Colquhoun

It may be remarked that there is a very great difference between the assurance of faith, and that assurance of sense which is one of the fruits of faith. The assurance of sense is a believer’s assurance that he is already united to Christ, and is in a state of grace. The assurance of faith is as inseparable from faith as light is from the sun; but it is quite otherwise with the assurance of sense. A man cannot have faith without having an assurance in it, but he may have faith and not have assurance of it. For, though the mind cannot but be conscious of its own act, yet whether that act has the peculiar properties and nature of saving faith cannot be satisfactorily known but by reflection. This assurance of sense or reflection, then, is not a believing in Christ; but it is a believing that we have believed him. It is not a direct act terminating on him, but a reflex by which we are assured of the saving nature of that direct act. But although the direct act may be without the reflect, yet the latter cannot be without the former. A man must begin to believe before he can begin to know that he has believed… The assurance of faith is commonly not so strong nor sweet as the assurance of sense which is supported by evidences. By the former, a man trusts upon the warrant of the free offer and promise that Christ will do the part of a Saviour to him; by the later, he believers upon the inward evidences of grace, that his faith is unfeigned and operative. By the one, he is assured of the truth of what God hath said to him; by the other, of the reality of what God hath wrought in him. By that he trusts he shall be pardoned and saved; by this he is persuaded that he is pardoned and saved in part already. The object of the assurance of faith is Christ revealed, and offered in the Word the object of the assurance of sense is Christ formed and perceived in the heart. The former is the root and the latter is the fruit.

Cited by Donald Beaton “The Marrow of Modern Divinity,” The Princeton Theological Review. 4, no. 3 (1906): 330.

[Note: this distinction arises out of the Westminsterian position on assurance, yet which seeks to integrate the original and classic Augustinian view of faith as entailing assurance. See also Steve Costly’s insightful remark: “When Nicole speaks of assurance, he means assurance of salvation, whereas Calvin spoke of assurance of God’s love.” I should add, that for Calvin, it was an assurance of God’s love through and in the death of Christ, and never apart from it. What is more, what Costly says of Calvin holds good for many other classic and original Calvinists, and what Steve says here captures well the very issues the Marrowmen were trying to express from within the limitations of Westminsterian orthodoxy.]

What is the instrumental cause of Justification?

Only faith in Christ, insomuch as by faith, even as by a hand and instrument we lay hold on, and apply unto us the merit and satisfaction o which Christ has performed for us.

What is faith?

Faith is not only a bare knowledge of the history of Christ, but it is also a sure confidence of the heart, whereby we set down in ourselves for certainty, and be persuaded that our sins are forgiven us of God for the death and passion of Christ [Syst. Theol. pag 427. Calv. Instit. lib. 3.ca. 2.]. Note here two main errors of Popery, whereof the first is, that faith only a certain historical knowledge, and no true and sure confidence of the heart: whereunto the Scripture itself directly speaks, Rom. 14.15. and Heb. 10.22. where faith is called pure trust and persuasion [Calv. Instit. Lib.3.cap.14 & 15. & 17 & 18]. See my Gymnasium logicum, where you have this in that theme Fides, somewhat opened. The second error is that we come by the remission of sins, not by faith alone, but also by the merit of good works; contrary unto those sayings in the Scripture, Ephes 2.8. “By the grace of God you are saved through faith, and not of yourselves.” Rom. 4. “Abraham believed, and that was imputed unto him for righteousness.” Again, “unto him not that works, but that believes in him, which justifies the wicked, by faith is counted for righteousness.” Luk. 8. Mark. 6. says Christ, ‘only believe:” which is all one, as if he had said, ‘By faith alone thou shalt obtain everlasting life.’ So then although these words be not manifestly extant, by faith alone are we justified, yet the sense is manifestly out down, and other words thereunto equivalent are contained in the Scripture: for whereas the Apostle says, Rom. 3.28. “We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law.

Bartholomaus Keckermann, Heavenly Knowledg, Second Edition (London: Printed for Thomas Jones, 1625),139-141.

[Explanatory notes: Most of what Bavinck says here is excellent and thought provoking. However, a couple of cautionary comments. 1) it is very doubtful that Calvin was a supralapsarian. For Calvin, While God is the ultimate cause of a man’s reprobation, the man is the proximate cause. Further, it is on the supposition of corruption that God predestines the reprobate to destruction. 2) Bavinck’s discussion of permission is problematic. At one point he says the one who permits sin is just as guilty as the one who commits sin. This is problematic because God is not bound to prevent sin. And if what he says holds good, then election itself is undercut and seen as seriously unethical. 3) Supralapsarian, though held by many Reformed theologians, is theologically unhealthy. It distorts one’s perception of God’s revelation to mankind. For sure, so does infralapsarianism, but supralapsarianism magnifies the distortion. 4) The so-called Amyraldian order of the decrees is also suspect given the denials and explanations of Amyraut himself.]

Bavinck:

In Christian theology, however, the word “predestination” (poorosmos)h as been used in very different senses. Meanings varied from broad to narrow. On the Pelagian position it is nothing other than the decree to grant eternal salvation to those whose faith and perseverance God had foreseen, and to consign others, whose sins and unbelief he had foreseen, to eternal punishment. The creation, the fall, Christ, the preaching of the gospel and the offer of gate to all, a persevering faith or unbelief–they all precede predestination, are not included in it but excluded from it. This decree is restricted to the decision to predestine some to eternal life and others to eternal punishment. Here predestination is understood in the most restricted sense and is totally dependent on the bare foreknowledge of God. It is uncertain and undeserving of the name “predestination.” Not God but humans make history and determine the outcome of it. This view has been sufficiently rebutted above and needs no further discussion here.

What does need further consideration is the important difference between infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism. This, in fact, consists in nothing other than a more restricted or broader definition of the concept of predestination. Augustine, to cite a major figure in this discussion, restricted the word in two ways. In the first place, in the order of the decrees he had the decree of predestination follow that of creation and the fall; second, he usually construed the word in a favorable sense, equated foreordination with election, and favored describing the decree of reprobation with the word “foreknowledge.” Predestination tells us what God does, that is, the good; but foreknowledge refers to what humans do, that is, evil. Generally speaking, scholasticism Roman Catholicism, and Lutheranism followed this latter usage. The infralapsarians among Reformed theologians similarly had the decree of creation and fall precede that of election and reprobation. But while the majority of them were willing to include reprobation in the decree of predestination-provided it follows that of the fall–and hence spoke of “double predestination,” others preferred to restrict predestination to election and to treat reprobation separately under a different name. Now if the word “predestination” is not construed in a Pelagian sense and reprobation is not withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the divine will, as was done in the thinking of later Catholic and Lutheran theologians, this difference is not material but merely verbal. Still, it is characteristic for the infralapsarian position that the decree of creation and fall precedes that of election and reprobation. Supralapsarianism, by contrast, so expanded predestination that it includes the decree of creation and the fall, which are then considered as means leading to an ultimate end: the eternal state of rational creatures.

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[Note: Shedd, is cited to respond to the claim that the expiation must, in and of itself, secure its application with regard to all those for whom it was made (contra Smeaton, et al) . See also Lane and Daniel for an explanation of this point.]

Shedd:

1) In the third place, an atonement, either personal or vicarious, when made, naturally and necessarily cancels legal claims. This means that there is such a natural and necessary correlation between vicarious atonement and justice, that the former supplies all that is required by the latter. It does not mean that Christ’s vicarious atonement naturally and necessarily saves every man; because the relation of Christ’s atonement to divine justice is one thing, but the relation of a particular person to Christ’s atonement is a very different thing. Christ’s death as related to the claims of the law upon all mankind, cancels those claims wholly. It is an infinite “propitiation for the sins of the whole world,” 1 John 2:2. But the relation of an impenitent person to this atonement, is that of unbelief and rejection of it. Consequently, what the atonement has effected objectively in reference to the attribute of divine justice, is not effected subjectively in the conscience of the individual. There is an infinite satisfaction that naturally and necessarily cancels legal claims, but unbelief derives no benefit from the fact. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:437

2) The expiation of sin is distinguishable from the pardon of it. The former, conceivably, might take place and the latter not. When Christ died on Calvary, the whole mass, so to speak, human sin was expiated merely by that death; but the whole mass was not pardoned merely by that death. The claims of law and justice for the sins of the whole world were satisfied by the “offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all” (Heb. 10:10); but the sins of every individual man were not forgiven and “blotted out” by this transaction. Still another transaction was requisite in order to this: namely, the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the sinner working faith in this expiatory offering, and the declarative act of God saying ” Thy sin is forgiven thee.” The Son of God, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins forever, ” sat down on the right hand of God ” (Heb. 10:12) ; but if the redeeming work of the Trinity had stopped at this point, not a soul of mankind would have been pardoned and justified, yet the expiatory value of the “one sacrifice” would have been just the same. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 3:418.