalism or the assumption that Christ’s sufficiency serves only to leave the nonelect without excuse. Although Moore can cite statements from the York conference that Dort “either apertly or covertly denied the universality of man’s redemption” (156), it remains that various of the signatories of the Canons were hypothetical universalistsnot only the English delegation (Carleton, Davenant, Ward, Goad, and Hall) but also the [sic] some of the delegates from Bremen and Nassau (Martinius, Crocius, and Alsted)–that Carleton and the other delegates continued to affirm the doctrinal points of Dort while distancing themselves from the church discipline of the Belgic Confession, and that in the course of seventeenth-century debate even the Amyraldians were able to argue that their teaching did not run contrary to the Canons. In other words, the nonspeculative, non-Amyraldian form of hypothetical universalism was new in neither the decades after Dort nor a “softening” of the tradition: The views of Davenant, Ussher, and Preston followed out a resident trajectory long recognized as orthodox among the Reformed.

In sum, this is a significant study of the theology of John Preston and of the importance of a form of hypothetical universalism in the Puritan and English Reformed theology of the early seventeenth century, but its conclusions need to be set into and somewhat tempered by a sense of the broader context and multiple streams of theology in the Reformed tradition.

English Hypothetical Universalism: John Preston and the Softening of Reformed Theology,” by Jonathan D. Moore. Reviewed by Richard A Muller, Calvin Theological Journal, 43 (2008), 149-150.

Credit to Steven Wedgeworth for the find.

Twisse:

1) And In the stating of this thesis we have a miserable confusion, as if these men delighted to fish in troubled waters. For when we say Christ dyed for us, our meaning is that Christ dyed for our good, and a benefite redoundes unto us by the deathe of Christ, now, it may be, there are diverse benefites redounding unto us by the deathe of Christ, and they of so different nature, that, in respect of some, wee spare not to professe, that Christ dyed for all, and in respect of others, the Arminians themselves are so farre from granting that he dyed to obteyn any such benefite for all, as that they utterly deny them to be any benefites at redounding to any by the deathe of Christ. Though we willingly acknowledge them to be benefites redounding to us by the death of Christ, albeit not redounding unto all, but only God’s elect. Now if this be true, is it not a proper course which this author takes in confounding things so extreamely different? And that it is so as I have sayde, I now proceede to shewe in this manner. We say, that pardon of sinne and salvation of soules are benefites purchased by the deathe of Christ, to be enjoyed by men, but how? not absolutely, but conditionally, to witt, in case they believe, and only in case they believe. For like as God doth not conferre these on any of ripe yeares vnles they believe, so Christ hath not merited that they should be conferred on any but such as believe. And accordingly professe that Christ dyed for all, that is, to obteyne pardon of sinne and salvation of soule for all, but how? not absolutely whether they believe or no, but only conditionally, to witt provided they doe believe in Christ. So that we willingly professe, that Christ had both a full intention of his owne, and commandment of his Father to make a propitiation for the sinnes of the whole world, so farre as therby to procure both pardon of sinne and salvation of soule to all that doe believe, and to none other being of ripe yeares, according to that Rom. 3:24. we are justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. v. 25. Whome God hath sett forth to be a propitiation (or reconciliation) through faith in his blood. But we further say, that there are other benefites redounding to us by the death of Christ, to witt, the grace of faith and of repentance. For like as these are the gifts of God wrought in us by his holy Spirit, so they are wrought in us for Christ his sake, according to that of the Apostle, praying for the Hebrewes, namely that God will make them perfect to every good worke, working in them that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Now, as touching these benefites, we willingly professe, that Christ dyed not for all, that is, he dyed not to obtaine the grace of faith and repentance for all, but only for God’s elect; In as much as these graces are bestowed by God, not conditionally, least so grace should be given according to mens workes, but absolutely, And if Christ dyed to obteyne these for all absolutely, it would follow here hence that all should believe and repent and consequently all shoulde be saved.   William Twisse, The Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles, Preface, pp. 15-17

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8
Nov

Hypothetical and Universal Covenant of Grace: An Early Source

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism   in God who Covenants

1) –In and for itself then it was the entire fallen race of man which God made the object of His gracious revelation, when He resolved to present to humanity as a gift of grace the lie which it had forfeited. This is the eternal testament of the Father, “the immutable will of God to give an inheritance to the believing”, and the eternal decree of the Father Himself, according to which He has promised the whole of humanity, so far as it accepts His grace with penitence and trust, righteousness and eternal life as an inalienable inheritance of grace.

Note the essentially universalistic basis upon which the idea of the covenant of grace rests. COCCEIUS introduces his exposition of the doctrine of the covenant of Grace (De foed. IV, 74), by declaring that of course God might at once have punished man with all evils. But the height of wisdom and power aided Him in His glorious plan for exercising mercy on man. Accordingly He resolved (1) to unfold His inexpressible mercy “in vessels of mercy”, and (2) “to employ an ineffable kindness and longsuffering towards the entire human race”.

–Similarly EGLIN (De foed. grat. 40): The “impelling cause of the covenant of grace” is the “love of God for the world, i.e. for the whole human race, which by the act of Satan had fallen into misery”. For this “common lapse” of the human race God had ordained in Christ a “common remedy.” Now a distinction must be drawn between “God’s general decree” and the “particular decree of election“. The former is (43) the “covenant of grace including the whole human race and by the counsel of His will planning for all indefinitely in Adam, on condition that man should repent and believe.” The latter on the contrary is the covenant according to which God “Himself graciously fulfills the condition required in those whom He has assigned to Christ from eternity”. As regards the former (44) the “promise is general by an outward calling“; as regards the latter we can only speak of an “effective application of the promise in accordance with the special promise of grace”.

Source: Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 371-372.

2) –OLEVIAN (30 f.): “The heavenly Father resolved so to execute the decree of His love as to satisfy perfect justice. As it is essential to Himself He can no more deny it than He can deny Himself. So in the actual execution of the righteousness the greatness and strength of His love in the Son and of His perpetual mercy sworn from the beginning had to shine fort”. Even in the Redeemer’s work of reconciliation its essentially universalistic side must be acknowledged. Hence EGLIN (54) declares that it must not be said that God did not send His Son into the world “to be the common Saviour of the whole world, conditionally set forth”. Only, the circumstance that not all attain to faith and blessedness must not give rise to the view, that “in proposing a common remedy” God had failed of His purpose (51): (i) “The things which. He decreed as ex hypothesi and conditionally must be estimated conditionally and (2) “in those whom (the Father) willed to give to Christ, fulfilled the requisite condition gratuitously”. But above all it must be insisted that it is not true to say that Christ accomplished nothing for the reprobate: “he broke and abolished the whole lapse of Adam, the whole curse of the whole law, in short, the one same enemy of all, Satan”. Undoubtedly therefore we may say (63) with Scripture, that “as regards all-suffciency of merit Christ made purchase even for the reprobate, and even for them paid the lutron of death in full considered by itself, although it is not applied to them by the saving attraction of faith”.

Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 373.

3) The single ground of the covenant of grace is God’s compassionate love for all men and the free Trinitarian counsel of God. EGLIN (De foed. grat., 40): “The impulsive cause of the covenant of grace has been, God’s love for the world, that is, for the entire human race fallen into misery by Satan’s cunning”

Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 384. Full name: Raphaelis Eglini Iconi Tigurini (Zurich, Marburg) c1614.

[Cf., Zwingli and Bullinger, here.]

Baxter:

2. About proving Christianity by Argument; of which I have heard from none since I published my papers against Infidelity. 3. About the universality of redemption: and 4. About the controversies of this book.

For the former of these last I find a reverend learned man endeavoring to load me with some note of singularity, I mean Dr Ludovicius Molinæus, in his Preface to his Parænesis ad ædificatores Imperii in Imperio (a book that has much learning, and more truth than is fairly used, the face of it being written to frown upon them that own it, and parties wronged even where truth is defended, though through the unhappiness of the distinctions oft clouded when it seems to explicated, and through–I know not what, the controversy seldom truly stated). This learned man has thought it meet, for the disgracing of Amyraldus, by the smallness of his success to mention me thus, as his only proselyte in England [Forsan eo consilio Amyraldus cudit suam Methodum, ut Lutherans subpalparet, & gratiam apud eos iniret, sperans per eam Lutheranos reconciliatum iri Calvinistis: sed revera dum falsam studet iniri gratiam, nulli parti eo nomine gratus est, nec ulla parte ha ret apud lutheranos, ut censet Calovius Clarissimus Wittenergæ Theologus; nec devincit sibi Anglos aut Belgas: In Belgio enim nulli nisi Arminiano; in Anglia uni Baxtero, apprime placet ejus Methodus] And three leaves later, [Sed in solatium Dallæo, ut Amyraldus Baxterum Anglum, sic Dallæus Woodbridgium itidem Anglum, peperit proselytam & admiratorem.] It is an ungrateful task to answer a writer, whose error is a multiplication of palpable untruths in matter of fact; for they are usually more unwillingly heard of than committed. But I shall lay these following considerations in the way of this learned man, where is conscience may find them.

1, If in England Amyraldus’ Method do please uni Baxtero, and yet Dallæus have proselyted Woodbridg also and Amryaldus and DallæusMethod be the same, Quær. Whether Baxter and Woodbridge are not the same man?

2. Qu. Whether this learned man know the judgment of all England?

3. I meet with so many of Amyraldus’ mind in the point of universal redemption, that if I might judge of all the rest by those of my acquaintance, I should conjecture that half of the divines in England are of that opinion.

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