Davenant:

No grace or gift is bestowed upon any man for this very end, that he may abuse it, but many excellent graces and gifts have been temporally bestowed upon angels and men not-elected with an eternal decree or purpose of God Not to keep them from abusing them, Not to keep them from incurring eternal death by abusing. This is the decree of reprobation which we admit: and if this author¹ can rightly infer that, this is contrary to the end and use of God’s gifts, we will subscribe to his conditional election and reprobation. If he hope to infer this conclusion, his premisses must be, Every absolute decree of God to permit the final abuse of any of his good gifts or graces, is contrary to the use or end of bestowing them upon man. But that decree of absolute negative reprobation which we defend is an absolute decree, &c. ERGO, it is contrary, &c. The major proposition will be denied by all judicious Divines, and can never be proved by the Remonstrants. Non institutio bonarei sed exorbitatio reproband est.²

That God wills the good of men in bestowing any good gifts or graces upon them, needed no proof at all: We have always affirmed willing granted this proposition. Yet for the true understanding thereof it must be observed, that when we say this is God’s will, this is God’s aim or intent, these words have not always the same signification. This author by confounding the divers meaning of these and the like words does strangely entangle himself through his whole discourse. For therefore, any thing is said to be according to God’s will, which considered in itself is according to the goodness and purity of the Divine nature. This is a perpetual necessary volition in God, qua deo placet omne bonum. And this simplex complancentia towards³ all good actions of men or events unto men, is possible circa creaturas omnes etiam nunquam futuras: For there is no goodness imaginable, which has not an agreement with the good will of God, which we call amorem simplicus complacentia.⁴ Satis constat hujusmodi complacentiam dei versari circa pœnitentiam, gratum & gloriam possibilem Iuda ant cujus libert damnati. 2. Secondly, God is said to will, desire, or aim-at that good, for the obtaining whereof he affords fitting means, though withal he wills that it shall be in the liberty of the creature to hinder and frustrate those means, and those he have absolutely decreed to permit the creature to abuse them unto his own destruction. This is that which usually is termed by Divines voluntas antecedens voluntas conditionata, voluntas simplicis complacentiæ. And thus God is said to aim-at or to will and desire the conversation and salvation of those who never shall be converted, justified or saved. Neither must we think that by these means⁵ God’s omnipotent will is cross, because his voluntas simplicis complantæ is not fulfilled. For the absolute will of God was, that in such persons their own free-will might hinder the good effect of his gifts and graces, which he was absolutely resolved to permit for some greater good. Lastly, there is a will in God strictly and most properly is called voluntas beneplaciti or his absolute will, which is not only a liking of the good willed unto the creature, and an ordering of fit means whereby the creature (if his own free-will hinder not) may attain it; but a merciful decree of so ordering the means and the very will of the creature, that it shall infallibly and unfrustatingly obtain the good end whereunto such means were accommodated. And of this Ruiz truly affirms, Sola hæ c voluntas absoluta simpliciter amplectitur objectum, & ideo sola simpliciter & absolute meritur nomen voluntatis beneplaciti.⁶ We grant, therefore, that in the second acception⁷ of the word will God truly wills, likes, desires the repentance, faith, perseverance, and salvation of all to whom the Gospel is preached and Christ offered. But in the last and most proper acception, God wills the perseverance and salvation only of his elect, in whom he never ceases working till the happy effect is produced.

Our Divines at Dort granted a true and serious will in God according to the second acception of the word will, but not according to the last. Which will simplicis complacentæ may stand with absolute reprobation.

Read the rest of this entry »

Burgess

I shall now in the next place, consider the work of Grace, under the notion of Conversion, or Turning unto God, which is one of the most frequent words in the Scripture to denote that duty. For the better opening of the words upon which I intend to build this discourse, we may observe God himself, inditing a Sermon for Ezekiel the Prophet to Preach, wherein there is, 1. The Doctrine, I have no pleasure in the death of a wicked man. 2. The confirmation of it by an Oath, which God himself makes, As I live, saith God. 3. The use of Exhortation, Turn ye, Turn ye. 4 The Motive, Why will ye die? For the occasion of these words, you may see God giving Commission to Ezekiel to be a Watchman, admonishing him by several Arguments to discharge his trust faithfully; and in that all Ministers are concerned: It was Chrysostom’s wonder, if any spiritual Officer, who had charge of souls committed unto him, could be saved; for if a man is not able to give an account for his own sin, how shall he do it for other? Therefore the forepart of his Chapter should be the faithful Ministers Looking glass, wherein he should often look: And if there be so much joy in heaven, for the reducing of one sheep that goes astray, how much rather for the conversion of a wandering Shepherd! Another part of his duty is, to vindicate and justify God; for the Jews quarreled and repined at Gods providence, as if his ways were unequal, or as if God did delight in the destruction of men, yea, though they turned from their wicked ways. Now my Text is an Apology unto that calumny, where the clear contrary is confirmed by an Oath of God himself; who though he cannot lie, and so his word is enough, yet for condescension to our capacity, and to confirm our faith, doth swear, That he delights not in the death of a wicked man, O beatos nos quorum causa Deus jurat, O miserrimos si nec juranti Domino credimus. Tertullian.

Now this Text is frequently urged and debated upon in the matter of Reprobation, corrupt Teachers concluding from hence, that there is no Election or Reprobation absolutely, because God doth seriously will every mans life, and no wicked mans death. Some answer, that this place is wholly impertinent to that question; for (say they) the Prophet speaks not here of eternal life, but temporal, and that which is by the violence of the sword: And (say they further) the antecedents and consequents do evidently show, that the sense is, God doth not will the death of a wicked man, if he will turn from his wickedness; for the Jews charged God foolishly, as if they were punished unjustly, for they persuaded themselves they turned to God, and yet their calamities were not taken away: This is probable, but grant the Text to be comprehensive of Eternal death, as many other places are; such that, God would not have any to perish, but come to the knowledge of the truth, &c. 1 Tim. 2. v. 4. Then the answer is known, which may easily be made good, though it be not my work now, God hath an approving will, and an effective or decreeing will. Gods approving will is carried out to the objects, as good in it self; but Gods Effective will is, when he intends to bring a thing about. God had an approving will, that Adam should stand, therefore he gave him a command, and threatened him if he did fall; yet he had not an effective will, to make him to stand, for then who could have hindered it? Thus Christ’s tears over Jerusalem (How often would I have gathered thee, and thou would not?) were not Crocodiles tears (as some say the Calvinists make them) for though Christ, as God, had not decreed the conversion of the Jews, yet the thing it self was approved of, and commanded, and he as the Minister of the New Testament, affectionately desired it: So here in the Text, God by this pathetic expression, doth declare, how acceptable and desirable a thing it is in its self, that the Jews should be converted; how distasteful and unpleasant their damnation was: therefore mark the expression, he doth not say, I do not will the death of the wicked, but I have no pleasure in it: And if that of the Arminians be true, that God doth effectually will the conversion of all, why then are not all converted? Who hath resisted his will? but I intend grapes, and not thorns; practical not controversial matter from this Text.

The first Observation is, That the damnation and destruction of a wicked man, is unpleasing to God, is not that which he delights in.

Before I open the point, you may object one known and evident place (there being many others also equivolent to it) Prov. 1. 26. I will laugh at your calamity, and mock when your fear comes: This argues their destruction was pleasing to him, Hence judgments upon the wicked are compared to Sacrifices, because they are so acceptable to him.

Read the rest of this entry »

Venema:

1) It is usually asked what kind of knowledge that is by which God knows things that are conditionally future. The Jesuits here introduce their scientia media, to which they assign a middle place between scientia simplicis intelligentice and scientia visionis; inasmuch as God by the former knows things merely possible–things not absolutely but only conditionally future.

Here, therefore, scientia media is required. But we say in reply, that this scientia media is introduced without reason and foundation, because nothing else is necessary to the knowledge of future contingent events than the knowledge of the connexion between the antecedent and the consequent. Now the connexion between the conditions, namely, and the occurrence of events, is either necessary or arbitrary and free, and depending on the decree of God. If it be necessary it belongs to scientia simplicis intelligentice, by which God knows things with their consequences and relations. Thus he knew that the inhabitants of Keilah would deliver up David; not, however, by scientia media, but by scientia simplicis intelligentice, by which he knows the relations of things, whether these relations be absolutely or restrictedly necessary. But if the connexion be arbitrary, or depend upon the free determination of the will of God, then it belongs to scientia visionis, or to that knowledge by which he knows by his decree the relations and issues of things. Now there is a general decree by which he has ordained the connexions of things. This knowledge, therefore, belonged to that part of the decree by which he instituted the mutual relation of events, such as that which we have already adverted to in the case of Joash who, if he had smitten the arrows upon the ground five or six times, would have smitten and consumed Syria. The event in this case depended on the good pleasure of God, because he had instituted the connexion between it and what went before.

Such also is the connection between the condition of salvation and salvation itself;–”H e that believeth shall be saved”–a connexion which depends upon the free decree of God. The same remarks may be applied to all conditionally future events. Hermann Venema, Institutes of Theology, trans., by Alex W. Brown, (Andover: W.F. Draper Brothers, 1853), 155. [Some spelling modernized; italics original; and underlining mine.]

Read the rest of this entry »

Bergius:

Q. 52. Then let us hear your [the Reformed] proper opinion and explanation of all these points; and First, Whether God will not at all that all men should be saved?
A. God is naturally good and merciful towards all men.¹ But also he is a just and angry God against the sins of men.² Therefore he has indeed no pleasure in himself in the condemnation of any man, but wills that every man turn by repentance and be saved:³ Yet with this proviso, that he will also according to his Justice judge and punish those that will not be converted.⁴

Q. 53. But your men [the Reformed]  teach that by the secret will of his Beneplacitum, he will not at all that all and every man should be saved, though externally after the revealed will, Voluntate signi, he make show of it.
A. They speak with Luther of that will of God which he wills wholly and altogether, so that it must certainly be done, of which it is written: He does whatsoever he will, Psal. 115:3 and 135:6. Isa. 46:10. Which the School-Divines have especially called the will of his Beneplacitum, because it is only fulfilled by, his good pleasure: And of this no man will say, no not the Lutherans, themselves wills that all men necessarily or inability must be saved.

Besides, ours deny not that God wills the salvation of all men thus far he has testified it in his word as the sign of his will, to which also the secret will of his beneplacitum is not contrary, which also some with Damascen called the Antecedent will of God, because herein is considered what God willed in and for himself before our works, according to the will of his goodness and mercy.

Namely First, Voluntate approbante: That for himself he has not delight or pleasure in their destruction but rather in their weal and salvation, Ezek. 18:32, and 33:11, 1 Tim. 2:4, and 2 Pet. 3:9.

Read the rest of this entry »