Hodge:

16. What distinction is intended by the theological terms, natural and moral ability? By natural ability was intended the possession, on the part of every responsible moral agent, whether holy or unholy, of all the natural faculties, as reason, conscience, free will, requisite to enable him to obey God s law. If any of these were absent, the agent would not be responsible.†

By moral ability was intended that inherent moral condition of these faculties, that righteous disposition of heart, requisite to the performance of duty.

Although these terms have been often used by orthodox writers in a sense which to them expressed the truth, yet they have often been abused, and are not desirable. It is evidently an abuse of the word to say that sinners are naturally able, but morally unable, to obey the law; for that can be no ability which leaves the sinner, as the Scriptures declare, utterly unable either to think, feel, or act aright. Besides, the word “natural,” in the phrase “natural ability,” is used in an unusual sense, as opposite to moral; while in the usual sense of that word it is declared in Scripture that man is by nature, i.e., naturally, a child of wrath.

[† Edwards on the Will, part L, sect. 4.]

A.A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1877), 272. [Footnote included.]

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Shedd:

1) In the Westminster statement, the disability or inability is connected with the disposition and inclination of the will. Man is “indisposed to all spiritual good, and inclined to all [spiritual] evil.” It follows from this, that the cause and seat of the inability in question is in the action and state of the voluntary faculty. It is moral or willing inability.

Nam servit voluntas peccato, non nolens sed volens. Etenim voluntas non noluntas dicitur. Second Helvetic Confession, IX.

In denominating it “moral” inability, it is not meant that it arises merely from habit, or that it is not “natural” in any sense of the word nature. A man is sometimes said to be morally unable to do a thing, when it is very difficult for him to do it by reason of an acquired habit, but not really impossible. This is not the sense of the word “moral” when applied to the sinner’s inability to holiness. He is really and in the full sense of the word impotent. And the cause of this impotence is not a habit of doing evil which he has formed in his individual life, but a natural disposition which he has inherited from Adam. The term “moral,” therefore, when applied to human inability denotes that it is voluntary, in distinction from created. Man’s impotence to good does not arise from the agency of God in creation, but from the agency of man in apostasy.

Whether, therefore, it can ever be called “natural” inability, will depend upon the meaning given to the term “nature.”

(a) If “nature” means that which is created by God, there is no natural inability to good in fallen man. But if “nature” means “natural disposition,” or “natural inclination,” there is a “natural” inability to good in fallen man.

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Haldane:

Because the carnal mind is enmity against God.–The word rendered carnal mind–or as it may be rendered, minding of the flesh, comprehends the acts both of the understanding and of the will. Some render it the prudence, or wisdom of the flesh–or the wise thoughts. The carnal mind in its wisest thoughts is rooted enmity against God. This is the reason why the carnal mind is punished with death. The mind of the flesh, or of man in his unconverted state, walking according to the flesh, in its best as well as in its worst character–however moral in conduct—whether seeking acceptance with God by its own services, or following altogether the course of this world in its sinful practices–is not merely an enemy, but enmity itself against God in the understanding, will, and affections. Every man whose heart is set on this world hates God, 1 John ii., 15. "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him," and the heart of every one who has not been renewed in his mind by the Spirit of God is set on this world. Such men hate the holiness of God, his justice, his sovereignty, and even his mercy in the way in which it is exercised. Men of this character, however, have no notion that they hate God. Nay, many of them profess to love him. But God’s testimony is, that they are his enemies; and his testimony is to be taken against the testimony of all men. This, however, does not suppose that men may not imagine that they love God. But it is not the true God whom they are regarding, but a God of their own imagination—a God all mercy, and therefore a God unjust; while they abhor the just God, and the Savior, who is the God of the Scriptures." He that comes to God must believe that he is."–Heb. xi., 6. He must believe that he is what he is.

For it is not subject to the law of God.–The carnal mind is not under subjection to the law of God. Whatever it may do to obtain salvation or avoid wrath, it does it not from subjection to the law. It has a rooted aversion to the spiritual law of God, and admits not its claim to perfect and unceasing obedience. All its performances in the way of religion spring from selfish motives, and a hope that, on account of these doings, it will be accepted; whereas the holy law of God utterly rejects all such service. So far from giving the law all its demands, the carnal mind gives it nothing. Nothing which it does constitutes obedience to the law. The law does not in any degree, or in any instance, recognize the works of the carnal mind as obedience to its requirements.

Neither indeed can be.–Not only is it a matter of fact, that the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, but such subjection is impossible. Sin cannot be in subjection to the law. This would be a contradiction in terms. For, so far as it would be subject to the law of God, it would be holy. If, then, sin is essentially, and in direct terms, contrary to holiness, the sinful nature can never yield subjection to the holy law. Men may speculate about metaphysical possibilities; but whatever explanation may be given of the matter, the decision of the inspired Apostle determines that the thing is impossible.

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Edwards:

Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity and Inability.

THAT Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural Necessity.

I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse.

The phrase, Moral Necessity, is used variously: sometimes it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, from which he cannot be discharged. So the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connection of things, which is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, Moral Necessity, in the following discourse.

By Natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity men’s bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.

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