Wardlaw:

2 Pet. iii. 9. There are two ways in which these words may be explained. [1.] The apostle may be considered as

speaking of the elect, of those -whom it is God’s purpose to bring to salvation, and of them as constituting a community of which he was himself a member, “long-suffering to us-ward,” in the same way in which Paul uses the expression: “We who are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord.”¹ This community is composed of many who are yet to live in the successive generations of mankind. God is “not willing that any” of these, the objects of His gracious purpose of salvation, “should perish,” etc.: the very purpose for which the world is spared being that they may all be brought in due time, and put in possession of the covenant blessings. [2.] Much depends on the sense affixed to the term willing, “not willing that any should perish,” etc. Hence a most general and comprehensive interpretation of the words may be fairly maintained. We have already viewed God as a Sovereign Benefactor, and as a righteous Governor. Under the former character He wills, that is, He absolutely determines, the salvation of a certain member, and secures the accomplishment of His gracious purpose. But it does not follow that in the latter character He wills the perdition of any. I mean, that as a Governor, in awarding punishments, He does not at all act in sovereignty. Sovereignty relates to the bestowment of good, not to the infliction of evil. A sovereign purpose to save we can understand; but a sovereign purpose to destroy is revolting and contradictory. It is not in consequence of any absolute sovereign act of His will that any sinner perishes. In no such sense does He will the death of the sinner. In the rectoral administration of God, salvation is set before all without difference, and is put within their reach, and pressed upon their acceptance. If any perish in these circumstances, they owe their perdition to the free, unconstrained, and uninfluenced choice of their own will rejecting the offer. God is under no obligation to save them; and they willfully destroy themselves. Again: Repentance is obviously in itself right and good. It must be in accordance with the rectoral will of God as the moral Governor of His creatures. All are by the Gospel called to repentance. There must, therefore, be a sense in which He is willing that all should come to repentance. This is His general will, His moral will, His rectoral will. And in this light, it is equally true of all His fallen creatures. It is true of devils as well as of men. If it was wrong for the angels to sin, it must be right for them to repent of their sin. It is impossible that God can ever will any thing else than what is in its own nature right and good; and repentance cannot in any case, where sin has been committed, be denied to be self-evidently right, and in this sense the holy God must will it. He ” commands all men, everywhere, to repent.”² And if He wills repentance, He cannot will perdition, excepting as the merited consequence of impenitence and perseverance in sin.

Ralph Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1857), 2:477-479.  [Some spelling modernized, footnote values modified; and underlining mine.]

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¹1 Thess. iv. 15, etc.

²Acts xvii. 30.

Wardlaw:

We shall consider the Calvinistic views under three modifications:– 1. Hyper-calvinism; 2. Calvinism as more generally held by the orthodox; and, 3. Moderate, or what may be designated modern Calvinism, as held and ably elucidated by the late Andrew Fuller, Dr. Edward Williams, and others, and now embraced by a growing proportion of Calvinistic ministers and professing Christians.

1. Of the hyper-calvinistic views on the present subject I have already indicated my opinion. They are the views of the exact equivalentists, of those who hold a limited atonement in the sense of its being sufficient only, in the way of legal compensation, for the salvation of the elect; so that, if more in number had been to be saved, more suffering must have been endured; that Christ, standing in the room of the elect, and appearing as their substitute and representative, bore their sins exclusively, making an atonement adequate for their remission and for no more; paying precisely (to use the ordinary but much abused phraseology) their amount of debt. This view of the atonement has been held by not a few, and has been advanced anew, and maintained as the only just and scriptural view, by some modern writers.

I have before expressed my unqualified reprobation of this doctrine, as having in it a littleness, a meanness, and an utter incongruity with the divine dignity of the Mediator, utterly revolting to both my judgment and feelings. My objections to the doctrine are these:–

(1.) That it is altogether irreconcilable with the infinite worth of the Savior’s sacrifice as arising from the infinite dignity of His person. The union of the divine and human natures imparted to it this infinitude of value. It was infinite, because it was divine. But every system which proceeds upon the supposition of its rising or falling in its amount of value, according as the substitute suffers for a greater or a smaller number, for a larger or a less amount or aggregate of guilt, is entirely at variance with this. That cannot be unlimited in intrinsic value, that is susceptible of increase and diminution. It may possibly be objected to this, that in that case any measure of suffering, howsoever small, might have sufficed. And perhaps we might be warranted in saying that whatever was done or suffered by a person sustaining the dignity of Godhead must in itself have possessed infinite value. But in the proper idea of atonement there is included, we ought not to forget, not the mere payment of a debt or settlement of an account, which equally cancels all claim, whatever may be the degree of either privacy or publicity with which the settlement is made; but a visible and impressive manifestation of the evil of sin, and an open and public vindication of the righteousness of God in its forgiveness. Now, in order to this, it would seem, the substitute must not only suffer, but appear to suffer, and to suffer deeply and shamefully, and in a way with which the idea of curse was implicated. This was necessary to effect what the apostle calls “declaring God’s righteousness for the remission of sins;”¹ making such a public manifestation of it as should fully maintain and even augment its credit in the eyes of the intelligent creation; making it conspicuous, and deepening the conviction and impression of it. God Himself knew best the degree of visible and apparent suffering requisite for securing this end. That which makes the atonement of Jesus sufficient is not the fact that sufferings were endured in His human nature (which alone could suffer) equal in degree to the concentrated sufferings of the multitude of the finally saved. Were that the case, then it would not be from the association of divinity with humanity that the real value of His sacrifice arose; but the sole use of that association must have been merely to enable the human nature to bear this required equivalent of suffering. If it be granted, as it generally is, by the advocates of atonement, that it was from the divinity of Jesus that His sacrifice derived its value; I might, I apprehend, go a step further, and affirm the idea of an exact equivalent for the deserts of the elect alone an impossibility in the very nature of things. The infinite dignity of His mediatorial person put it necessarily and for ever out of the question that the value of His propitiatory sufferings should be measured and bounded by the amount of penalty due to finite creatures. His substitution and obedience unto death must, of necessity, have infinitely exceeded an equivalent for the penal sufferings of any conceivable number of the race of men.

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[This is tight reasoning and requires careful and attentive reading; see notes below.]

Wardlaw:

III. The third view, then, as has been already observed, holds the atonement to have been a general remedy, with a particular application; a vindication or display of the righteousness of God, such as to render forgiveness honorable to that perfection of the divine character; leaving the supreme Governor and Judge, in the free exercise of the mercy in which He delights, to dispense it according to His sovereign pleasure, more or less extensively. Dr. Symington states the difference between the two theories thus; and, with very slight exception, we should not object to the statement: “On the extent of Christ’s atonement, the two opinions that have long divided the church are expressed by the terms definite and indefinite. The former means that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, and made atonement, only for such as are saved.

The latter means that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, or made atonement for all mankind without exception, as well those who are not saved as those who are. The one regards the death of Christ as a legal satisfaction to the law and justice of God, on behalf of elect sinners; the other regards it as a general moral vindication of the divine government, without respect to those to whom it may be rendered effectual, and of course equally applicable to all.”¹ The extent of such exception to the view given in this statement may appear in discussing the respective claims to preference of the two theories, which, while they differ in expression, come as near to one in reality as can well be.

Let it be observed, then, that by denying the restriction of the atonement’s efficiency to be in its application alone, he must be considered as affirming the definiteness to be, in some sense, in the atonement itself. Now, I must at once acknowledge myself at a loss to conceive how an atonement admitted to be infinite, can with any consistency be, at the same time, affirmed to be a definite atonement; how the atonement can be held to have been made “only for such as are saved;” “as a legal satisfaction to the law and justice of God on behalf of elect sinners;” while yet, in the atonement made, a value is admitted to have been contained, infinitely beyond the actual amount of salvation that shall arise from it. The explanation given is, that it is definite in its destination. But does not this come as near as possible to a purposed restriction in its application? The difference appears to me very slender; and, so far as there is a difference, the latter view seems to be the more self-consistent of the two. For observe the sense in which the restriction is in the atonement. It is not in its value, but in its destination, that is, in the circumstance of God’s having meant it as an atonement for a certain number only, and of its having been made for them alone. But, with all deference, this is a very different thing from definiteness in the atonement itself. With what propriety can the epithet definite be applied to that of which the author writes in the following terms:–”For these reasons” (reasons urged against the exact equivalent scheme), “we reject the theory of atonement against which the objection is pointed, and hold by the view already explained, namely, that the sufferings of Christ are to be regarded in the light of a moral satisfaction to the law and justice of God, which would have been requisite had there been but one sinner to be saved, and had that sinner had but one sin; and which would have been adequate had the number to be saved been to any conceivable extent greater than it is.”² Is there any propriety in calling this a definite atonement, which must have been the same for one sin as for the sins not only of the actually saved, but of any indefinite number more? Does it not follow, that the definiteness must lie in the purposed application, seeing in itself it was so indefinite as to be necessary for one and enough for millions? Is the difference at all material, or deserving of the eagerness and the copiousness with which it is insisted upon, between the purposed application of the atonement and its divine destination? It seems to me a hardly divisible hair’s breadth, and to approach as near as may be to a logomachy. This may the more appear to you, when you hear a few sentences more: “It” (the exact equivalent scheme) “is at variance with what we have before established, namely, the infinite intrinsic value of the atonement of Christ. It overlooks the grand design of the atonement, which was, not simply to secure a mere commutative satisfaction to the justice of God, but to glorify all the divine perfections, and to make an illustrious manifestation of the principles of His government before the whole universe of moral creatures. It leaves no room for such an unlimited offer of Christ in the Gospel, as to render without excuse those who reject Him; for if the atonement of Christ bore an exact proportion, in point of worth, to the sins of those who are actually saved by it; then the salvation of any others was a natural impossibility, and no blame could attach to such for neglecting to embrace the proffered boon: indeed there would be no ground on which such an offer could be made.”³ This is surely as near as it is possible to come to the hypothesis of a general remedy with a limited application, or, as he defines an indefinite atonement, a “general moral vindication of the divine government,” such a vindication as leaves the Divine Governor free to extend the benefits of it to whom He will. When the definiteness is made to lie in the atonement itself, and in answer to the question, ” What is the atonement of Christ?” the following answer is given: “It has been ‘already defended and explained as that perfect satisfaction to the law and justice of God, on account of which sinners are delivered from condemnation. Or, in other words, it is that which removes the offence subsisting between God and men, and procures a reconciliation. It supposes a compensation to be made to the lawgiver, in consideration of which certain specific blessings flow out to men. From its very nature, then, all for whom the atonement is made must reap its fruits. It is no atonement without this.” When the admissions made are remembered, namely, of the infinite value of the atonement, and of its grand design as being “to glorify all the divine perfections, and to make an illustrious manifestation of the principles of His government before the whole universe of moral creatures,” what more can this mean, consistently with itself, than that all those whom it was the sovereign purpose of God to save on the ground of the atonement, must be saved. If it does go further, if it means that there was any thing in the atonement itself by which this limitation was necessitated, no matter by what designation it be called, then does it come under the objection formerly shown to hold against the commutative justice, the personal compensation, the debt and credit system; the same objection which contributes to the explosion of the scheme of exact equivalent. And, accordingly, as might also have been anticipated, the idea of destination in the atonement, or of its being an atonement exclusively for the elect considered individually, comes to be so associated, I might say identified, with that of personal compensation, as naturally to lead to the placing of the actual virtue of the atonement in procuring the pardon and salvation of those whom the destination included, and for whom alone it was intended, on the ground of commutative justice. The following passage will show this. The object of it is to show that the distinctive and limited destination of the atonement is required by the rectitude of the divine character.

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Berkhof:

3. Another objection to the doctrine of common grace is that it presupposes a certain favorable disposition in God even to reprobate sinners, while we have no right to assume such a disposition in God. This stricture takes its starting point in the eternal counsel of God, in His election and reprobation. Along the line of His election God reveals His love, grace, mercy, and long-suffering, leading to salvation; and in the historical realization of his reprobation He gives expression only to His aversion, disfavor, hatred, and wrath, leading to destruction. But this looks like a rationalistic over-simplification of the inner life of God, which does not take sufficient account of His self-revelation. In speaking on this subject we ought to be very careful and allow ourselves to be guided by the explicit statements of Scripture rather than by our bold inferences from the secret counsel of God. There is far more in God than we can reduce to our logical categories. Are the elect in this life the objects of God’s’ love only, and never in any sense the objects of His wrath? Is Moses thinking of the reprobate when he says: “For we are consumed in thine anger, and in thy wrath are we troubled”? Ps. 90:7. Does not the statement of Jesus that the wrath of God abides on them that obey not the Son imply that it is removed from the others when, and not until, they submit to the beneficent rule of Christ? John 3:36. And does not Paul say to the Ephesians that they “were by nature children of wrath even as the rest”? Eph. 2:3 . Evidently the elect can not be regarded as always and exclusively the objects of God’s love. And if they who are the objects of God’s redeeming love can also in some sense of the word be regarded as the objects of His wrath, why should it be impossible that they who are the objects of His wrath should also in some sense share His divine favor? A father who is also a judge may loathe the son that is brought before him as a criminal, and feel constrained to visit his judicial wrath upon him, but may yet pity him and show him acts of kindness while he is under condemnation. Why should this be impossible in God? General Washington hated the traitor that was brought before him and condemned him to death, but at the same time showed him compassion by serving him with the dainties from his own table. Cannot God have compassion even on the condemned sinner, and bestow favors upon him? The answer need not be uncertain, since the Bible clearly teaches that He showers untold blessings upon all men and also clearly indicates that these are the expression of a favorable disposition in God, which falls short, however, of the positive volition to pardon their sin, to lift their sentence, and to grant them salvation. The following passages clearly point to such a favorable disposition: Prov. 1:24; Isa. 1:18; Ezek. 18:23,32; 33:11 ; Matt. 5:43-45; 23:37; Mark 10:21 ; Luke 6:35: Rom. 2:4; I Tim. 2:4. If such passages do not testify to a favorable disposition in God, it would seem that language has lost its meaning, and than God’s’ revelation is not dependable on this subject.

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1960), 445-446.