Archive for the ‘Divine Permission of Sin’ Category

28
Jan

Henry B. Smith (1815-1877) on Divine Permission of Sin

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

Smith:

2.  The permissive and efficient will of God. This is the distinction made all through the history of Calvinistic theology down to the time of the Hopkinsian school in New England. God permits the morally evil and effects the good. In respect to sin, He for wise reasons simply determines not to prevent it, all things considered. The efficient will of God has respect to what God directly produces through his own agency. The importance of this distinction is, that we cannot logically or rationally or morally conceive that God would directly produce by his positive efficiency what He forbids. Accordingly we must employ some milder term than efficiency with respect to the relation of God to moral evil, and the term selected is permission. This may not be the best, but it is well to retain it until we get a better.

Henry B. Smith, System of Christian Theology, 2nd ed., (New York: A.C. Armstrong and Son, 1884), 31. [Underlining mine.]

Truman:

Obj. 17. But it may be that God has decreed to, and so will, condemn me, do what I can.

Ans. Abhor such an opinion or thought. This, all sides disown: The utmost that is pretended by any moderate men, about this we are now speaking, is, “That there is a positive Decree to permit some to undo, or not hinder them from thus undoing themselves.” And this I shall not deny, but with them, that are better able to judge, to consider (since such conceptions help our understandings, that our imperfect notions may be in some measure rationally consistent), whether it be necessary to conceive, and so to affirm any such positive Decree to permit, whether a conception of a mere negation of a will in him to hinder, not a decreeing to hinder, be not enough: For you use to found this positive decree not to hinder, upon his fore-sight of what men would do if not hindered; now if they would do it without, and antecedently, to such a positive decree, what need is there? Nay is it not to conceive a vain positive act, to affirm such a positive decree to permit that which men would do without such a positive decree to permit, if he do not positively decree to hinder? But to let this pass, and suppose such a positive decree (he giving men means enough, and more than enough) not to go any further in hindering them from going in their impenitency.

How comes it about, that men make stops and exceptions about the decrees in God in reference to their soul-concernments, and never make such questions about them in other concerns, wherein learned men that differ about these things, seem better agreed about positive decrees? Men plow and sow, and never question whether God has decreed, whether there shall be any increase. When yet God has reserved to himself a liberty here, and may, for any thing they now, blast all their corn, and does sometimes (and therefore decreed it), notwithstanding their good husbandry. Yet none here says, “I will plow or sow: for if he have decreed a good crop, I shall have one, if not, I shall not have it.”  But this satisfies men here, “Though God, it may be, will blast all, do what I can; yet God uses to succeed diligent endeavors. But here, in the case in hand, you have far more reason to be consistent, for God has reserved to himself here no liberty to blast at all. All agree in this, that none shall fail, or not find who heartily seek, and so continue, nor shall so choose and pursue this better part, and miss of it: “He that comes to him, he will in no wise cast off.”

All agree, that there are no decrees but what are well consistent with the truth of those promises, and all notions of decrees really inconsistent with such promises are false. As also all those notions of decrees that are not consistent with his threatenings as he “He that repents not, shall perish.” But one may perceive how it comes about, that men fly to decrees here, and not in worldly concernments, but have a mind to go in their sins, and would fain find out some excuse for their sloth, and to lay the fault on God that they perish.

But it would be a wiser, and easier course, “To be making your calling and election sure,” than be making objections from such things as you do not understand, to hinder you. You in vain expect to be carried to Heaven, or to escape Hell without diligent endeavors of your own. Had those now in Heaven, continued while they were here on earth to make such objections, so as to be by them hindered from giving up themselves to the obedience of faith, if they had never come there.

Joseph Truman, A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency (London: Printed for Robert Clavel; and are to be sold at the Sign of the Peacock in St. Pauls Church yard, 1675), 205-208.   [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; italics original; and underlining mine.]

Marbeck:

1)

PERMISSION

Of God’s permission or suffering.

We must note, that when either the Scriptures or Fathers, do seem God to be the cause of sin, this word permission is not there so to be added, as though only he suffered men to sin, and by his providence or government, wrought nothing as concerning sins. Indeed, he lets  [prevents] them not, though he can, but uses them, and shows in them his might, and not only his patience, which thing Augustine understood right well; and disputed against Julianus, he confuted that sentence, where it is said, that God suffers sin only according to patience, and proves that his might is also thereunto to be added by the words of Paul, who wrote unto the Romans: “if God by much patience has suffered vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, to show forth his anger, and to make known his might.” And undoubtedly there are many things in Holy Scipture, which cannot always be dissolved by the word of permission or patience. “For the heart of the king is said to be in the hand of the Lord, so that he inclines it, whether soever it pleases him.’” And Job testifies that it was so done as God would. But as touching sin of the first man, when yet nature was not vitiated and corrupted we grant that the cause thereof came from the will of Adam and suggestion of the Devil, and we say that God permitted it, because he might have withstood and let [prevented] it, he would not do it, but decreed to use that sin, to declare his Justice and goodness.

Pet. Mar. upon Judg, fol. 167.

Iohn Marbeck, A Book of Notes and Common Places, collected and gathered out of the works of diuers singular Witers, and brought Alphabetically in order (Imprinted at London by Thomas East, 1581), 808. [Some spelling modernized; square bracket inserts mine.]

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4
Sep

John Brown of Haddington (1722-1787) on Divine Permission

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

Brown:

1)
Q. In what manner doth God hate sin?
A . With boundless hatred, as a thing most abominable to him.

Q. How then is God in scripture said to bid men sin, and to harden them in it?
A. The meaning only is, that he permits, and punishes men by sin, 2 Sam. xvi. 10.

Q. If God hate sin so much, how can he permit it?
A. His permission doth not in the least effect or encourage sin; nor would he have permitted it, but to display his holiness by occasion thereof, especially in punishing it upon Christ, and saving men from it through him.   John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 37. [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

Q. How is God’s providence exercised about angels
A. In permitting some to sin, and lie therein; establishing the rest in holiness and happiness, and employing them in the administration of his mercy and justice.   John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 50. [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

2)
Q. How is God’s providence peculiarly exercised about men?
A. In giving or withholding from them the ordinary means of salvation, and enabling them to improve, or suffering them to abuse these means, as he sees meet, Psal. cxlvii. 19, 20. Rom. ix. John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 59. [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

3)
Q. How is God’s providence exercised about casual or accidental actions, as killing a man with a bow-shot at a venture, &c.?
A. In joining or disjoining the circumstances of these actions otherwise than the actors thereof intended, Exod. xxi. 13, 2 Kings xxii. 34.

Q. How is God’s providence more generally exercised about moral and reasonable actions?
A. In prescribing a law to be the rule of them, end in annexing rewards punishments to them, Exod. xx., Deut. xxviii

Q. How may moral actions be distinguished?
A Into good and evil, Deut. xxviii. 1. 15.

Q, Are no reasonable actions indifferent, that is neither good nor evil?
A. They may be indifferent in their nature; but with respect to their manner and end, they must be either good or evil, 1 Tim. i. 5, 6.

Q How is God’s providence specially exercised about good actions?
A. In stirring up to, directing in, and giving power and opportunity. for them, Phil. ii. 12. 13.

Q. How is God’s providence exercised about sinful actions?
A. In concurring to the substance of the act; and in permitting, bounding, and over-ruling to his own glory the sinfulness of it, Iso. xxxvii. 29.

Q. Doth not this way make God the author of sin?
A. No; when God so hates and punishes sin, he can never in any respect be the author of it, Zeph. iii. 6.

Q. Does God’s exciting or concurring in actions any way cheek the free will of creatures?
A. No.

Q. Whence it then that men raise an outcry against God’s providential concurrence with all, especially sinful actions, as if that and his decree put a farce upon the will of creatures?
A. It arises from their great pride and ignorance, in measuring God by themselves; for, because they could not effect the matter of a sinful action, and not its sinfulness, neither absolutely decree, nor infallibly determine another to an action, without forcing his will, they conclude that God is incapable to do it; forgetting that as the heavens are high above the earth, so are God’s ways above our ways, Isa. Iv. 9.      John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 59-60.  [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

4)
Q. How doth tho curse of God consume men’s wealth?
A. It deprives them of prudence to keep it, blasts their endeavors to increase it, and permits others unjustly to bereave them of it, Zech. v. 4. Job xx.

Q. How doth the curse of God slay the souls of men by their wealth?
A. By permitting them to improve it as an excitement to, and instrument of spiritual idolatry, carelessness about salvation, pride, uncleanness, &c.    John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 258. [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

5)
Q What do you mean by temptation?
A. Temptation properly signifies an enticing to sin.

Q. Does God the properly: tempt any man?
A. No; God tempts no man, but only tries them, James i. 13.

Q. What then is meant by God’s leading into temptation?
A. His laying such occasions before men, as their lusts can improve to sinful purposes; withdrawing his grace; and permitting Satan, the world, and the flesh, to seduce them into sin, Joshua vii. 21, Job i. and ii.    John Brown, An Essay Towards an Easy, Plain, Practical, and Extensive Explication of the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (New York: Robert Carter, 1846), 352.  [Some Reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

15
May

Experience Mayhew (1673-1758) on Divine Permission of Sin

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

Mayhew:

1) 4. From God’s permitting free Agents thus to act, the Things in this Way brought to pass, will as certainly have a Being as if God decreed to bring them about by a positive Act of his Power. For if he himself does, or decrees to do all that is necessary in order to their Futurition, giving his Creatures all the Power and Aid that is necessary thereunto, administering also the Occasions leading to such Actions or Events, when he knows that his Creatures being put into such a State, and then left to their own free Will, will assuredly act after such a Manner; he does by Consequence will or decree such Actions or Events, as they, not he, are the immediate Efficients and formal Causes of. I say, he that wills to do that on which he certainly knows such an Event will follow, does by Consequence will that Event, tho’ he himself neither does the Thing, nor is properly the Cause of another’s doing it; and tho’ the Agent by whom such an Agent is done, or such an Effect produced, be at perfect Liberty whether he will do so or not. In this Case the Event will assuredly happen, or the Effect be produced, as if the Agent acting had no Liberty; because God has determined to do, and actually does, that which he knows will be an Occasion (not Cause) of that Agent’s so acting.

The certain Futurition of any Events thus necessarily, or rather certainly, consequent on God’s permissive Decree, relating to them, does not at all infer a Want of Power or Liberty in the Agents immediately concerned in them, of not acting as they do. If God decrees to do that, on which he knows such an Event will follow, that is. That his Creature having Power so to act, will of its own Accord do so, the Consequence of this is not, that his Creature has not Power to do otherwise. I think this is as plain as any Thing can be. How should God’s Decree to suffer a free Agent to act after such a Manner, infer that Agent’s not having Power to forbear so acting?      Experience Mayhew, Grace Defended in a Most Plea For an Important Truth; Namely, That the offer of Salvation made to Sinners in the Gospel comprises in it an Offer of the Grace given in Regeneration (Boston: Printed by B. Green, and Company, for D. Henchman, in Cornhil, 1744), 187-189. [Some spelling modernized; underlining mine.] 158-159

2) As God neither will, nor ever designed to torment Men in another Life, save for their Sins, whereby they well deserve the fame; so he never is, nor intended to be, the Cause of those Sins for which he resolved to punish those who he ever knew would deserve it. If God should himself cause Men to commit Sin, it would not stand with his Justice to punish them for it. But no Man can prove, that God was ever the Author of any Sin. To affirm he ever was, is to blaspheme his holy Name. If any have let fall Expressions implying that God is the Author of Sin, they have certainly erred therein: And they who accuse Men with this (as I think, is frequent) when they are not guilty of it,, are guilty of grievously wronging them.

They who affirm. That God has from Eternity decreed to permit those Sins to be committed, which he certainly knew would be committed, if he prevented them not, and that he accordingly does permit them, do not hereby make him the Author of Sin. God’s suffering his Creatures to Sin, when it is in his Power to hinder them, is not to be the Author of Sin. Nor is God in Justice obliged to exert his Power in hindering Persons from sinning, tho’ he knows they will Sin if he does not, and that their Sinning will bring Ruin on them.

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