Dabney:

Nor would we attach any force to the argument, that if Christ made penal satisfaction for the sins of all, justice would forbid any to be punished. To urge this argument surrenders virtually the very ground on which the first Socinian objection was refuted, and is incompatible with the facts that God chastises justified believers, and holds elect unbelievers subject to wrath till they believe. Christ’s satisfaction is not a pecuniary equivalent, but only such a one as enables the Father, consistently with His attributes, to pardon, if in His mercy He sees fit. The whole avails of the satisfaction to a given man is suspended on His belief. There would be no injustice to the man, if he remaining an unbeliever, his guilt were punished twice over first in his Savior, and then in Him. See Hodge on Atonement, page 369.

Dabney, Lectures, p., 521

Shedd:

1) It is objected that it is unjust to exact personal penalty from any individuals of the human race, if a vicarious penalty equal in value to that due from the whole race has been paid to justice. The injustice alleged in this objection may mean injustice toward the individual unbeliever who is personally punished; or it may mean injustice in regard to what the Divine law is entitled to, on account of man’s sin. An examination will show that there is no injustice done in either respect. (a) When an individual unbeliever is personally punished for his own sins, he receives what he deserves; and there is no injustice in this. The fact that a vicarious atonement has been made that is sufficient to expiate his sins, does not stop justice from punishing him personally for them, unless it can be shown that he is the author of the vicarious atonement. If this were so, then indeed he might complain of the personal satisfaction that is required of him. In this case, one and the same party would make two satisfactions for one and the same sin one vicarious, and one personal. When therefore an individual unbeliever suffers for his own sin, he receives the due reward of his deeds, Luke 23:24. And since he did not make the vicarious atonement “for the sins of the whole world,” and therefore has no more right or title to it, or any of its benefits, than an inhabitant of Saturn, he cannot claim exemption from personal penalty on the ground of it. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:443.

2) The other injustice alleged in the objection, relates to the divine law and government. It is urged that when the unbeliever is personally punished, after an infinite vicarious satisfaction for human sin has been made, justice, in this case, gets more than its dues; which is as unjust as to get less. This is a mathematical objection, and must receive a mathematical answer. The alleged excess in the case is like the addition of a finite number to infinity, which is no increase. The everlasting suffering of all mankind, and still more of only a part, is a finite suffering. Neither the sufferer, nor the duration, is mathematically infinite; for the duration begins, though it does not end. But the suffering of the God-man is mathematically infinite, because his person is absolutely infinite. When, therefore, any amount of finite human suffering is added to the infinite suffering of the Godman, it is no increase of value. Justice, mathematically, gets no more penalty when the suffering of lost men is added to that of Jesus Christ, than it would without this addition. The law is more magnified and honored by the suffering of incarnate God, than it would be by the suffering of all men individually, because its demand for a strictly infinite satisfaction for a strictly infinite evil is more completely met. In this sense, “Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound,” Romans 5:20. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:444.

Polanus :

1)

4. Moreover, the will of God, is either the goodness of God, or the justice of God.

The goodness of God, is his will, by which, he himself is by all means good, being both in himself and without, the author of all good things.

In himself he is good, by his essence, and chiefly.

In his essence, because he is good, not by participation of God from another, but naturally, and of himself, and that from eternity: neither is he so, by accidental goodness, but it is his own very goodness.

Chiefly, because he only is the chief good, that is to be desired of all.

Without himself, he is the author of all goodness, both in making so many good creatures, and also by doing good to the creatures that he hath made.

This goodness of God, by which he is the author of all good things without himself, is either general or special.

General is that, which generally extends itself to all creatures, not only towards them, which have continued in that goodness in which they were created, but also towards those which have fallen from their first goodness, as toward the evil angels, and wicked men.

The special goodness of God is that, by which God wills well to the elect angels, and his chosen among men. Psalm 73:1.

Moreover, the goodness of God, is the fountain of the grace, love, mercy patience and clemency of God.

The grace of God, is God’s most gentle goodwill, and his fatherly favour and will, by which he fatherly embraces us unworthy of it, and no man deserving it. Genes. 6:8, Luke 1:30, Tit. 2:11.

And this grace is truly and rightly termed grace, that makes us accepted before God.

But it is not poured into us.

Neither is it a quality inherent un us, but remains only in God’s himself.

It is distinguished from the gifts, which from God and bestowed upon vs Rom. 5:15, which are called graces freely given.

The love of God, is the most gracious will of God, by which he delights himself takes pleasure in that, wich he approves.

And this love of God, is both towards himself, and also towards the creatures.

The love of God towards himself, is that wherewith the persons of the Godhead love mutually, and each one the other. John 3:35.

The love of God towards the creatures, is either general or special.

The general love of God, is that with he embraces altogether all things which he has made, and does good unto them, and preserves and sustains them.

For though he hate sin, yet he loves the nature which he has created.

The special love of God is that, which he doth peculiarly prosecute the elect only.

And this is either towards Christ as in respect of his human nature, or towards the elect in Christ.

The love of God towards Christ as in respect of the human nature is that, by which he has appointed him, to be the head of the elect.

And this love is the foundation of his love towards the elect.

The love of God towards the elect in Christ is both towards the holy Angels, and also towards men that shall be saved. Ephes. 1:6, John 3:16.

The mercy of God, is his most favourable good will, ready to succour such, as are in misery. The general mercy of God, is that by which God, as God, is not only prest [pressed?] to succour all his creatures, & specially men both just and unjust, being in any misery, but does indeed help & relieve them, though not all unto eternal life, yet unto some salvation, or as we may say, temporary deliverance, Luke 6:36.

The special mercy of God is that, by which God, as a most bountiful and free Lord, has mercy upon whom he will. I mean of these, whom he has predestinated to eternal life, whom he also calls, justifies, and glorifies. Rom. 9:18. He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens.

The patience of God, is his most gracious will, by which he long suffers men’s sins, and defers the punishment thereof. And this is called the long sufferance of God, Rom. 2:4. and 3:26. and 9:22. 1 Pet. 3:20. 2 Pet. 3:15.

The clemency of God, is his most favourable will, by which also even in wrath he remembers his mercy, and spares us, though we have deserved otherwise.

Amandus Polanus, The Substance of Christian Religion, (London: Arn. Hatfield, 1600), 16-19.

2)

Arg. 5. He that has mercy on all, & loves all things that are, and hates nothing of that he has made, doubtless his will is not the cause &c. but those things are true of God: ergo: Wis. 11:24&c.

Asw. There is an homonymy in the words to have mercy, to love, to hate: For the proposition is meant a special love and mercy, by which God as a most free Lord has mercy on whom he will Rom. 9:18. and an especial love which peculiarly he extends to his elect, enriching them wit all the benefits thereof, in which he loved Jacob Mal. 1:2; Ro. 9:13. and a special hate by which God (having chosen to salvation whom he would) passed over whom he would, such as he used toward Esau Mat. 1:3; Rom. 9:13.

But the assumption and place out of the book of wisdom, God’s general mercy extends to all creatures that are in any miseries, and therein to all men as well as unjust as just, wherein he is prone to succor them and does indeed preserving and nourishing all things even the very ravens hat are Psal. 147:9. that is that croke.

The old translation has “that call on him,” but that is not so in the Hebrew: that is his own. So likewise his general love &c, so God hates nothing of that he has made so far forth as he made it.

Amandus Polanus, A Treastise of Amandus Polanus Concerning God’s Eternal Predestination (Printed by John Legat, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1599), 177-178.  [C.f. Polanus on the Providence of God.]

Polhill:

Object. 4.

If Christ died for all men, then he was a surety for all, and satisfied for the sins of all, and consequently God hath a double satisfaction; one in Christ the surety, and another in the persons of the damned, which is against the nature of his justice. In this argument are two consequences to be weighed. 1. If Christ died for all, then he was a surety for all, and satisfied for the sins of all. 2. If Christ so satisfied for the sins of all, then God bath a double satisfaction, which is against justice. As to the first consequence, I admit it as a very truth, that Christ was a surety for all, and satisfied for the sins of all; for if all did believe and repent, the sins of all should be remitted, and remitted they could not be; without a surety, and a surety making a satisfaction; therefore, such a surety was Christ for them all. As to the second consequence, if Christ satisfied for the sins of all, then God hath a double satisfaction, and that is against justice. I shall first premise some distinctions, and then answer. 1. I shall premise three distinctions.

1. Either the first satisfaction was made to the creditor or law-giver by the debtor or offender himself, or else it was made by a surety; if it was made by himself, justice forbids a second satisfaction.

2. In the first satisfaction being made by a surety, was either made by a surety of the debtor’s or offender’s own procuring, or else by a surety procured by the creditor or law-giver; if it was made by a surety procured by the debtor or offender himself, justice forbids a second satisfaction; for it is all one as if he had satisfied by himself.

3 When a surety provided by the creditor or lawgiver makes the first satisfaction, either he makes satisfaction in such sort, as that the debtor or offender shall be thereby immediately, ipso facto, without any more ado, discharged; or else e makes satisfaction in such sort, as that the debtor or offender shall be thereby discharged, but upon the performance of some conditions, and not otherwise; if the surety make satisfaction in the former way, still justice forbids a second satisfaction; but if he make satisfaction in the latter way, then upon the final non-performance of those conditions, justice may admit a second satisfaction. I will illustrate this by two instances. Suppose a man indebted to another in £1,000, the creditor procures his son to lay down the money in satisfaction of the debt, but withal it is agreed between them, that the debtor shall be discharged from his debt if he assent to this payment and not otherwise; if then the debtor dissent, the creditor may justly demand of him a second satisfaction. Again, suppose multitudes of attainted traitors be shut up in prison, and the king procures his son to suffer punishment in their stead, but withal the king and his son proclaim it as a law, that none of the traitors shall be thereby absolved, unless such as honour and do homage unto them; if any traitor refuse to do it, the king may justly exact a second satisfaction; and the reason of both is this, because the debtor or traitor not performing the conditions, can have no benefit by the first satisfaction, and therefore must be subject to a second, as if there had been no first at all. 2. These distinctions premised, I answer, men’s I sins are debts and rebellions, and satisfaction for them is due to God as the great creditor and lawgiver; but this satisfaction was not made by men themselves, but by Jesus Christ as their surety, and this surety was not procured by men, but provided by God himself; and being provided by God, he did not pay down his satisfactory blood in such sort, as that men should be thereby immediately, ipso facto, absolved from their debts and rebellions, but in such sort, as that men may be acquitted from their debts and rebellions if they re pent and believe; wherefore, if they do neither, they can have no benefit by Christ’s satisfaction, and by consequence a second satisfaction may be justly exacted from them.

Now for the more distinct clearing of this momentous objection, I shall propose four things. 1. God out of mere grace procured Christ to be a surety for men; and therefore it was in his power to prescribe the conditions, upon the performance or non-performance whereof men should have or not have benefit by Christ’s satisfaction.

2. According to this power, God hath plainly set down the conditions in the gospel, viz. “He that believes shall be saved, and he that believes not shall be condemned.”

3. These conditions being thus set down by God himself, no man falling short of them can have benefit by Christ’s satisfaction. If men will not receive the atonement, (Rom, v. 11), how can they be at peace? If they will not receive remission of sins, (Acts x. 43), how can they be pardoned? We are all in a worse dungeon than Jeremy’s, and if we will not put the cords of grace under our arms, we cannot get out; we are all servants of sin, and if we say to it, we love thee and will not go out free, we must be bored for eternal slaves. Christ hath opened the fountain of his blood, but we must wash in it, (Zach. xiii. 1); Christ hath made a purchase of souls, but we must believe eis peripoiesin psuches, to the purchasing of the soul, (Heb. x. 39) : not that faith is part of the purchase-money, but that it is the condition of the gospel, without which the glorious purchase of Christ profits not; if men live and die in unbelief, ek eti apoleipetai, there remaineth no more sacrifice for them. (Heb. x. 26). Indeed Christ offered a sacrifice for them, but ek eti, the benefit of that sacrifice cloth no more remain unto them; upon their final unbelief they have no more benefit by it than if there had been none at all for them : in which sense I understand that of the father, Si non credis, non tibi descendit, non tibi passus est Christus.

4. If final unbelievers can have no benefit by Christ’s satisfaction, then God may justly require a second satisfaction of them, because they cannot plead the first; and so it is in law as to them as if there had been no first at all. Shimei had a pardon from Solomon, but passing over Kidron lost it; and therefore (notwithstanding the same) was justly put to death for his offence: Jesus Christ as a surety made satisfaction for men, but they through their final unbelief lose the benefit of it; and therefore (notwithstanding the same) God may justly require a second satisfaction from them. It Shimei had pleaded his pardon, Solomon would have told him, That is nothing to thee, ever since thou didst pass over Kidron; and if unbelievers should plead Christ’s satisfaction, God would tell them, That is nothing to you, seeing you have lived and died in unbelief. Edward Polhill, “The Divine Will: Considered in its Eternal Decrees,” in Works, chapt 7, section 4, sub-section 3, Obj., 4., 168-169.

Edward Polhill, “The Divine Will: Considered in its Eternal Decrees,” in Works, chapt 7, section 4, sub-section 3, Obj., 4., 168-169.