Stock:

Psal. 5:5¹ Thou hates all the workers of iniquity.

The next thing is, the Hatred of God: and to hold the same course we have held before, our first question is this:

Quest. What is the hated of God?

Answ. The is thus much, the hatred of God is a communicable attribute, whereby he freely decrees not to show mercy, but to deny to most the grace of election, destining them to destruction, exactly punishing them when they are wicked, and so hating all iniquity.

This description has a great deal of matter in it, therefore, we will explain it. Hatred, say some, is not to be attributed to God, we do not contend against them if they understand hatred to be a passion of the mind, which is seldom without corruption, but when they take hatred, as the Scriptures speak of it, then as God loves that which is good, so he hates that which is nought and evil: for as God is said to love, so he is said to hate. Again, I say it is a communicable attribute, because that there is the like in man.

Next, it is that by which he freely decrees not to show mercy to the wicked, to deny them the grace of election. To open this, hatred in the Scriptures does many times signify to refuse, to give and deny favors, to put behind, and make less account of than another, as our Savior Christ says, Luke 14:26, “He that hates not his father and his mother,” &c., that is, he does not deny his father, by putting him behind him, and neglecting him, when he commands anything, and God another. God say that Leah was hated, so that is, was not so dearly loved as Rachel, so this hatred of God is to neglect to show favor, and to deny the grace of election to the wicked. This is apparent, Rom. 9:13, “I have hated Esau, and loved Jacob,” This is not put down but with opposition: “I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau,” that is to say, I have not decreed nor offered this grace and favor of election to Esau, which I have allowed Jacob. It is that which is further manifest in the 18^th verse of the same chapter, “I will have mercy on whom I will, and whom I will harden,” &c. This God does freely from his own will. His will is the solitary cause of denying the grace of election. The cause of why he chose Jacob, and hated Esau, was nothing but his will. It is manifest, Rom. 9:11, 12, before they had done anything good or evil, God said, that the elder should serve the younger, that it might be of grace. If you ask the Apostle a proof of this, he alleges a place out of Exodus: if any man should wrangle with God and say, God is unjust, that he should love one, and hate another, the Apostle answers, “There is no unrighteousness with God,” verse 14, and for this he gives a proof, Exod. 23:19, “I will mercy on whom I will have mercy, and whom I will,” &c. As God does absolutely love whom he will, so he does absolutely hate whom he will, he denies the grace of election to the most, there are but a few that have favor, Matt. 20:16, “Many are called.” The thing is, that he destines them to destruction, as punishment of sin, Jude 4, “men were before of old ordained to this condemnation”: “he has prepared tophet² of old,” Esa 30[:33] ult, not that God does delight in torment of the creature, or created anything that he might destroy it, but out of his hatred to sin, and love of justice, did decree and prepare to punish all, and only such as should live and die in sin, without repentance. That negative act of reprobation, or preterition finds all men alike, in the same condition, this positive act of predamnation, respects men as sinners, without repentance. That first act is grounded only in his absolute will of God, “I will have mercy on whom I will,” &c., “and whom I will harden,” but this latter act is an act not so much of power as of justice, and always has respect to sin.

The third thing, That he actually punishes them when they are wicked: it is manifest, that they that be born in sin, live in sin, knowing it to be sin, be enemies of God, and to the grace of God, and them he actually hates when they are wicked. This is apparent, “Thou hates all those that work wickedness,” and that hatred carries the punishment, as appears by the next words of my text, “and thou destroys all those that tell lies,” and, therefore, he does not hate them as they are men, and his creatures, but as they are wicked. Bernard says, that man could not endure after God’s making, but he would be better. Therefore, he was cast out of Paradise: God hating all iniquity in whomsoever it was, elect or reprobate, Psal. 45:7, “Thou loves righteousness, and hates iniquity.” And this I might show unto you, that there is no sin almost, but I can bring you a plain text of God’s hatred of it, sometimes hating idolatry, sometimes hating blood, sometimes false weights, sometimes contempt of his Word, sometimes wicked thoughts, all which show that he hates iniquity: two ways he manifests he hates it, in some, because he destroys them for it, in others, because he took it away by justice, in is own Son. And thus much for this description.

Richard Stock, A Stock of Divine Knowledge. Being a Lively Description of the Divine Nature. Or, the Divine Essence, Attributes, and Trinity Particularly Explained and Profitably Applied. The First showing Us What God is: The Second, what We Ought to be (London: Printed by T.H. for Philip Nevil, and are to be sold at his Shop in Ivie Lane, at the Signe of the Gun, 1641), 224-226. [Some spelling modernized; some sentence restructuring; contents in brackets mine; footnotes mine; and underlining mine.]

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¹The original incorrectly cites Psalm 6:6.

²Hebrew, Tophteh, a place of fire.

Alexander:

Some excellent men, who saw the danger of so insisting on the inability of man as to furnish an apology for the careless sinner, borrowed a little aid from the Arminian scheme, and taught that if the sinner would do what was in his power, and continue faithfully to use the outward means of grace, the Spirit of God would assist his endeavors: and thus a connection was formed between the strivings of the unregenerate and the grace of God. But this was not consistent with the other opinions of these men, and involved them in many practical difficulties, and contradicted many clear passages of scripture, which teach that " without faith it is impossible to please God:" and it seemed to be obviously absurd, that the promise of grace should be made to acts and exercises which, it could not be denied, were in their nature sinful. Some, indeed, spoke of a kind of sincerity which they supposed an unregenerate sinner might possess; but it was found difficult to tell what it was; and another difficulty was to quiet the minds of those convinced sinners who had been long using the means of grace. Such persons would allege that they had prayed, and read, and heard the word for a long time, and yet received no communications of grace. To such, nothing could on this plan be said, but to exhort them to wait God’s time, and to entertain the confident hope that no soul ever perished, that continued to the last seeking for mercy. The inconvenience and evil of these representations being perceived, many adopted with readiness a distinction of human ability into natural and moral. By the first they understood merely the possession of physical powers and opportunities; by the latter, a mind rightly disposed. In accordance with this distinction, it was taught that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God required of him; but that every sinner labored under a moral inability to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the heart, for which every man was responsible. Now this view of the subject is substantially correct, and the distinction has always been made by every person, in his judgments of his own conduct and that of others. It is recognized in all courts of justice, and in all family government, and is by no means a modern discovery. And yet it is remarkable that it is a distinction so seldom referred to, or brought distinctly into view, by old Calvinistic authors. The first writer among English theologians that we have observed using this distinction explicitly, is the celebrated Dr. Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and the able opposer of Arminianism, and advocate of the Supralapsarian doctrine of divine decrees. It was also resorted to by the celebrated Mr. Howe, and long afterwards used freely by Dr. Isaac Watts, the popularity of whose evangelical writings probably had much influence in giving it currency. It is also found in the theological writings of Dr. Witherspoon, and many others, whose orthodoxy was never disputed. But in this country no man has had so great an influence in fixing the language of theology, as Jonathan Edwards, president of New Jersey College. In his work on "The Freedom of the Will," this distinction holds a prominent place, and is very important to the argument which this profound writer has so ably discussed in that treatise. The general use of the distinction between natural and moral ability may, therefore, be ascribed to the writings of President Edwards, both in Europe and America. No distinguished writer on theology has made more use of it than Dr. Andrew Fuller; and it is well known that he imbibed nearly all his views of theology from an acquaintance with the writings of President Edwards. And it may be said truly, that Jonathan Edwards has done more to give complexion to the theological system of Calvinists in America, than all other persons together. This is more especially true of New England; but it is also true to a great extent in regard to a large number of the present ministers of the Presbyterian church. Those, indeed, who were accustomed either to the Scotch or Dutch writers, did not adopt this distinction, but were jealous of it as an innovation, and as tending to diminish, in their view, the miserable and sinful state of man, and as derogatory to the grace of God. But we have remarked, that in almost all cases where the distinction has been opposed as false, or as tending to the introduction of false doctrine, it has been misrepresented. The true ground of the distinction has not been clearly apprehended; and those who deny it have been found making it themselves in other words; for that an inability depending on physical defect, should be distinguished from that which arises from a wicked disposition, or perverseness of will, is a thing which no one can deny who attends to the clear dictates of his own mind; for it is a self-evident truth, which even children recognize in all their apologies for their conduct. We do not assert, however, that the dispute between the advocates and opposers of this distinction has been a mere logomachy. There is one important point of difference. They who reject the distinction, maintain that if we have lost any physical ability to perform our duty by our own fault, the obligation to obedience remains, although the ability to execute it is utterly lost; while the advocates of the distinction between natural and moral ability hold that obligation and ability must be of equal extent; and although they admit that we are accountable for the loss of any faculty which takes place through our fault, yet the guilt must be referred entirely to the original act, and no new sin can be committed for not exercising a faculty which does not exist, or which is physically incapable of the actions in question. To illustrate this point, let us suppose the case of a servant cutting off his hands to avoid the work required of him. The question then is, is this servant guilty of a crime for not employing those members which he does not possess? It is admitted that he is chargeable with the consequences of his wicked act, but this only goes to show the greater guilt of that deed. It is also true, that if the same perverse disposition which led to this act is still cherished, he is virtually guilty of the neglect of that obedience which was due. Sin consists essentially in the motives, dispositions, and volitions of the heart, and the external act only possesses a moral nature by its connection with these internal affections. But it cannot be truly said that a man can be guilty of a crime in not using hands which he does not possess. Let us suppose this servant to have become truly penitent, and to have nothing in his mind but a strong desire to do his duty; can any impartial man believe that he commits a sin in not doing the work which he has no hands to execute? We think not. The case will appear more evident, if the faculty lost should be one which is essential to moral agency; as if a man should by his own fault deprive himself of reason. It is manifest that a man totally destitute of reason is incapable of any moral acts; and this is equally true, however this defect may have been contracted. If a man performs an act by which he knows reason will be extinguished or perverted, he is guilty in that act of a crime which takes its measure, in part, from the consequences likely to ensue. Thus in the case of the drunkard; he who destroys his reason by ebriety, may be considered as guilty of an act, the guilt of which has respect to all the probable consequences. In human courts we are aware that intoxication cannot be pleaded as a justification of crime; but on this subject it may be observed, that drunkards are not commonly so destitute of a knowledge of right and wrong as to be deprived of their moral agency. And again, it would be of dangerous consequence to admit the principle, that a man might plead one crime in justification of another; and it would be exceedingly liable to abuse, as a man might become intoxicated for the very purpose of committing a great crime, or he might affect a greater degree of intoxication than was real; so that it is a sound political maxim, that a man shall be held responsible for all acts committed in a state of ebriety. But in foro conscientiae, we cannot but view the matter in a different light. If by an intoxicating liquor reason is completely subverted, and the man is no longer himself, we cannot judge that he is as accountable for what he does, as when in his sober senses. You may accumulate as much guilt as you will on the act of extinguishing or perverting his reason; but you cannot think that what he madly perpetrates under the influence of strong drink, is equally criminal as if committed while reason was in exercise. This we take to be the deliberate judgment of all impartial men….

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Stock:

Quest. What is the goodness of God, and of the divine essence?

Ans. The answer is: It is a communicable attribute, whereby it is absolute, in and of itself, good, liberal, and bountiful, communicating good to the creature.¹ This being the description, we must open the several parts, and first, the answer says that god is good, liberal, &c., (and this is true). But yet to express the extension of that we have in hand, I say further that he is goodness itself. God is an accident, and no accident is in God. God is good, and whatsoever is in God is good. God is good, and such a good as has no evil annexed to it, as that which is truly heat is not mixed with any cold, and that which is essentially sweet, is not mixed with any sorrow, so God is such, as that whatsoever is in him is essential. Thus we find in Scripture, as in Psal. 52:1, “Why boast thou thyself, thou cruel man? Seeing the goodness of God,” &c. Rom. 2:4, “The bountifulness of God,” that is the goodness of God, so the Apostle speaks, 2 Thess. 1:11. Secondly, I call it a communicable attribute, because this goodness is in some proportion in man, though not as it is in God, therefore, we call it communicable, not that there is goodness in man, as it is in God, but a goodness whereby we resemble the divine nature, as the Apostle Peter says. The next thing, that he is good, in, and of himself. The ground is this, that which Christ speaks, Matt. 19:17, “Why call thou me good? There is none good but God.” There are good men, but these are none eternally and essentially good, but God. There is a created goodness, and there is an uncreated goodness, and, therefore, we say, he is good in and of himself, and is good to the creatures, and this the Learned a relative goodness. This goodness is the extension (not essentially relative, as it is in the three persons is here meant), but a relative between the creature and God, and this is the same Gen. 1:13, “And he looked upon all that he had made, and behold it was very good,” so in many other things, Psal. 118:1, “Praise the Lord because he is good, and his mercy,” &c., he is good showing mercy, that is, his bountifulness continues for ever, Psal. 73:1, “However, God is good to Israel.” The goodness of God admits this division, some is spiritual, some temporal, some general, and some particular. Common goodness he shows to all, but his special he shows but to some, Esai. 34:11, “The Lord is a sun and shield, and he will give grace, and glory: what to every man? No: but to the pure in heart. So Christ says, Matt. 7:10, “If a son ask his father bread, will he give him a stone? If you being evil, can give good things to your children, how much shall your heavenly Father give his Holy Spirit to those that ask him?” As Luke 11:13, so Matt. 5:35, “he makes the sun to shine upon the just and the unjust.” So Acts 14:7, “He has not left himself without witness, in that he has filled our hearts with good and gladness,” that as we know the goodness of the tree by the fruit thereof, so we know this goodness of God by the fruits thereof in the creatures, and so we have this description proved.

The next question is:

Quest. Why is it said that he communicates goodness, and is good to all creatures?

Answ. The answer is, because what goodness soever is begun, and continued in any, is from God, and the cause is in him only. It is not the creature’s own goodness, Psal. 30:11, “The goodness of God has made my mountain strong,” where he shows that this estate and condition wherein he was, was nothing from himself, all came from God. Therefore, when as Esau asked Jacob, how he came by that wealth, Gen. 33:11, “The Lord has been good to me,” &c., therefore, I have all merely of this goodness, and hereupon, Jacob says, Gen. 33:11 “I am less than the least of all thy mercies,” when he calls God’s goodness, his mercy, because it comes from the mercy of God, 2 Sam. 7:8, “Lord, what am I?” says David, “or what is my father’s house?” &c. So every man may say, whatsoever he is, whatsoever he has, “Lord what I am, that thou have brought me to this,” &c. So, whatsoever any man has, it comes from the goodness of God.

There be many uses of this point, but we will content ourselves with some.

Use 1. The first use, is briefly this: It teaches us that of the Apostle Saint James is true, James 1:13, “God tempts no man, God is not tempted,” why? His goodness is such, that which is good itself, has no evil mixed with it, honey has no sorrow in it, the sun has no darkness, God nothing but goodness, so that this is true, “God tempts no man,” the ground why man is tempted, is in himself, not in God, because there is no evil in God. Tempting is when there is some setting upon, and receiving an assault, with rejection. How can a man cast darts into the sun? God being good in himself, &c., cannot tempt nor be tempted.

Use 2. Secondly, this teaches us that we should not sin against this God. The reason is, because he is good, nay, because he is goodness, therefore, we ought not, this should be a restraint to us. How does every man condemn wrongs done to a poor innocent, that he has done no evil? So if we see a man full of goodness brought to misery, every man will cry out of them, that brought him to it, and do we so in respect of men, ought we not so to reason in respect of God? that if God be so good in himself why should I commit this wickedness, against him? When Satan tempts, the world provokes, &c. What should be the answer, if I should commit such a wickedness, you yourselves, and Satan would accuse me, for sinning against such a good God? And, indeed, the devil entices to sin, for nothing, but to accuse us when we have sinned. Therefore, get the behind me, Stan, shall I sin against this God? that is not only so good in himself, but is good to al his creatures, look which way though will, thou cannot but see the goodness of God. Oh what ingratitude! what impiety were this, for a man to offend this God, so that is so good in himself, and good to all creatures? And why has God shown thee this goodness? but because he would have thee good to him. S. Bernard has this saying, for a man to do good for good, his natural, and for a man to do evil for good is diabolical. Now then, if here be but so much as common reason, we will return good for good, but to return evil for God is devilish. And the more any man has received, the more good he ought to be, as Salvian says, “God has given us good, then we ought to be good to him again,”² remember what good thou have in thy creation, redemption and renewing. Let every man, therefore, labor after this manner, to answer the goodness of God, that herein may be his comfort, for when we are best to ourselves, when we return good again, and worst to ourselves, when we return evil. Therefore, we ought thus to approve our goodness to him, and have this ever upon our hearts: how does the goodness of God call for obedience, that we may glorify God here, and then by him, we may be glorious in the life to come.

Richard Stock, A Stock of Divine Knowledge. Being a Lively Description of the Divine Nature. Or, the Divine Essence, Attributes, and Trinity Particularly Explained and Profitably Applied. The First showing Us What God is: The Second, what We Ought to be (London: Printed by T.H. for Philip Nevil, and are to be sold at his Shop in Ivie Lane, at the Signe of the Gun, 1641), 148-154.

[Some spelling modernized; some sentence restructuring; footnotes mine; and underlining mine.]

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¹Stock repeatedly extends his sentences with colons and then semi-colons. Most of these sentence extensions I have converted into proper sentences.

²The difficulty with Stock and other early English literature of this period is identifying the end of a quotation. Here I have simply guessed based on the punctuation.