Polanus:

The hatred of God, is either the withholding or denying of his goodwill, or reprobation itself, or his decree not to choose to everlasting life. Malac 1:2,3. Rom. 9:13. And the cause of this divine hatred, is only God, and that is his own good pleasure.

Or else it is his displeasure, detestation, abomination, or turning away. Isa. 1:14. My soul hates your new moons, and set feasts. But the cause of this hatred is in men themselves.

Or else it is the execution of the decree of God, to punish and to destroy the wicked, Psal. 5:6. Thou hates all them that work iniquity: that is, thou doth punish and destroy the ungodly, as they was want both to punish and destroy them. And the cause of this hatred also, is even in men themselves.

Amandus Polanus, The Substance of Christian Religion, (London: Arn. Hatfield, 1600), pp., 34-35.

Zanchi:

1) II.–When hatred is ascribed to God, it implies

(1) a negation of benevolence, or a resolution not to have mercy on such and such men, nor to endue them with any of those graces which stand connected with eternal life. So, “Esau have I hated ” (Rom. ix.), i.e., “I did, from all eternity, determine within Myself not to have mercy of him.” The sole cause of which awful negation is not merely the unworthiness of the persons hated, but the sovereignty and freedom of the Divine will.

(2) It denotes displeasure and dislike, for sinners who are not interested in Christ cannot but be infinitely displeasing to and loathsome in the sight of eternal purity.

(3)It signifies a positive will to punish and destroys reprobate for their sins, of which will, the infliction of misery upon them hereafter, is but the necessary effect and actual execution. Zanchius, Absolute Predestination, p., 78.

2) Further, it is manifest, that all things that are without God and made by him, are beloved of God, both by testimonies of Scripture, and by firm reasons. Wisd. “Thou loves all things that are, and hates nothing that thou made,” [Wisd. 11]. But what is it, to say that God loves any thing? it is to wish and do well unto the same. But God has both willed and done good to all things that he has made: for for any thing to be is good, add farther hereunto, the divers and excellent qualities wherewith every thing is endued and adorned. What a great goodness is this? and therefore Moses says, Gen. 1. all things which God made were very good.  Therefore, as we love things because they are good, so all good things of their own nature, for that God loved and does love them. For God infuses goodness into things, by loving it, and this is truly to love: as we do contrarily love things because they are good: and we are said to love them, when we desire to have them, keep the good they have and wish them further that good they want [lack]. Thus appears the love of God to be more excellent then ours, because it is more effectual, and the cause of goodness in everything. It is manifest therefore that all things are beloved of God; for whatsoever he makes, he makes it good, how then could be but love it before he made it? He sustains those things which he has made, how can he then but love those things which he has made? by this means, there is no man nor devil, which can say, “God loves him not.” For God always did and does good to all.

Object.

But the Scripture says, that God hated the wicked, “thou has hated all those that work iniquity.”

Answ.

How therefore can the same thing be loved and hated? Answ. 2. Things are to be considered in a wicked man, nature, and iniquity. Nature is made by God, but iniquity is not, but belongs to the wicked. And we said in the proposition, “that God loves all things that are made by him.” Therefore these two are not repugnant; that God loves a wicked man as his own work and creature, and hates him as he is evil and works wickedness. For God does not properly hate a wicked man, but wickedness in him: according to that, “Thou has loved righteousness and hated iniquity.”   [Girolamo Zanchi] Live Everlasting: Or The True Knowledge of One Iehova, Three Elohim and Jesus Immanuel: Collected Out of the Best Modern Divines, and compiled into one volume by Robert Hill, ([Cambridge:] Printed by Iohn Legat, printer to the Vniuersitie of Cambridge. And are to be sold [in London] at the signe of the Crowne in Pauls Church-yard by Simon Waterson, 1601), 362-363. [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; inserted bracketed material mine; side-headers included; repeated Scripture side-header references not included; and underlining mine.]

[Notes: Worldcat and Wing identify this as as: “Largely a translation and abridgement of Zanchi, Girolamo. De natura Dei. Zanchi is identified in the side-note on page 655—STC…” I have inserted Zanchi’s name in the title as a reflection that because: 1) as noted, this is largely a translation of Zanchi’s work; 2) because it quite probably does reflect Zanchi’s theology; 3) because Wing attributes the authorship to Zanchi, and Hill as the translator; and 4) from the opening “Epistle Dedicatory” (3^rd page) Hill identifies a work by Zanchi as the principal text upon which this work is based. Lastly, I actually suspect this is a much more reliable translation than Toplady’s briefer translation from the same work.]

Turretin:

1) VIII. (3) The question is not whether there is in God a will commanding and approving faith and the salvation of men; nor whether God in the gospel commands men to believe and repent if they wish to be saved; nor whether it pleases him for me to believe and be saved. For no one denies that God is pleased with the conversion and life of the sinner rather than with his death. We willingly subscribe to the Synod of Dort, which determines that “God sincerely and most truly shows in his word, what is pleasing to him; namely, that they who are called should come to him” (Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti [1620], Pt. I, p. 266). But the question is whether from such a will approving and commanding what men must do in order to obtain salvation, can be gathered any will or purpose of God by which he intended the salvation of all and everyone under the condition of faith and decreed to send Christ into the world for them. Hence it appears that they wander from the true order of the question who maintain that we treat here only of the will of approbation (euarestias), but not of the will of good pleasure (eudokias). It is evident that we treat not of that which God wishes [Lat.: vult] to be done by us, but what he wills to do for the salvation of men and of the decree of sending Christ for them (which everyone sees belongs to the will of good pleasure [eudokias] and not to that of approbation [euarestias]). Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994) 1:397.

2) XXVI. Purely personal sins differ from those which are and public. The former should not be imputed posterity. Of them, the law must be understood: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin” (Dt. 24:16). However nothing prevents the latter from being imputed, and such was the sin of Adam. (2) The law imposed upon men differs from the law to which God binds himself. Barriers are placed to human vengeance because it might be abused, but not to divine justice. In this passage, God undoubtedly shows what he wishes [Lat.: velit] to be done ordinarily by men, but not immediately what he wishes [Lat.: velit] to do or what he can do from the order of justice. Otherwise he could not have said in the law that he would visit the iniquities of parents upon their children, nor would he have confirmed this by many examples. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994), 1:624.

3) XVI. It is one thing to will [Lat.: velle] reprobates to come (i.e., to command them to come and to desire [Lat.: gratum] it); another to will [Lat.: velle] they should not come (i.e., to nill the giving them the power to come). God can in calling them will the former and yet not the latter without any contrariety because the former respects only the will of precept, while the latter respects the will of decree. Although these are diverse (because they propose diverse objects to themselves, the former the commanding of duty, but the latter the execution of the thing itself), still they are not opposite and contrary, but are in the highest degree consistent with each other in various respects. He does not seriously call who does not will the called to come (i.e., who does not command nor is pleased with his coming). But not he who does not will him to come whither he calls (i.e., did not intend and decree to come). For a serious call does not require that there should be an intention and purpose of drawing him, but only that there should be a constant will of commanding duty and bestowing the blessing upon him who performs it (which God most seriously wills). But if he seriously make known what he enjoins upon the man and what is the way of salvation and what is agreeable to himself, God does not forthwith make known what he himself intended and decreed to do. Nor, if among men, a prince or a legislator commands nothing which he does not will (i.e., does not intend should also be done by his subjects because he has not the power of effecting this in them), does it follow that such is the case with God, upon whom alone it depends not only to command but also to effect this in man. But if such a legislator could be granted among men, he would rightly be said to will that which he approves and commands, although he does not intend to effect it. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994) 2:507-508.

4) XXI. The invitation to the wedding proposed in the parable (Mt. 22:1-14) teaches that the king wills [Lat.: velle] (i.e., commands and desires [Lat.: gratum]) the invited to come and that this is their duty; but not that the king intends or has decreed that they should really come. Otherwise he would have given them the ability to come and would have turned their hearts. Since he did not do this, it is the surest sign that he did not will they should come in this way. When it is said “all things are ready” (Lk. 14:17), it is not straightway intimated an intention of God to give salvation to them, but only the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice. For he was prepared by God and offered on the cross as a victim of infinite merit to expiate the sins of men and to acquire salvation for all clothed in the wedding garment and flying to him (i.e., to the truly believing and repenting) that no place for doubting about the truth and perfection of his satisfaction might remain. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994) 2:509.

Vermigli:

1) Now let us see by what means god works so excellent good things un us. First he offers the promises of these things, secondly, by his inspiration by the opening the heart, that those promises may be admitted: which never find place in us; for man’s heart is stubborn and resists spiritual things; and therefore there is need of continual ministry in the church. For it is the duty of pastors, to lay before the people the promises of God, & not only to urge the same with words, but also to seal the same by sacraments, which are certainly visible words. But first of all their part is to remove two impediments, which chiefly lead men away from the promises of God. For on the one part, men think they cannot attain to the promises of God, because they be unworthy of them: here ought a faithful minister diligently to persuade & teach, that these things are freely bestowed by God, not through works, or for any worthiness of the receivers. On the other part, men are wont to doubt, whether themselves, by election of God, be excluded from these promises, or no: here must they teach, that it is the part of the faithful people to receive the promises of God generally, as they taught us in the Holy Scriptures, by the Spirit of God; and that they ought not to be very inquisitive of the secret will of God. For undoubtedly, he would have revealed & declared who be the chosen & reprobate, he had known that the same should be profitable to salvation.

Wherefore, seeing that the Scriptures reject none particularly from the promises, every man ought to harken unto them, as if they should particularly pertain to himself. And certainly, together with faith, there will be a persuasion of the Spirit, given unto the believers; so as they shall not be in any doubt, but that they verily pertain unto the elect…

But this one thing we seem to have affirmed, which as yet is not proved by the Scripture; namely, that God does not only by his mere grace and good will offer the promises, which we have now spoken of; but that he also by his Spirit bends our heart to receive them…

But men are wont to say, and commonly boast, that the grace of God is laid forth to all men; wherefore if the same be not embraced, the fault is in ourselves, for that every man may attain to it if he will. This could we must rid away, by some sort short discourse. Indeed we may grant, that after this sort, grace is set abroad unto all men; because the general promises of God are offered and preached to indifferently to all men. Neither do the preachers, which publish those promises, stick anything about the secret will of God, or else think this with themselves; ‘Peradventure this man is not predestinate;’ or ‘I shall further nothing by my travail’: they imagine no such thing, but they propound the word of God to all men generally. But this means the grace and calling of God may be said to be common unto all men. Albeit, when as any man receives the promises of God offered, he does it not by his own power or will…

Peter Martyr, “Of Grace,” in The Common Places, rans., and compiled by Anthonie Martin, 1583, part 3, pp., 49-50 and 51.

2) But some man will say God by the prophet Jonah, said it should come to pass, that the city of Nineveh should be destroyed, and that after 40 days. And by Isaiah the Prophet h showed unto Hezekiah the king, that he should dye: which things yet came not to pass as they were foretold. Yet also the Lord himself in Jeremy the 18. Chapter thus speaks, “if any man speak of any kingdom; or nation, to root it out and to destroy it and they in the meantime repent, I also will repent me. And on the other side, if I shall speak to plant, and to build any kingdom or nation, and they in the meantime behave themselves wickedly, I will not perform these things which I have spoken. But we answer, that the promise whereof Paul here speaks depends not of any condition, as do a great many promises of the law, unto which pertain these threatenings which are now alleged yea the Apostle himself sufficiently expressed, of what kind of promises he speaks when he says, “By faith, that it should be of grace.” For if it consist freely, then hangs it not on any condition, or supposition, and by this means the promise can in no case be made frustrate. This may the easier be understand by a similitude: If a physician should by taking of any medicine promise health, but yet upon this condition, that he would have for his pains infinite sums of money, & that the sick person should observe a very hard diet, a poor man might easily answer that that promise of health is vain, both for that he has not the money to pay, and also for that being weak he is not able to observe the diet which is prescribed him. But contrariwise, if a man promise a medicine which he will give freely, neither requires any work of the sick person, but only that he would drink, or some other way receive his medicine, this promise is easily made firm. So undoubtedly stands the case here: the promise is offered unto us, and that freely. For only is of us required, that by faith we receive it. And this bus the first principal point, whereupon depends the certainty of the promise: namely, for that the promise consists of the Word of God, and is offered freely.

Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, Most learned and fruitful Commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, Professor of Divinity in he School of Tigure, upon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romans: wherein are diligently & most profitably entreated all such matters and chief common places of religion touched in the same Epistle, (Imprinted at London by Iohn Daye, 1558), 91[b]-92[a].