Weeks:
SERMON VI.
EPHESIANS 1:11
Who works all things after the counsel of his own will.
We proceed in the discussion of objections.
Objection 7. It is said, that God, in scripture, represents sin as contrary to his will, and. forbids it under the penalty of his severest indignation but this doctrine represents sin as taking place agreeably to his will; and if God represents sin as contrary, to his will, and at the same time teaches this doctrine he contradicts himself. It is said, that God, in scripture, expresses the greatest abhorrence of sin, but that if he has decreed the existence of sin, and employs his own agency in causing it to take place, then he must be well-pleased with sin; and therefore, he expresses an abhorrence which he does not feel, and acts a deceitful part. It is said, that God, in scripture says, that he wills not the death of the sinner; but that if this doctrine is true, he does will his death. And if he punishes his creatures for doing what he caused them to do, then he must delight in their misery: which represents God as a most wicked, false, cruel, and unfeeling tyrant.
Answer. Before we proceed directly to the consideration of this objection, let a few things be premised. First, let it be observed, that in order to make out a contradictions in the declarations of anyone, we must be certain than the words, which are supposed to contradict each other, are used, in both instances, in the same sense. For example, the scripture says, in one place, “Answer a fool according to his folly,” and in another place, “Answer not a fool according” to his folly.” Now, to make out a contradiction here,” we must be certain that the words are used in both places in the same sense for if they are used in different senses, the two passages may be perfectly consistent. Again, let it be observed, that an event may, at one time, be considered by itself alone, and spoken of in that point of view, without taking into consideration any of its connections and consequences; and it may, at another time, be considered, and spoken of with all its connections, consequences, relations, and dependencies. When spoken of in the former point of view, it is said to be spoken of a it is in itself considered j and when spoken of in tile latter point of view, it is said to be spoken of as it is upon the whole, all things considered. Once more, let it be observed, that a thing may sometimes be chosen for its own sake, without any reference to any other thing; and this is what is called being desirable in itself. As, for example, we choose happiness for its own sake, because it is desirable in itself. And again, a thing which is not desirable in itself; and which never could be chosen for its own sake, may be chosen for the sake of some other thing with which it is connected, and which may thereby be attained; and this is called being desirable on the whole. For instance, we may choose to suffer a small temporary evil, for the sake of some great and lasting good, which may thereby be attained. We may choose to suffer the pain of cutting off one of our limbs, which is very undesirable in itself; for the take of preserving our whole body from destruction. A wise and good parent may choose to inflict pain upon his undutiful child, not for its own sake, not because he delights in seeing his child suffer, for that is very undesirable in itself, but he chooses it for the sake of the child’s good, or for the good of the rest of his family, to deter them from the like disobedience. God chose that his Son should die, not for its own sake, be had no pleasure in the sufferings of his Son, in themselves considered, but he chose it for the sake of the salvation of sinners; he chose it, because, upon the whole considering the amazing worth of souls, and the great glory that will redound to his name from saving sinners, considering how much his law would be honored, and how clearly his hatred of sin would appear in the cross or Christ, all things being considered, he chose the death of his Son, as upon the whole a desirable event, though in itself considered nothing could be more undesirable. He chooses often to afflict his children in this world, not for its own sake, he does not delight in their sufferings, in themselves considered; but he does it for their good, he does it because all things considered it is desirable, and will prepare them. for a higher degree of happiness in heaven that they could otherwise enjoy. It must be evident that this distinction is well founded. For if it is riot, if God gave up his Son to die, and “put him to grief,” because he took pleasure in his sufferings, considered in themselves, if he afflicts his children in this world because he delights in their pain, he must be a malevolent being. But this is the character of Satan. Satan torments others because he delights in their misery in itself considered. This is pure malice, and cannot be ascribed to God. But if this distinction is well founded, as it certainly is, the way is prepared to remove the objection under consideration.
For, with respect to the same event, we may be laid without any contradiction, to will it, and not will it at the same time. It would indeed be a contradiction lf we used the word will both times in the same sense, and with the same extent” of signification i but we do not. We will it, in one sense, while, in another sense, we do not will it. We will it, in itself considered, while we do not will it, on the whole; or else we will it on the whole, while we do not will it in itself considered. We do not will the loss of one of our limbs, in itself considered, as in the case supposed above while we do will its loss, on the whole, all things considered The parent wills not the pain of his child, in itself considered, while he does will his pain on the whole, for the sake of its consequences. In like manner, God may be said to will a thing, and not will it, at the same time; that is, he does it in different senses. He willed not the death of his Son, in itself considered, while at the same time, all things considered, he did will his death. He wills not the affliction of his people, in itself considered; he takes no delight in their pain; while, at the same time, he does will their affliction, on the whole, all things considered, and brings it upon them.
Keeping this distinction in view, God may be said to will sin, and not will it, at the same time; but in different senses. That is, he does not will it, in itself considered; it is in itself that abominable thing which his soul hates. But at the same time, when he sees that he can make a particular sin the occasion or means of some great good, which could not otherwise be accomplished, then he will. it to take place for the sake of that great good. It was in itself a very undesirable that man should fall, and that sin should enter into the world; and consequently. God must, in itself considered, have desired or willed that it should not take place. But when he considered that without this he could never display his wonderful mercy and grace in saving fallen man, which will fill all heaven with admiration and praise ages without end, for the sake of this great good, he willed that man should fall. Or, if it should be said that God could not prevent man. From sinning without destroying his moral agency and that this was the reason he did not prevent it; then it follows, that although in itself considered. God willed that man should not sin, yet on the whole, rather than destroy his moral agency; he willed that man should sin. The sin of the betrayers and murderers of our Lord was in itself very undesirable, and so, in itself considered, God could not have willed it. But when he considered that without this no atonement could be made, and no sinner pardoned, for the scripture says, Hebrews 9. 22, “Without shedding of blood, is no remission;” when he considered that without this, all our fallen race must perish forever, for the sake of the great good to be accomplished by it, he willed that men should betray and murder his Son. Thus, we see how God can be said, without any contradiction, to will sin and not will it, at the same time. He does it in different senses. He never wills it for its own sake, but for the sake of some great good which he will bring out of it. And that God wills sin, in this sense, do not imply that he feels any approbation towards sin in its own nature, or that he looks upon it with the least complacency, any more than it implies that we love pain, when we choose to endure it for the sake of some good. Neither does it imply that God is insincere in expressing the greatest abhorrence of sin. In itself, it is most odious and undesirable; and when God expresses an abhorrence of it, he expresses what he really feels. He hates it with all his heart. But this is no more inconsistent with his willing that it should take place, when he Sees that some good can be attained by it, that will overbalance the evil, than it is inconsistent for us to do every day those things which are undesirable in themselves, for the sake of some good which we expect to accomplish by so doing.
This distinction lays the foundation for mother distinction, which must be made in order to reconcile the scripture with itself; that of God’s will of command, and will of decree. God has given us his will of command, as the rule of our conduct whatever is: right in its own nature, he has commanded. Whatever is wrong in its own nature, he has forbidden. It is right in its own nature, and desirable for its own sake, that all intelligent creatures should love Goo with all their hearts and their fellow-creatures as themselves. This, therefore, he has commanded. And all those things, in our external conduct, which are suitable expressions of this love, he has also commanded. But, not to exercise this love, or to indulge any affection which is inconsistent with it, is wrong in its own nature; it is in. itself a very undesirable and wicked thing; and therefore, God has forbidden it. It is also right in its own nature, and desirable for its own sake, that God should exercise the same disinterested, universal and impartial benevolence, which he requires of his creatures. And he does exercise it. But our capacities and our circumstances are so different from his, that what would be a suitable expression of that benevolence in God, would not be so in us. It is incumbent on all moral beings, to exercise the same benevolent affection, to be of the same holy temper. But their capacities and circumstances, their situations and relations, are so various that what would be a very unsuitable expression of that holy temper in one, would not be in another. What might be suitable for the father of a family to do, and would be in him an expression of a right temper might be very unsuitable for a child in that family to do, and might be in him an expression of a very different temper. The same external action, which would, in a magistrate, be an expression of a right disposition, might, in a private citizen, be an evidence of a very wicked disposition. God has given us his revealed will, in which he has pointed out what things are, in us, proper expressions of a holy heart, and baa commanded us to do those things, and forbidden the contrary. But for himself, being placed in different circumstances, he has marked out, in his own mind, a different course or conduct, as in him a proper expression of the same holy heart. Being himself at the head of the universe, and possessing infinite power, and infinite wisdom, it is, in him, an expression of holy benevolence, to decree and cause those things to take place, which are upon the whole wisest and best. If he did not decree and cause those things to take place, which are, upon the whole, wisest and best, it would be an evidence of a want of goodness. God can discern what the greatest good of the universe requires, and bring it to pass. This, therefore, is the proper rule of his conduct; and it is suitable for him to decree and cause those things, by which this object will be beat promoted. But we are place in different circumstances, and cannot make this our rule of conduct, because we are not able to see beforehand what will be, on the whole, for the greatest good of the universe. For us, therefore, to leave our proper sphere, and attempt to do those things which are God’s peculiar prerogative, would be the height of arrogance and impiety. No; what is right in itself, God’s will of command, mast be our rule of God’s; for moment we depart from this rule, we manifest a wicked disposition; and we must leave it to God, to make what is best on the whole, and ,his will of decree, his rule of conduct. It does not, therefore, imply any contradiction in God, for him to command us to do what is right in itself, while he himself determines that he will do what is best on the whole. It is wrong in itself, that men should commit murder; and for them to do it, is an expression of a wicked disposition; and therefore, God has forbidden it. But, It was best on the whole, that his Son should be murdered by wicked men, best that in that way an atonement should be made for sin. Therefore, it was proper for God to decree and cause that his Son should be “taken, arid by wicked bands be crucified and slain;” (Acts 2. 23.), and his doing so, is in him an expression of a holy disposition. It is his will of command, “Thou shalt not kill,” but it was his will of decree, his “determinate counsel,” that they should put his Son to death. It is his will of command, that men should not commit adultery, and -that they should not dishonor their parents; but it was his will of decree, that Absalom should do both, for he says to David, II Samuel 12:11. “Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives, in the sight of this sun.” This was fulfilled in the wicked conduct of Absalom, recorded in the following chapters. It was God’s will of command, that Pharaoh should let hiss people go; but it was his will of decree, that Pharaoh should refuse to let them go, for he says to Moses, Exodus 4:21. “I will harden his heart that he shall not let the people go.” It is his will of command that men should do lie; but it was his will of decree, that the prophets of Ahab should lie to him, for the prophet of the Lord says, I Kings 22:23. “The Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets.” And the scriptures use the word will in both of these senses Mark3:35. “For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother.” There it is will of command. I Peter 3:17. “It is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well doing than for evil doing.” Here it is will of decree; for God has not commanded that men should suffer for well doing, though it is sometimes his decree that they should. Examples of this kind may be multiplied, but these are sufficient to show, that this distinction is clearly warranted by scripture, and indeed absolutely necessary, to reconcile the scripture with itself. When it is said, therefore that an is contrary to God’s will, and yet takes place agreeably to his will, there is no contradiction, if it is understood according to the sentiments here advanced. Sin is always contrary to God’s will of command, it is always undesirable in itself, it is always odious in its own nature; and in that sense, to wit. in itself considered, he never wills it; while, at the same time, all the sin which does take place; is, on the whole, for the best, and in that sense, always takes place according to the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness.
The objection further supposes that our doctrine makes God will the death of the sinner, in such a sense as to contradict his own declaration, and delight in his misery, like a cruel tyrant. The distinction, however, laid down in our premises, removes this part of the objection also. For although the infinite goodness of God makes him desire the good of every creature he has made, for its own sake, yet it makes him desire the good of the whole, taken collectively, more than of any part. And if he sees that the greatest good of the whole, requires that the good of a part should he given up, and that they should suffer eternal misery, his infinite goodness makes him desire that it should be done. When he punishes the devils according to their deserts, he does not do it because he has any delight in their pain. In itself considered, he desires their happiness very strongly. But considering the honor of his government, considering how much the great interests of the universe would suffer; if they should go unpunished upon the whole, all things considered, his goodness prompts him to punish them according to their deserts and sentence them to the blackness of darkness forever. So, when he punishes wicked men, whether in .this world or the next, he does not do it because he delights in their pain. He desires their happiness, in itself considered, very strongly. But he desires the good of the universe much more; and when that good requires, he inflicts upon the wicked the punishment they deserve. In itself considered, he willed not the punishment of Ephraim; and he expresses his feelings in the. strongest manner. Hosea 11:8. “How shall I give you up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver you, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set you as Zeboim? My heart .is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together.” But, at the same time, he did will his punishment, on the whole, all things considered, and gave him up to suffer accordingly. He wills not the death of sinners, even the most obstinate and incorrigible, in itself considered; it is very undesirable in itself; but yet he does will there, death, all things considered, and pronounces upon them the sentence, “depart ye cursed.” He is not “willing that any should perish,” in itself considered, “but that all should come to repentance,” II Peter 3:9; it is, in itself, very desirable, that all should repent and be saved; and yet, it is laid of some, II Thess. 2:11, 12.”God shall send them strong delusion that they should believe a lie, that they n might be damned.” ‘In these, and similar passages God doe. not contradict himself; but he does really, in itself considered, desire the salvation of all men; while, on the whole, all things considered, he wills that some should perish. And when he “hardens” and “blinds” some, and “sends them strong delusion, that they might be damned,” and causes them to do these things which will fit them for destruction, he does it for wise and benevolent reasons, and not because he has any delight in seeing their torments or hearing their groans….
Objection 9. It is said, that if this doctrine is true, and God decrees and causes whatsoever comes to pass, then he decrees and causes that some should reject the offers of salvation. But that if he decrees that they shall reject the offers of salvation, and causes them to reject those offers, he cannot be sincere in making those offers to them. He binds the prisoner fast in chains, and then opens the door, and bids him come out, which is but mocking his misery.
Answer. To make out the charge of insincerity against God, it must be made to appear that be refuses to give salvation to those who are willing to accept it, according to his offer. If he offers it on conditions which are in the power of every one, and gives it to all who comply with those conditions, and withholds it from none but those who refuse to comply, there is no foundation for the charge of insincerity. It would indeed be an evidence of insincerity, to bind a prisoner fast in chains, and then invite him to come out of his prison. But this supposes that the prisoner is willing to come out, but cannot. This case is not at all like that of the sinner. The, sinner can, but will not. If the prisoner had his chains knocked off, and the doors set open, he might be sincerely, invited to come out. What Christ has done, has opened the prison doors, and knocked oft the chains. The sinner may come out, if he will. Every obstacle is removed. Whoever accepts the offered mercy, receives the benefit of it. And those who will not accept it, have do right to conclude that God is not sincere in making them the offer.
But it is said again, that, according to the doctrine supported in these discourses, God hardens the sinner’s heart; and causes him to refuse the offered mercy. He cannot, therefore, desire he should accept it. And if he does not desire he should accept it, he cannot be sincere when he expresses such a desire, as he evidently does, in his offers of life, his warnings, threatenings, invitations, expostulations, and commands to choose life. Answer: When God, by his invitations, commands, &c., represents himself as desiring the salvation of the sinner, he must either desire his salvation on the whole, all things considered because it is best on the whole, or only desire his salvation in itself considered, because it is desirable for its own sake. Is it, then, best on the whole, that every sinner should be saved? and does God, taking into view all the consequences, upon the whole, desire the salvation of every sinner? and is this the desire which is expressed in the offers of life? No; this cannot be the ease. For, if God did, on the whole, desire the salvation of every sinner, he would save every sinner. It is God that saves sinners, and he is as able to save all, as he is to save a part. If he did, on the whole, desire that every sinner should comply with the offers of salvation, he would change their hearts, and cause them to comply. It is he that takes away the stony heart, and gives a new heart; and he is able to do it in every instance, if he chooses. If he does not do it, then, in any instance, it is because he does not, on the whole, choose to do it, in that instance; that is, he does not, on the whole choose that that sinner should be saved. But, should any say that God cannot change the sinner’s heart, and make him “willing in the day of his power,” and “cause him to walk in his statutes,” though he does, on the whole, desire to do it; we may ask them, if God does, on the whole., desire the salvation of every sinner, why does he not do all that he can, to save them? If he cannot give them a new heart and make them willing to comply with the terms of the gospel, why does he not use with them all the means that he can? He could raise up more preachers. he could pour out his spirit, he could awaken the careless and secure, he could place before every sinner a lively view of the glories of heaven and the torments of the damned, he could send his gospel to all nations, he could furnish his preaches with all those miraculous gifts, which were so instrumental of spreading the gospel at first, he could do a thousand things, which he does not do to promote the salvation of all men. It is evident, then, that he does not, on the whole desire the salvation of all men; but chooses, for some wise reasons, that, a part should perish; and, according to his own word, “send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they might be damned.” Since, therefore, God does not on the whole, desire the salvation of all men, the offers of life, which are made to all, do not express a desire, on the whole, for the salvation of all. But God does desire the salvation of all men, in itself considered. He views it, as in itself, exceedingly desirable. And the offers of life, the invitations; warnings, threatenings, expostulation, and commands, express this desire. And they express what God sincerely feels. But they do not express any other desire, and God does nol feel any other desire for the salvation of those he does not save. The salvation of a particular sinner may be exceedingly desirable in itself, while, on the whole, for some wise reason, it may be best he should not be saved. God, therefore, may, without any inconsistency, sincerely desire his salvation, in itself considered, while, on the whole, all things considered, he desires his destruction. He may, therefore, express his desire for his salvation, in itself considered. by offering him life, and exhorting him to choose it, and be very sincere in it; while, at the same time, since his damnation is best on the whole, he may decree his damnation, and harden his heart, and “send him strong delusion, that he might be damned.”
Williams Weeks, Nine Sermons on the Decrees and Agency of God, 3rd ed., (Newark, N.J.: Published by the Ecclesiastical Board of Trustees for the Propagation of the Gospel. John R. Weeks, Printer), 93-106, 108-112. [Some spelling modernized and underlining mine.]