Zanchi:

The third question.

Whether the will of God be simply one, or divers; and if divers, which they be.

The Proposition.

The will of God in divers respects is both and divers.

Divines do make many divisions of the will of God: some divide it into antecedent or consequent, as Damascus, 1.2.c.46, others into the will of his good pleasure, and the will of sign, that is, by which he signifies what his pleasure is: as the Schoolmen, others into his secret and revealed will: others into his absolute and conditional will; others into that which he will do with us, and that which he will have done by us. Others though they seem divers, yet if they be well weighed they all come to the same purpose. But how this will is both one and divers, it is hard to set down. if we take will in any of three acceptations which I mentioned before, it will appear that the will of God is one only, both in efficacy, in act, and in his object. And this will of God is his free, eternal, most wise, and immutable decree, by which he brings every singular creature which he made to their several use and end, by such means as he has appointed: and to permit sins which he neither did not, nor does make, to be in the world; and all for the manifestation of his glory.  I call it a decree, because the Scripture does so: “My counsel or decree,” says the prophet of God, “shall stand, and I will do whatsoever I will,” [Isai, 46:10.]: where counsel and will are joined together as all one.  So the Apostles said that Herod and Pontius Pilate were gathered together, to do whatsoever the counsel of God had determined before to be done “[Act. 4:28]: and Paul calls the will of God concerning the salvation of the elect, predestination [Rom. 8:29]: and when Christ says that a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without the will of his Father [Matt. 10:26.], his meaning is, without his certain, and eternal decree: as also Ioho[?], 6:40, “and who has resisted his will:” his immutable decree. I call it free, because none more free then God, whose decree is therefore called the “God pleasure of his will,” [Eph. 1:8]. I said eternal, because look what he now will, he ever would: and we are said to be elected before the foundation of the world: the like may be said of all other things that they were purposed from eternity. I added most wise, because God is wisdom itself: and immutable, because he is without change. I mention every singular creature, because all were made by him, and that very good: and are directed to their several ends: directed, for God does either immediately, or mediately move all things: to their several ends and uses; for there is one use of fire, another of water: one of godly, another of the godless: and therefore they are called vessels of mercy, those of wrath. And these ends are either near or far off: the next end of the wicked is death, of the godly life, the last is God’s glory, who created all things for himself even the wicked against the evil day. And all this God does by such means as he has appointed: his children are elected, but in Christ; called to him, but outwardly by the word preached: inwardly by the Spirit: brought to him by the knowledge of the law and the Gospel:” engrafted in him by faith: sanctified by the Spirit and by good works brought into the possession of eternal life. As for sins, I said he decreed to permit them: for sin as it is sin, and evil as it is evil, God is not the author of it; but as all men confess permitted it, not unwillingly, but willingly; and therefore it was the eternal decree and will of God to permit the same. The end of all I said to be the glory of God, all things which God either has willed or does will, are comprehended under this eternal decree and will, the which if it were not one but divers the Scripture would not ever speak of it in the singular number, and term it counsel, good pleasure, will: but would sometimes use the plural number, as they do not: nay God would not ever command us to do his will, that is, his commandments: neither should it be said that all things are governed according to his will, as one, but as many:” so then though God will not all things after one sort, but some things for himself as that which is good’; others for other respects as those things which are evil: some absolutely as whatsoever he will; others conditionally as that which he promises, if we do this or that, yet if we consider God who wills we shall see that his decree or will is one only, by which he wills whatsoever he will.

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Humfrey:

The Scriptures say, Christ died for all, and for every man. God so loved the World, (says Christ) that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. By the World, this Gentlemen must understand the Elect: but when by the words [that whosoever believeth in him] Christ plainly intimates, that there are some of those God loves, do believe, and some not; the World must be more than the Elect. Of the world of those God loves so as to give his Son, to die for them; some believe in him, and have everlasting life, and some believe not and perish. But of the Elect all believe, and none perish.

John Humfrey, Peace at Pinners-Hall Wish’d and Attempted in A Pacifick Paper Touching The Universality of Redemption, the Conditionality of the Covenant of Grace, and our Freedom from the Law of Works (London: Printed and be Sold by Randal Taylor near Amen-Corner, 1692), 2-3. [Some spelling modernized; italics original; and underlining mine.]

Credit to Tony.

Humfrey:

When the Arminian then argues here, Christ hath died for All and Every man and that is not to be put off with the genera singulorum, or, the Gentiles as well as the Jews: therefore the grace of God is universal for all and every one to repent and believe that they may be saved. I answer, this is manifestly inconsequent, because it is true that what Christ hath done by way of Redemption is universal, and belongs to all the World, and every man alike, which is terminated in procuring these terms to be offered to the World for salvation. But as for mans belief, repentance, sincere obedience, which are the terms, they come directly and immediately otherwise, not from the grace of Redemption, nor from the fountain of mans free will with them, but from the grace of Election. God gives us his Son, and he gives us his Spirit. His sending his Son is one thing, and his sending his Spirit another. The work of drawing persons to Christ, I do observe, is attributed to the Father and the Spirit, because this is Peculiar: when the work which is attributed to Christ in distinction to them, is General to all mankind. He sent his Son to purchase salvation, if we Believe: he sends his Spirit to work that faith and repentance in us that we may be saved. In the one does lie the mystery of our Redemption, in the other, I say, the mystery of Election. Let it be true on one hand that Christ by his Redemption hath indeed procured no more for Paul and Peter, than for Judas and the reprobate, and so the honor of his Redemption be kept up with the Arminian to the height they contend for it: Yet may it be true, I hope likewise, on the other hand, that the grace of God towards Peter and Paul was more in giving them saving faith and repentance, than to Judas or the reprobate, and so the doctrine of Special Grace and Election need not neither be discarded.

John Humfrey, The Middle-Way in One Paper of Election & Redemption (London: Printed for T. Parkhust, at the Three Bibles in Cheap-side, 1673), 29-30. [Some spelling modernized and underlining mine.]

Zanchi:

Chap. 4.

Of the mercy of God.

The first Question.

Whether mercy be truly and properly attributed unto God.

Concerning this first question, the Stoics were of opinion that the name of mercy could by no mean be attributed to God, drawing a reason from the definition of mercy. For what is it else, say they, but weakness of mind, sadness and grief conceived upon an other’s misery and grief? and so does Cicero also define it as envy contrarily, is grief conceived of another’s prosperity. And so says Seneca also in his  book of clemency. Augustine also following in a manner the same definitions, says thus: “What is mercy but a certain compassion of another’s misery in our heart, by which we are compelled to help if we can?” and again, “Who knows not that hereof it is called mercy, for that it makes the heart miserable, grieving for another’s evil?” The like affirms Aristotle and Phavorinus. But no grief nor weakness can happen to God. For, if according to the Stoics’ opinion, it is not incident to a wise man, much less to God. But they are deceived. For God plainly calls himself merciful, and of great mercy. To the reason they bring, we make this answer: first, That it is manifest that God is not subject to grief nor weakness. But it therefore follows not, that therefore is is no mercy in God. For though man’s mercy defined by Cicero and others be a weakness of the mind; yet that Mercy which God attributes to himself, is not so. They only define that of men, but not that of God, and which the Scriptures speak of. Then the Latin word misericordia, we may thus interpret, as if we should take to heart another’s misery. If it was lawful for Augustine to derive it of miseria and corde, as that it is the misery of the heart conceived of another misery: why may not we say, that it is so called, for that we take another’s misery to heart? Truly this etymology can not be refuted by any good reason. And this definition does better agree with Mercy then that of Cicero’s, whether divine or human. For even God himself takes to heart the misery of his elect, as he teaches by his prophets. We commonly also call him merciful, not which has a miserable heart passively (for such a one is rather miserable then merciful), but actively, that is, him which desires and studies in his heart to help one in misery, and helps him as much as he is able. And so the Scripture calls men merciful: as where Christ says, “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy,” Math. 5:7. But I pray you whom calls he merciful here? not those which have a merciful heart: but those which study and endeavor from the heart to help those that are in misery. But although the Latin word did signify that they would have it, yet neither the Hebrew word racham, used by the Prophets, nor the Greek word eleeo, used by the Apostles, does include any weakness or grief of mind, as they that have skill in these languages do well know: but only either love, and an inclining of the heart towards the evil affected, or else alms, the very effects of love: and hence is that of the Apostle, Rom. 12, “He which shows mercy,” that is, which gives alms to the needy, “let him do it with a cheerfulness.” Wherefore it signifies not sadness of heart, but a work of love done to the needy, with cheerfulness of heart. But let us grant that which they gather out of Cicero, Aristotle, Seneca, Augustine, that misericordia signifies grief and weakness of heart conceived from another’s misery: follows it therefore, that that name can by no means be attributed to God? are not also the names of love, hatred, anger, and such like, which signifies affects and passions attributed to God amongst profane authors? yes: but not after the same manner, that they are to us. For they are in him without passion, but not so in us. And why then may we not say the same of mercy? Therefore the Stoics’ opinion is utterly to be rejected who do not it any place in a wise man. There are others which think that the manner of mercy may be attributed to God, and that God is in the Scriptures worthily called merciful, and to be of great mercy, but improperly: as he is also said to repent, be angry, and such like. And they are led with the same reason that the former, to wit that it is a grief and passion of the mind, which God cannot be subject unto, and therefore that it is improperly attributed unto him. And this is the common opinion, which yet  I do not simply approve. For the reason why they think thus is, because they consider mercy in us, and then transfer it from us unto God: thinking that it is so properly and of itself called mercy, as it is in us: and  so for that it cannot be so in God, to wit, with passion, as it were in us, therefore they think it is improperly attributed unto God in the Scriptures. But it is my judgment far otherwise. For the name of mercy is first in God, before it is un us: for it was in him first: and it is eternal in God. And this gift and virtue of mercy, as all other good gifts, is given us of God: and therefore God is called, “Father of mercies: and we are commanded by Christ to imitate the Father’s mercy, as the rule of all true mercy. But God’s mercy, which is the true mercy, is not any infirmity. For God is merciful, of his own eternal and simple essence, as also good, gentle, and mighty: therefore that particle, weakness of mind, is not necessary in the definition of true mercy: but it is by accident that it is such in us: for that we are of such a nature as is subject to griefs and passions, so as we cannot bear, see, or think of another’s misery, especially if he be of our affinity, or nation, or else joined unto us by the bond of nature, or friendship, without sympathy and grief. Wherefore it is so far off, that because of the weakness of mind, which is not incident to God, but is incident to us, it should be attributed to God improperly, and properly to us: that contrarily rather, as wisdom, life, justice, goodness, and other good gifts, so also mercy should first of itself and properly be said of God, and secondly and less properly of us: for that it is perfection in God, and imperfect in us…

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