Venema:

(4.) We come now to the fourth question–the question namely as to the manner in which the decree was formed in the mind of God.

A decree is not a natural act on the part of God, but an act of his will freely determining itself. It proceeds indeed from a natural self determining power in him, hut it is not in itself an essential act. The power to decree is essential but not the decree itself. The decree accordingly is not of the essence of God, because it is a free act of his will and must not consequently be confounded with his nature. They speak inaccurately therefore or do not understand what they say or deny the freedom of the decree who affirm that the decree is God himself. Those who hold that the decree is freely made cannot , confound it with God; because that which may or may not be does not belong to his nature. Now he forms his purpose because he wills to do so; but it cannot be said that he exists because he wills to exist and consequently the decree is not natural–it cannot be said to belong to his nature, for it exists because he wills it,–it cannot be said to be God himself. From this it will appear how incorrect it is to say what is in every one’s mouth that God is a pure act, that he is every thing that may be. This is a contradiction in terms, for that which has a possible has not an actual existence.

God who is possessed of all power can produce more than he does, because his omnipotence is not exhausted. His decree is a free act and does not therefore belong to his nature, and although he maybe in the state of decreeing, he is not naturally and of necessity so. It is not correct, moreover, to deny that those actions are free which proceed from the natural power of God, as if the act and the power to act were in him two separate and distinct things. Those who say that as a pure act he is every thing that exists have done so chiefly for the purpose of avoiding the error of those who ascribe to him accidental qualities–qualities, i.e. which are superinduced from another quarter and which contribute to make up the perfection of which he is possessed. But a free action is not of this description. It is the result of an inherent power and, although in common with an accidental property it may or may not be, it has yet no effect in making him the perfect being he is. No addition is made by it to his excellence which is already infinite; it is only the effect of an exercise of the power which originally and naturally belongs to him.

A decree is an act which occupies the whole mind of God, the understanding and the will. In regard to the understanding it is an idea of possible things and a perception of ends and of means. It passes thence to the judgment by which its proportion and form, its end and means, are settled, and which combines, disposes, and arranges the ideas of these, and is at length completed by the will in the exercise of which God determines to give them being for these ends and by these means. The decree has thus its full form, inasmuch as it is the determination of the divine will.

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Venema:

1) (a.) Benevolence is an inclination of the will to do good as far as it is possible and lawful to do so. It is also called the love of God towards his creatures–the strong desire by which he is actuated to promote their happiness and perfection. It is universal in its extent, because it has for its object creatures as such, inasmuch as they are the works of his own hands. For the Creator cannot hate what he himself has made, but is naturally and necessarily led to preserve, to perfect, and to bless his own work. He is called love in the highest sense and without any restriction. “God is love,” 1 John iv. 8; “good and upright is the Lord,” Ps. xxv. 8; ” there is none good but one, that is God,” Matt. xix. 17; “he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good,” Matt. v. 45. Scripture declares that he has no pleasure in the death of him that dies,” because he is his creature, Ezek. xviii. 32; that he “will have all men to be saved,” 1 Tim. ii. 4; that he is ” not willing that any should perish,” 2 Pet. iii . 9. It tells us that he “so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life,” John iii . 16. This love, therefore, is universal, and prompted him to give Christ; and hence he is said to be “the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe,” 1 Tim. iv. 10. His Love of benevolence to all appears also in the command which he gave that his Gospel should be preached to every creature without exception, Matt, xxviii. 19. It is said that he “will render to every man” without respect of persons, “according to his deeds,” Rom. ii. 6; that “we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad,” 2 Cor. v. 10. Hermann Venema, Institutes of Theology, trans., by  Alex W. Brown,  (Andover: W.F. Draper Brothers, 1853), 163-164.

2) There is still another passage on which our opponents found an objection. We refer to 1 Tim. ii. 5. The apostle in the beginning of the chapter, we are told, exhorts that supplications, &c. should be made for all men, and then for the purpose of enforcing his exhortation, he adds that there is “one God” who will have all men to be saved, and “one Mediator, the man Christ Jesus.” Our answer to the objection now stated is this. Not only may what has already been said be applied in explaining the apostle’s words, but there is another reason why God is called one. This reason has no reference to unity of essence, but to men in their collective capacity. The apostle in calling him one God, means that he is God to all alike and stands in the same relation to all. He proves that prayers should be offered for all, because God wills all to be saved, because he is one God–not of the Jews only but of the Gentiles also–the middle wall of partition between them having been broken down. In like manner there is also one Mediator, because he stands in the same relation to all, not only to the Jews but also the Gentiles. The case was different under the old dispensation. There was not then a Mediator of one, Gal. iii . 20, i.e. of one God who stood in the same relation to all, seeing that God was the God only of the Jews. Moses therefore was not a real but a typical and external mediator, because he is called a Mediator not of one, i.e., not of God as God equally to all and as occupying one and the same relation to all, for he was the God of the Jews only to the exclusion of the Gentiles. Now however under the New Testament he is the God alike of both. The apostle clearly intimates this in another place, “Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also; Seeing it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith,” Rom. iii. 29, 30.

But why, it is asked, is the one God hero called the Mediator, the man Christ Jesus? Is it not meant by this that he is not God!? By no means, we reply. We infer from such language nothing more than this, that he became man for the purpose of discharging his work as Mediator. Why then is he called man and not God? Obviously for the only reason which bore upon the point in hand, that the apostle namely might infer that God was willing that all, Gentiles as well as Jews, should bo saved, because the Mediator is man and therefore is related to all men. Thus as he had called God one, so now he says that there is one Mediator, the man Christ Jesus, in order to furnish a new argument to prove that God wishes the salvation of all whether Jews or Gentiles. Hermann Venema, Institutes of Theology, trans., by  Alex W. Brown,  (Andover: W.F. Draper Brothers, 1853), 252.

4) 7. Scripture assures us that the love of God towards men as such is universal–that he has “no pleasure in the death of him that dies” that he “will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth“–that he is “not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance,” Ezek. xviii . 32; 1 Tim. ii . 4; 2 Pet.  iii . 9. From these passages we infer that there is a general will or purpose of God held forth in the gospel by which he has linked together faith and salvation without excluding any man, and declares that it is agreeable to him that all should believe and live. If this be denied then it follows that he absolutely willed that some should perish and that, according to his good pleasure, the proposition “he that believes shall be saved” should not apply to them. What becomes, in this case, of his universal love? What are we to make of the passages in which he declares that he wills not the death of the sinner, that he will have all men to be saved?  Hermann Venema, Institutes of Theology, trans., by  Alex W. Brown,  (Andover: W.F. Draper Brothers, 1853), 306.

Richard Muller:

Hermann Venema (1697-1787); studied at Groningen (1711-1714) and Franecker (1714-1718). In 1723 he succeeded the younger Vitringa as professor of theology at Franecker, a post he held until his retirement in 1774. His dogmatic work was published posthumously in English translation: Institutes of Theology (1850). Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:51 [first edition].

[Note: From what I can gather, only volume 1 was ever published.]

The Henry Commentaries:

II. Reconciliation, which is here spoken of under a double notion:–

1. As an unquestionable privilege, v. 18, 19. Reconciliation supposes a quarrel, or breach of friendship; and sin has made a breach, it has broken the friendship between God and man. The heart of the sinner is filled with enmity against God, and God is justly offended with the sinner. Yet, behold, there may be a reconciliation; the offended Majesty of heaven is willing to be reconciled. And observe, 1. He has appointed the Mediator of reconciliation. He has reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, v. 18. God is to be owned from first to last in the undertaking and performance of the Mediator. All things relating to our reconciliation by Jesus Christ are of God, who by the mediation of Jesus Christ has reconciled the world to himself, and put himself into a capacity of being actually reconciled to offenders, without any wrong or injury to his justice or holiness, and does not impute to men their trespasses, but recedes from the rigor of the first covenant, which was broken, and does not insist upon the advantage he might justly take against us for the breach of that covenant, but is willing to enter into a new treaty, and into a new covenant of grace, and, according to the tenor thereof, freely to forgive us all our sins, and justify freely by his grace all those who do believe. 2. He has appointed the ministry of reconciliation, v. 18. By the inspiration of God the scriptures were written, which contain the word of reconciliation, showing us that peace was made by the blood of the cross, that reconciliation is wrought, and directing us how we may be interested therein. And he has appointed the office of the ministry, which is a ministry of reconciliation: ministers are to open and proclaim to sinners the terms of mercy and reconciliation, and persuade them to comply therewith. For,

2. Reconciliation is here spoken of as our indispensable duty, v. 20. As God is willing to be reconciled to us, we ought to be reconciled to God. And it is the great end and design of the gospel, that word of reconciliation, to prevail upon sinners to lay aside their enmity against God. Faithful ministers are Christ’s ambassadors, sent to treat with sinners on peace and reconciliation: they come in God’s name, with his entreaties, and act in Christ’s stead, doing the very thing he did when he was upon this earth, and what he wills to be done now that he is in heaven. Wonderful condescension! Though God can be no loser by the quarrel, nor gainer by the peace, yet by his ministers he beseeches sinners to lay aside their enmity, and accept of the terms he offers, that they would be reconciled to him, to all his attributes, to all his laws, and to all his providences, to believe in the Mediator, to accept the atonement, and comply with his gospel, in all the parts of it and in the whole design of it. And for our encouragement so to do the apostle subjoins what should be well known and duly considered by us (v. 21), namely, (1.) The purity of the Mediator: He knew no sin. (2.) The sacrifice he offered: He was made sin; not a sinner, but sin, that is, a sin-offering, a sacrifice for sin. (3.) The end and design of all this: that we might be made the righteousness of God in him, might be justified freely by the grace of God through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. Note, [1.] As Christ, who knew no sin of his own, was made sin for us, so we, who have no righteousness of our own, are made the righteousness of God in him. [2.] Our reconciliation to God is only through Jesus Christ, and for the sake of his merit: on him therefore we must rely, and make mention of his righteousness and his only.

Matthew Henry, Commentary, 2 Corinthians 5:19-21.

[comments below]

Introduction:

The following extracts are taken from Grohman’s dissertation.¹ Some of the material is irrelevant, but included for the sake of context.

The historical context of the following “theses” relates to Alexandre Morus (1616-1670) who was a candidate for ministry in 1641. However, his application and acceptance into the Genevan church ministry was not readily accepted by the “venerable company” of Genevan pastors. He was suspected of being: 1) in agreement with Amyraut on universal grace; 2), that he agreed with Joshua de la Place on original sin; and 3), that he agreed with Piscator on the question of Christ’s active and passive obedience. The company of pastors drew up a list of theses which they demanded Morus sign and thereby assent to. After the theses, I have included Grohman’s comments regarding the theses’ statements relative to Dort and the death of Christ.

Grohman:

1) At the Council’s insistence the Company met on Monday, May 28, and agreed to draw up for Morus a list of theses containing the pure doctrine and rejecting the false doctrine. Theodore Tronchin and Antoine Léger, professors of theology, were appointed to write the theses.

These theses were read and approved at the Company meeting on June 1, and they were signed on behalf of the Company by the moderator Sartoria and the acting secretary Girard. The theses are organized under five headings original sin, predestination, redemption, the disposition of man to grace, and promises made to the faithful and their prerogatives. The theses are as follows:

Original Sin

I. The first sin of Adam (maraptoma) is imputed to his posterity by a just disposition and judgment of God, and corruption is poured-out on each and everyone who proceeds naturally from that source. Thus, there are three things which render man accused before God: (1.) The guilt flowing from the fact that we have all sinned in Adam; (2) the corruption which is the punishment of this guilt, imposed both on Adam and on his posterity; (3) the sins which men commit as adults.

2. The imputation of Adam’s sin and the imputation of the justice of Jesus Christ answer each other mutually. Just as Adam’s sin is imputed to his posterity, so the justice of Christ is imputed to the elect. The imputation in of Adam’s precedes corruption; the imputation of Christ ‘s justice precedes sanctification.

3. The imputation of Adam is sin and impure generation, which are certainly two ways of transmitting original sin, are interrelated and completely inseparable. Nevertheless, when they are considered as antecedent and consequent or cause and effect, to be sure, the corruption of nature in us is derived from Adam, because in him we have sinned and we have been made guilty.

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