Ursinus:

1) Merciful. God’s mercy appears in this: 1. That he wills the salvation of all men. 2. That he defers punishment, and invites all to repentance. 3. That he accommodates himself to our infirmity. 4. That he redeems those who are called into his service. 5. That he gave and delivered up to death his only begotten Son. 6. That he promises and does all these things most freely out of his mercy. 7. That he confers benefits upon his enemies, and such as are unworthy of his regard. Obj. 1. But God seems to take pleasure in avenging himself upon the ungodly. Ans. Only in as far as it is the execution of his justice. Obj. 2. He refuses mercy to the ungodly. Ans. Only to such as do not repent. Obj. 3. He does not save all when he has the power. Ans. God acts thus that he may exhibit his justice with his mercy. Obj. 4. He does not exercise his mercy without a sufficient satisfaction. Ans. Yet he has most freely given his Son, that he might make satisfaction by his death.

Bountiful. God is said to be bountiful; I. Because he creates and preserves all thing. 2. Because he confers benefits upon all, even upon the wicked. 3. Because of the free and boundless love which he exercises towards his creatures, especially to man. 4. Because of the love which he cherished towards the church, and in giving eternal life and glory to his people. Obj. 1. But the Scriptures speak of God as cherishing anger. Ans. Be is angry with sin and depravity, but not with his creatures. Obj. 2. God often inflicts punishment upon his creatures. Ans. Only upon such as are impenitent.  Ursinus, Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 8, Q 25, p., 127.

2) Obj. He who rigorously exacts his right, shuts out every expectation of clemency. God rigorously exacts his right. Therefore with him there is no clemency. Or the objection may be thus stated: He who does not yield any thing in relation to his rights, is not merciful, but only just. God does not yield any thing as it respects his rights, because he punishes every sin with a punishment that corresponds with its just desert. Ana. We deny the minor proposition, because God, although he punishes sin with eternal punishment, does nevertheless yield much as it respects his right. He exhibits great clemency, for instance, towards the reprobate, for he defers the punishment which they deserve, and invites them to repentance by strong and powerful motives. And as to the punishment which he will inflict upon them in the world to come, it will be lighter than they deserved. So he also exercises great mercy towards the faithful, for he has, from his mercy alone, without being bound by any law or merit on our part, given his son, and subjected him to punishment for our sake. We also deny the major proposition, if applied either to him who is endowed with such wisdom that he can discover a method of exercising mercy without violating his justice, or when applied to him who, whilst he executes his justice, does not rejoice in the destruction of man, but would rather that he be saved [Lat. “sed mallet eu esse saluum“]. As a judge, when he passes the sentence upon a robber that he deserves to be put to the torture, and yet does not take pleasure in his punishment, exhibits great equity and clemency, even though he seems to exact the most rigorous demand of the law,so God is far more equitable and clement, although, in his just judgment, he punishes sin, for he does not delight in the destruction of the wicked, (Ez. 18:23; 33:11.) and has also shown his mercy and compassion towards us, by laying the punishment which we deserved upon his own Son.  Ursinus, Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 4, Question 11, pp., 69-70. [Note: on this last, the earliest English translation of Ursinus’ commentary has nearly identical wording, even down to, “but had rather he were saved.”  The Summe of the Christian Religion, Delivered by Zacharias Ursinus, trans., D. Henry Parry, (London: Printed by Robert Young, 1633), 102.]

Heppe:

1) 32.–God’s holiness is manifested generally as perfect kindness and love and as perfect righteousness. Both rest upon a “certain benevolent and beneficent propension towards the creatures”, which is present in God (MASTRICHT II, xvii, 3). “The love of God is the essential property or essence of God, whereby delighting Himself in it He wishes it the good which He approves.” To be distinguished are the “general love of God”, the object of which is creation generally, so that “no one either of men or even of demons may say that he is not loved by God”; God hates the sin in the godless, but loves the nature created by Him-and the “special love of God, by which He peculiarly pursues the separate elect” (POLAN, II, 122). Herein is manifested the “goodness of God”, according to which God is in and for Himself “supremely good” and towards creation “beneficent” (RIISSEN III, 41). Since then God’s love for the creature is essentially a “love not due”, it appears as grace. “God’s’ grace is His virtue and perfection, by which He bestows and communicates Himself becomingly on and to the creature beyond all merit belonging to it” (HEIDEGGER III, 94). Over against the misery of the creature God’s love is manifested (I) as mercy. Etymologically misericordia is wretchedness of heart due to a sense of another’s wretchedness together with alacrity in succouring the wretched. Actually in God it is nothing but grace towards the wretched” (MASTRICHT II , xvii, 22); (2) as patience and long suffering. “Patientia Deiis His most benign will, by which He so controls His anger, that He either bears sinning creatures long and puts off punishment, awaiting their repentance, or He does not pour forth all His anger in one moment upon them, lest they should be reduced to naught”; and (3) as gentleness: “God’s clemency is His most benign will, by which mindful of His mercy in wrath He is propitious to us and spares us, although we have deserved otherwise, preferring our repentance and conversion to our death” (POLAN II, 24 and 25).

Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 95-96.

2) [Heppe:]Therefore the number of the elect has been fixed by God from eternity. His universal love and grace God of course shows to all His creatures. But His redeeming grace. is not universal but particular. It has only chosen those whom according to His unsearchable counsel God wished to elect, in order to make known to them the glory of His sin forgiving love, which rescues them from eternal death.

Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 172.

3) RIISSEN (VI, 18, 2): “The question is not of God’s general love and philanthropia, which He exercises towards all creatures, but of His special saving love, by which He has wiled to pity them unto salvation”.

Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1978), 173.

[Biographical note: Loenard Riissen (ca. 1636-1700) or Ryssen: studied at Utrecht and received his doctorate in theology from that university in 1655. He served as pastor and enver occupied an academic post. He wrote a Synopsis theologiae elencticae (1671) but his best known work is his Summa theologiae, based on Turretin and also entitled Compendium theologiae didactio-elencticae. Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, first ed., 1:49.]

Leigh:

The affections which Scripture attributes to God, are 1. Love, which is an act of the Divine Will, moving itself both to the most excellent good in itself, and to that excelling in the reasonable creature, approving it, delighting in it, and doing good to it. John 6:16, 35, Rom. 5:8. In which definitions two things are to be noted.

The primary object of God’s love is himself, for he takes great pleasure in himself. The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost love one another mutually. Matth. 3:7, and 17:5. John 3:33, 35. and 5:20. and 10:17. and 17:24. The secondary object of God’s love is the reasonable creature Angels and men. For though he approve of the goodness of other things, yet he has chosen that especially, to prosecute with his chiefest love: for these reasons.

1. For the excellency and beauty of the reasonable creature, when it is adorned with its due holiness.
2. Because between this only and God, there can be a mutual reciprocation of love, since it only has a sense, and acknowledgment of God’s goodness.
3. Because God bestows Eternity on that which he loves; but the other creatures besides the rational perish.

God’s love to Christ is the foundation of his love to us, Matth. 3:17. Ephes 1:6.
God loves all creatures with a general love. Matth. 5:44-45. as they are the work of his hands; but he doth delight in some especially, whom he has chosen in his Son, John 3:16. Ephes. 1:6. Psal. 106:4.

God loves his Elect before they love him; his love is actual and real in the purpose of it to them in Eternity. There are four expressions in Scripture to prove this:

1. He loves his people before they have the life of grace, Ephes. 4:5. 1 John 4:19. Rom. 5:8.
2. Before they have the life of nature, Rom. 9:11.
3. Before the exhibition of Christ, John 3:16.
4. Before the foundation of the world was laid,. Ephes 1:3. 2 Tim 1:9. Therefore God loves the elect more than the Reprobate, and our love is not the motive of his love.

Object. How could God love them when they are workers of iniquity, Hab. 1:13. Psal. 5:3,4. He loved their persons, but hated their works and ways. God loved Christ’s person, yet was angry at him when the guilt of our sins was upon him.

He loves his people, 1. Before conversion, Amore benevolentia, with a love of good-will and of pity, which is properly showed to one in misery, Ezek. 16:5.
2. After Conversion, with a love. 1. Of sympathy, Isa. 63:9. Heb 4:15. and 5:2. 2. Of Complacency and delight, Psal. 16:10, 11. that Psalm is a prophecy of Christ, see Ephes. 2:5. This love of his delight is discovered four ways:
1. By his valuing of his people, Since thou wast precious in my sight thou wast honourable.
2. By his commendation of his Church and people, as often, as often shown in the Canticles.
3. By his frequent visits; Luke 1:68. Rev. 3:20.
4. By revealing his counsels to them. John 15:15.

2. The effect or manner of God’s love is, that God makes the person happy whom he loves. For he doth amply reward that joy and delight which he takes in the holiness and obedience of the Elect, while he pours plentifully upon them all gifts, both grace and glory.

This love of God to the elect is:

1. Free, Hosea 15:5. he was moved with nothing but his own goodness, Ezek 16:8.
2. Sure and firm, and unchangeable, Rom. 5:8, 10. 1 John 4:10. John 13:1. and 31.
3. Infinite and Eternal, which shall never alter, John 3:16. It is without cessation, Psal. 27:10. Diminution Cant. 8:7. interruption, Rom. 8:35. to the end, or alteration, every created thing is immutable.

3. Effectual, as is declared both by his temporal and eternal blessings, 1 John 3:1. Dei amore est bonum velle.
4. Sincere, It is a love without any mixture, love, and nothing but love.
This is the motive which persuades Gods to communicate himself, and act for his people Isa. 63:9. Rev 3:19, and hath no motive but itself, Deut. 6:6,7,8. 1 John 4:3. God hath no need of us, or our love, nor doth not advantage himself by loving us, Job 22:2.

5. Great and ardent, John 3:16. and 15:13. Rom. 5:6,7. God bestows pledges of his love and favor upon them whom he has chosen, and sometimes he sheds the sense of his love abroad in their hearts, transforms us into his own image, Cant. 4:9. and 6:5. See Zech 3:17.

Edward Leigh, A System or Body of Divinity, (Printed by William Lee, at the Sign of the Turk’s-head in Fleet-street over against Fetter-lane, 1654), 167-168.

It is abundantly plain by the Holy Scriptures, and generally allowed, not only by Christian divines, but by the more considerable deists, that virtue most essentially consists in love. And I suppose, it is owned by the most considerable writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: though it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained, which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses on this subject.

When I say, true virtue consists in love to being in general. I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object: so that no exercise of love, or kind affection, to any one particular being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue. But that the nature of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards being in general; though from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder, that be who is of a generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons, with whom he is acquainted and conversant, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists a disposition to love being in general.

And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent being having a heart united and benevolently disposed to being in general, I thereby mean intelligent being in general. Not inanimate things, or beings that have no perception or will, which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.

Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence. Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being, which causes it to incline to its well being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity; but that there may a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence; so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation of God’s benevolence; as it is supposed that it is God’s goodness which moved him to give them both being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to being, which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God’s virtue is so extended as to include a propensity, not only to being actually existing and actually beautiful, but to possible being, so as to incline him to give being beauty and happiness.

What is commonly called love of complacence, presupposes beauty. For it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the person or being beloved for his beauty. If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent being, and virtue consists in love, then it is a plain inconsistency to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty of intelligent beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or that their virtue first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistency, and going in a circle. Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists; or it supposes the first virtue to be the consequence and effect of virtue. Which makes the first virtue, both the ground and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be inquired, what that virtue is, which virtue consists in the love of the love of, it must be answered, it is the love of virtue. So that there must be the love of the love of the love of virtue — and so on ad infinitum. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation; it is without beginning and hangs on nothing. — Therefore if the essence of virtue, or beauty of mind, lies in love, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because it is absurd to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.

Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, (University of Michigan: Ann Arbor: 1966), 4-6.