Bavinck:

But this first period in the history of humankind also soon became marked by the most fearsome wickedness. The corruption of the best proved the worst; the extraordinary powers and gifts were abused in the service of sin. This period was ushered in with fratricide. The Cainites, separating themselves from the Semites, concentrated on dominating the earth (Gen. 4:20ff.) and found their strength in the sword (Gen. 4:24). But only when the two, the Sethites and the Cainites, intermingled did wickedness explode: the imagination of the thoughts of their hearts were continually only evil (Gen. 6:5). It was a period so full of iniquity as would never come again until its return in the days of the Son of Man (Matt. 24:37). In a calamitous flood this whole generation disappears, except for Noah’s family, which then becomes the nucleus of a second humanity. The period after the flood is essentially different from that before the flood. In the time from Adam to Noah, nature–the world of plants and animals–as well as humankind bore a very different character from that of the time following. Powerful and copiously supplied with gifts, the world was, as it were, left to itself for a time; but it soon became evident that if God did not forcefully intervene, the world would perish in its own wickedness. With Noah, therefore, a new period begins. The grace that manifested itself immediately after the fall now exerted itself more forcefully in the restraint of evil. God made a formal covenant with all his creatures This covenant with Noah (Gen. 8:21-22; 9:1-17), though it is rooted in Gods grace and is most intimately bound up with the actual covenant of grace because it sustains and prepares for it, is not identical with it. It is rather a “covenant of long-suffering” made by God with ad humans and even with all creatures. It limits the curse on the earth; it checks nature and curbs its destructive power; the awesome violence of water is reined in; a regular alternation of seasons is introduced The whole of the irrational world of nature is subjected to ordinances that are anchored in God’s covenant. And the rainbow is set in the clouds as a sign and pledge (Gen. 8:21-22; 9:9-17).

A humanity now appears that, by comparison with the preceding one, is much gentler in nature, diminished in power, and of a much shorter life span. The blessing of multiplication is again expressly stated (Gen. 9:1); the fear and the dread of humans is laid on every animal (v. 2); green plants and meat are given to humans for food (v. 3). Human life is safeguarded by the requirement of the death penalty for murder and by implication, in principle, by the institution of government (w. 5-6). And later when humanity in building the tower of Babel conceives a plan to continue to live together in one location and to start a world empire, God frustrates the plan, disperses it in peoples and languages, and in that way, too, counters the development and explosion of wickedness! The grace of God, accordingly, manifests itself much more forcefully after the flood than before. To it is due the existence and life of the human race; the expansion and development of peoples; states and societies, which gradually came into existence; religion and morality, which were not completely lost even among the most degenerate peoples; and the arts and sciences, which achieved a high level of development. Everything that after the fall is still good even in sinful humans in all areas of life, the whole structure of civil justice, is the fruit of Gods common grace. Granted, God did allow the Gentiles to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16), but he did not leave them; he did not leave himself without witnesses to them but revealed himself to them through the works of his hands (Acts 14:16-17; 17:27-28; Rom. 1:19; James 1:17). The Logos illumines every human coming into the world (John 1:9). The Holy Spirit is the author of all life, power, and virtue, also among the Gentiles (Gen 6-17- 7:15; Pss. 33:6; 104:30; 139:2; Job 32:8; Eccles. 3:19). Humankind was led by this grace and under the dispensation of this covenant of nature before Christ and prepared for his coming. One can indeed speak in a positive sense of mankind’s education by God. A susceptibility for salvation was maintained and the need for it aroused.

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 2004), 3:217-219. [Original footnotes not included, and underlining mine.] [For more on Bavinck and Common Grace, see his excellent article, Calvin and Common Grace.]

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Dagg:

An unrestricted invitation to all who hear the gospel, to come to Christ for life, seems to imply that universal provision has been made in him; and in order to the making of universal provision, it appears necessary that he should have borne the sins of all men.

But the supposition that he bore the sins of the whole human race, is attended with much difficulty. Multitudes died in impenitence before he came into the world, and were suffering for their sins in the other world, while he was hanging on the cross. How could he be a substitute for these, and suffer the penalty for their sins, when they were suffering it in their own persons? And if he endured the penalty for the sins of all who have since died, or shall hereafter die in impenitence, how shall they be required to satisfy justice a second time by personal suffering?

For a solution of this difficulty, with which the minds of many have been much perplexed, it has been supposed that the amount of suffering necessary to make an atoning sacrifice, is not increased or lessened by the amount of the sin to be atoned for. This hypothesis is entitled to respect, not only because of the relief which it affords the mind, but also because it has recommended itself to the general acceptance of learned and pious men. Nevertheless, like every other hypothesis invented for the removal of difficulty, it should not be made an article of faith, until it has been proved.

In support of the hypothesis, it has been argued that since the wages of sin is death, Christ must have died for a single sin, and he needed only to die, in making atonement for the sins of the whole world.

This argument does not sustain the hypothesis, unless it be assumed that death is the same in every supposable case. But death may be an easy and joyful transition from this world to the world of bliss. Such was not the death of Christ. Death, as the wages of sin, includes more than the mere dissolution of the body: and Christ, in dying for sin, endured an amount of sorrow which was not necessary to mere natural death. In this suffering, the expiatory efficacy of his death chiefly consisted; and we dare not assume that the amount of it must be the same in every supposable case. The sufferings of Christ derive infinite value from his divine nature; but, being endured by his human nature, their amount could not be infinite; hence it is supposable that the amount might have been different in different circumstances. The inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah will, in the last day, be doomed to the second death, equally with the more guilty inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida: but the anguish attendant will be more intolerable in one case than in the other. Analogy would seem to require, that Christ, suffering for the sins of the whole world, must endure more than if suffering for only one sin.

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Bavinck:

1) But though he wills all creatures as means and for his own sake, he wills some more than others to the degree they are more direct and suitable means for his glorification. God is a Father to all his creatures, but he is that especially to his children. His affection for everything he created is not as deep as his affection for his church, and that in turn is not as great as his love for Christ, the Son of his good pleasure. We speak of a general, a special, and a very special providence; in the same way we make as many distinctions in the will of God (as it relates to his creatures) as there are creatures. For the free will of God is as richly variegated as that whole world is. Hence, it must not be conceived as an indifferent power, a blind force, but as a rich and powerful divine energy, the wellspring of the abundant life that creation spreads out before our eyes. In that world, however, there is one thing that creates a special difficulty for the doctrine of the will of God, and that is the fact of evil, both evil as guilt and evil as punishment, in an ethical as well as a physical sense. Though evil is ever so much under God’s control, it cannot in the same sense and in the same way be the object of his will as the good. Hence, with a view to these two very different, in fact diametrically opposed, objects we must again make a distinction in that will of God, as Scripture itself shows. There is a big difference between the will of God that prescribes what we must do (Matt. 7:21; 12:50; John 4:34; 7:17; Rom. 12:2), and the will of God that tells us what he does and will do (Ps. 115:3; Dan. 4:17, 25,32,35; Rom. 9:18-19; Eph. 1 :5, 9, 11; Rev. 4: 11) . The petition that God’s will may be done (Matt. 6: 10) is very different in tenor from the childlike and resigned prayer: “Your will be done” (Matt. 26:42; Acts 21: 14). Over and over in history we see the will of God assert itself in two ways. God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet he does not let it happen (Gen. 22). He wants Pharaoh to let his people Israel go, yet hardens his heart so that he does not do it (Exod. 4:21). He has the prophet tell Hezekiah that he will die; still he adds fifteen years to his life (Isa. 38: 1, 5). He prohibits us from condemning the innocent, yet Jesus is delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God (Acts 2:23; 3: 18; 4:28). God does not will sin; he is far from iniquity. He forbids it and punishes it severely, yet it exists and is subject to his rule (Exod. 4:21; Josh. 11 :20; 1 Sam. 2:25; 2 Sam. 16: 10; Acts 2:23; 4:28; Rom. 1 :24, 26; 2 Thess. 2: 11; etc.). He wills the salvation of all (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33: 11; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9), yet has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills (Rom. 9: 18). Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Backer Academic, 2004), 2:241. [Original footnotes not included and underlining mine.]

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Ainsworth:

3 Bounty.

God’s virtues in respect of his will are bounty, and justice: Bounty is that, by which out of love, God procures to every creature the good thereof, and it is common, and particular. Common bounty is towards all creatures, even such as offend him, directing them to their natural good, and sustaining them therein, so long as justice suffers, Luke 6:36. God cannot hate his creatures, as his works, for so they carry a similitude of God, the first cause [Eze. 33:11.]: and none can hate himself, or his similitude, for a similitude is something of himself. God’s bounty to his creatures presupposes not any debt or duty, which implies imperfection; and if God were bound to his creatures, he should depend on them, and be imperfect.

God’s bounty which is infinite, gives creatures good things, of nature, of sour, and body, and of outward things.

Such is God’s bounty, as the creatures suffer no evil, unless God’s justice require it, or a greater good confirm it; of this virtue God is called patient, and long-suffering.

Particular, or special bounty, is that whereby God loved some men (in Christ) fallen into sin, and furnishes them to eternal salvation [Eph. 2:4-5.]. God’s special bounty, is the first beginning, both of salvation, and of the means thereto. This bounty is no inherent quality in us, but we are the object of it, it is a grace making us grateful, not finding us so.

Henry Ainsworth, The Old Orthodox Foundation of Religion: Left for a Patterne To a New Reformation (London: Printed by E. Cotes, and are to be sold by Michael Spark at the Blue Bible in Green Arbour, 1653), 16-17. [Some spelling modernized; some reformatting; italics original; and underlining mine.]