Shedd:

1) Accepted by the law and lawgiver. The primal source of law has no power to abolish penalty any more than to abolish law, but it has full power to substitute penalty. In case of a substitution, however, it must be a strict equivalent, and not a fictitious or nominal one. It would contravene the attribute of justice, instead of satisfying it, should God, for instance, by an arbitrary act of will, substitute the sacrifice of bulls and goats for the penalty due to man; or if he should offset any finite oblation against the infinite demerit of moral evil. The inquiry whether the satisfaction of justice by Christ’s atonement was a strict and literal one, has a practical and not merely theoretical importance. A guilt-smitten conscience is exceedingly timorous, and hence, if there be room for doubting the strict adequacy of the judicial provision that has been made for satisfying the claims of law, a perfect peace, the “peace of God,” is impossible. Hence the doctrine of a plenary satisfaction by an infinite substitute is the only one that ministers to evangelical repose. The dispute upon this point has sometimes, at least, resulted from a confusion of ideas and terms. Strict equivalency has been confounded with identity. The assertion that Christ’s death is a literal equivalent for the punishment due to mankind, has been supposed to be the same as the assertion, that it is identical with it; and a punishment identical with that due to man would involve remorse, and endless duration. But identity of punishment is ruled out by the principle of substitution or vicariousness, a principle that is conceded by all who hold the doctrine of atonement. The penalty endured by Christ, therefore, must be a substituted, and not an identical one. And the only question that remains is, whether that which is to be substituted shall be of a strictly equal value with that, the place of which it takes, or whether it may be of an inferior value, and it must be one or the other. When a loan of one hundred dollars in silver is repaid by one hundred dollars in gold, there is a substitution of one metal for another. It is not an identical payment; for this would require the return of the very identical hundred pieces of silver, the ipsissima pecunia, that had been loaned. But it is a strictly and literally equivalent payment. All claims arc cancelled by it. In like manner, when the suffering and death of God incarnate is substituted for that of the creature, the satisfaction rendered to law is strictly plenary, though not identical with that which is exacted from the transgressor. It contains the clement of infinitude, which is the clement of value in the case, with even greater precision than the satisfaction of the creature does; because it is the suffering of a strictly infinite Person in a finite time, while the latter is only the suffering of a finite person in an endless but not strictly infinite time. A strictly infinite duration would be without beginning, as well as without end. William G.T. Shedd, Discourses and Essays, (Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1862), 307-308.  [Underlining mine.]

2) In saying that the suffering substituted for that of the actual criminal must be of equal value, it is not said that it must be identical suffering. A substituted penalty cannot be an identical penalty, because identical means the same in every respect. Identity is inconsistent with any exchange whatever. To speak of substituting an identical penalty is a contradiction in terms. The identical punishment required by the moral law is personal punishment, involving personal remorse; and remorse can be experienced only by the actual criminal. If, in commercial law, a substituted payment could be prevented, a pecuniary debtor would be compelled to make an identical payment. In this case, he must pay in person and wholly from his own resources. Furthermore, he could not pay silver for gold, but gold for gold; and not only this, but he must pay back exactly the same pieces of gold, the ipsissima pecunia, which he had received. Identical penalty implies sameness without a difference in any particular. Not only is the quantity the same, but the quality is the same. But substituted penalty implies sameness with a difference in some particular. And in the case before us, that of Christ’s satisfaction, the difference is in the quality: the quantity being unchanged. The vicarious suffering of Christ is of equal value with that of all mankind, but is not the same in kind.

Equivalency, not identity, is the characteristic, therefore, of vicarious penalty. The exchange, implied in the term substitution, is of quality not of quantity. One kind of judicial suffering; that is, suffering endured for the purpose of satisfying justice; is substituted for another kind. Christ’s sufferings were of a different nature or quality from those of a lost man. But there was no difference in quantity, or value. A less degree of suffering was not exchanged for a greater degree. The sufferings of the mediator were equal in amount and worth to those whose place they took. Vicarious penalty then is the substitution of an equal quantity, but a different quality of suffering. The mediator suffers differently from the lost world of sinners, but he suffers equally.

Equivalency satisfies justice as completely as identity. One hundred dollars in gold extinguishes a debt of one hundred dollars as completely as does one hundred dollars in silver. If the sufferings of the mediator between God and man are of equal value with those of the world of mankind, they are as complete a satisfaction of justice as the eternal death of mankind would be, although they do not, in their nature or quality, involve any of that sense of personal wickedness and remorse of conscience which enters into the punishment of a lost man. They get their value from the nature of the God-man, and it is the value of what is substituted which justice looks at.

The following extract from Samuel Hopkins (System of Doctrine, Works, I. 321) enforces this truth. “The mediator did not suffer precisely the same kind of pain, in all respects, which the sinner suffers when the curse is executed on him. He did not suffer that particular kind of pain which is the necessary attendant or natural consequence of being a sinner, and which none but the sinner can suffer. But this is only a circumstance of the punishment of sin, and not of the essence of it. The whole penalty of the law may be suffered, and the evil may be as much and as great, without suffering that particular sort of pain. Therefore, Christ, though without sin, might suffer the whole penalty; that is, as much and as great evil as the law denounces against transgression.” William G.T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1971),, 2:454-456. [Underlining mine.]

Shedd:

1) 2. Revision is objectionable, because the Confession is a correct statement of ” the system of doctrine contained in the Scriptures.” The system meant in this phrase is universally known as the Calvinistic; not as resting upon the authority of Calvin, but as a convenient designation of that interpretation of Scripture which is common to Augustine, Calvin, the Reformed theologians, and the Westminster divines. The term “evangelical” does not define it, because there are several evangelical systems, but only one Calvinistic. The systems of Arminius, of Wesley, and of the Later-Lutherans, as well as that of Calvin, are alike evangelical, in distinction from anti-evangelical systems like Socinianism and Deism. They are all alike derived from the Bible, and contain the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the apostasy, and the redemption But the Calvinistic interpretation of Scripture, which is the one formulated in the Westminster Standards, differs from these other “evangelical” systems, in teaching unconditional election and preterition, instead of conditional; limited redemption (not atonement) instead of unlimited; regeneration wholly by the Holy Spirit instead of partly; the total inability of the sinner instead of partial. The Calvinistic system, as thus discriminated from the other “evangelical” systems, has been adopted by American Presbyterians for two centuries. Neither Old Lights, nor New Lights; neither Old School, nor New School; have demanded that these tenets which distinguish Calvinism from Arminianism should be eliminated from the creed. They were accepted with equal sincerity by both branches of the Church in the reunion of 1870, and there is no reason for altering the formulas that were satisfactory then, unless the belief of the Church has altered in regard to these distinctive points of Calvinism. William G.T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure and Mixed, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 14-15. See also: William G.T. Shedd, The Proposed Revision of the Westminster Standards, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1890), 15.  [Underlining mine.]

2) The question, What is Calvinism? is mainly one of reasoning and discrimination. It relates to a matter of fact. This question will answer itself in the discussion now going on; for this theological system possesses as distinctive features as the Copernican astronomy, and it will be as impossible to confuse and unsettle the religious world respecting the former, as it would be to confuse and unsettle the scientific world respecting the latter. The essential parts of this system are the well-known five points of Calvinism, namely, total depravity in distinction from partial; unconditional election in distinction from conditional; irresistible regenerating grace in distinction from resistible; limited redemption (not atonement) in distinction from universal; the certain perseverance of the regenerate in distinction from their possible apostasy. No one of these points can be rejected without impairing the integrity of Calvinism, any more than one of the points of the mariners’ compass can be omitted and the scheme be complete; any more than one of the contrary five points of Arminianism can be deleted and the theory remain unaltered. William G.T. Shedd, Calvinism: Pure and Mixed, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 153-154.  [Underlining mine.]

3) Since redemption implies the application of Christ’s atonement, universal or unlimited redemption cannot logically be affirmed by any who hold that faith is wholly the gift of God, and that saving grace is bestowed solely by election. The use of the term “redemption,”  consequently, is attended with less ambiguity than that of “atonement,” and it is the term most commonly employed in controversial theology. Atonement is unlimited, and redemption is limited. This statement includes all the Scripture texts: those which assert that Christ died for all men, and those which assert that he died for his people. He who asserts unlimited atonement, and limited redemption, cannot well be misconceived. He is understood to hold that the sacrifice of Christ is unlimited in its value, sufficiency, and publication, but limited in its effectual application. William G.T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1971), 2:470.  [Underlining mine.]

[Note: For more on Shedd on unlimited atonement, go here.]

Weeks:

A[spasio]. I have mentioned the principal; but I will suggest one more, the identity of atonement and redemption. As they signify the same thing, all who are atoned for are redeemed. But the elect only are redeemed; therefore the atonement was made for none else.

P[aulinus]. Atonement and redemption are not the same thing. Atonement is satisfaction for sin; redemption is deliverance from sin. The atonement was finished when Christ rose from the dead; but the redemption of any individual is not finished till he is freed from sin by complete sanctification, and received to heaven. Christ is said to have “obtained eternal redemption for us;” not eternal atonement, surely. The apostle exhorts Christians, ” Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption;” not the day of atonement, for that was past already. And when the Son of Man shall be seen coming in the clouds of heaven, his people are exhorted, “Then look up, and lift up your heads: for your redemption draws nigh;” not your atonement draws nigh, for that was accomplished long since. If atonement and redemption were the same thing, it would be as improper to pray for redemption 11.1 for atonement. To pray for atonement would be to pray that Christ might die again. ‘No Christian prays for atonement. But Christians may pray for redemption. They may pray with the Scripture saints, ” Draw nigh unto my soul, and redeem it.” “Redeem me, and be merciful unto me.” Atonement and redemption, therefore, are different things; and the argument which is built upon their identity is built upon the sand.

William R. Weeks, “A Dialogue on the Atonement,” in The Atonement: Discourses and Treatises, ed., Edwards A. Park, (Boston: Congregational Board of Publications, 1868), 579. [First published in 1825.]  [Some spelling modernized and underlining mine.]

[Note: Once again, it is not necessary, or the point, that one has to agree with everything Weeks says on the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction, it is  his distinction between atonement and redemption–the former being universal, the latter particular–which interests us here.]

M.B. Riddle:

1) The germ of the controversy was the position attributed to Dr. Taylor, “that no human being can become depraved but by his own act, and that the sinfulness of the race does not pertain to man’s nature.” In connection with this, regeneration was regarded as the act of man’s own will or heart; and the primary cause of this right choice was found in self-love, or a desire for the greatest happiness. (Some of these positions have been disclaimed by Dr. Taylor and his friends.) He claimed to be in accord with the New England Calvinism, represented by the two Edwardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, and Dwight. His position on the doctrine of original sin was not Augustinian: over against Dr. Taylor he asserted depravity of nature and the federal headship of Adam, but did not accept immediate imputation. He denied the self-determining power of the will, or the power of a contrary choice, and would not limit the definition of sin to voluntary transgression of known law. He accepted the distinction of Edwards between natural and moral ability, and denied most resolutely the “happiness theory.” By discriminating between an unlimited atonement and limited redemption, he sought to preserve the doctrine of individual election. Regeneration he regarded as “effected, not by moral suasion, or by the efficiency of any means whatever, but by the direct agency of the Holy Spirit, changing the moral disposition, and imparting a new spiritual life to the soul.” The controversy, as was usual at that time, was carried on with speculative and dogmatic weapons, though both parties appealed to Scripture.     M.B. Riddle, “Tyler, Bennet,” in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, [1912] ), 12:46.

Nahum Gale (1812-1876):

2) To those who entertain this opinion, I would commend the following extract from an article in the Princeton Review for July, 1831. The orthodoxy of this work will not be questioned….

Again,–the founders of this seminary believed that the only ground of pardon and salvation to sinners, is the atonement of Christ, and that Christ, by his obedience and death, honored the divine law, satisfied divine justice, and thus rendered it consistent for God to pardon sinners who repent and believe in Christ. They repudiated the theory that the sufferings and death of Christ were intended only to exert a moral influence on the minds of men. They believed that his sufferings were truly vicarious; that he suffered in the room and stead of sinners, 80 that the demands of justice are as fully answered in the case of those who repent and are pardoned, as in the case of those who remain impenitent and are destroyed. They believed that the atonement is of infinite value; that it is sufficient to expiate the sins of all men; and that, on the ground of it, pardon and eternal life are sincerely offered to the whole human race. They did not believe that Christ died for all men, with a design to save all, or to do all in his power to save them. But they believed that he died for all in such a sense as to render it consistent and proper for God to invite all men to come to Christ and be saved, and to make it apparent that those who perish are justly condemned, not only for transgressing the law, but for rejecting the gospel. They made a distinction between atonement and redemption. The former they considered unlimited, the latter limited. Redemption, they supposed, included the application of the atonement, in the sinner’s effectual calling; and they supposed, of course, that none but the elect are actually redeemed. They believed that the only ground of the sinner’s justification is the imputed righteousness of Christ, which is received by faith alone.

They believed that except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God, and that regeneration is effected, not by moral suasion, or by the efficiency of any means whatever, but by the direct agency of the Holy Spirit, changing the moral disposition, and imparting a new spiritual life to the soul. They believed this to be a sovereign work, and that God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy.

They believed that those who are made the subjects of renewing grace, were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, and that they are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation.

They believed that there will be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust, a day of final judgment, and a state of eternal and unalterable retribution for the righteous and the wicked.

These are the prominent doctrines which were held by the founders of this seminary, and for the maintenance of which the Institute was established. They are embodied in the creed to which all the trustees and professors are required annually to give their assent.

That I have given a true exposition of their creed, I feel a good degree of assurance, having been somewhat intimately acquainted with the men. A goodly number of them are still living, and to them I confidently appeal as witnesses of the truth of my representations.      Gale, Nahum, A Memoir of Rev. Bennet Tyler, (Boston: J.E. Tilton and Company, 1860), 74, 77-79.  [Underlining mine.]

[Notes: 1) I am still in the process of tracking down the original article as cited by Gale. 2) When referencing the seminary, Gale means the newly founded Theological Instituted, of which Bennet Tyler was the principal founder. This seminary later became the Hartford Seminary. 3) When Gale speaks of the faculty, he, therefore, refers to Bennet along with the rest of the faculty.]