Candlish:

1) III. Nor, lastly, is it to be omitted that the cross of Christ is the proof and measure of that infinite compassion which dwells in the bosom of God towards each and all of the lost race of Adam, and his infinite willingness, or rather longing and yearning desire, to receive each and all of them again into his favor. Even the cross itself would almost seem to be an inadequate expression–though a blessed confirmation–of what is in his heart; of the feeling, as to speak, to which he gives utterance by an oath, when he swear, “As I live, saith the LORD I, have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth;” and of the deep, ineffable sincerity of hie assurance, that be would rather-how much rather–that the sinner should turn and him and live.

There is a well known theological distinction between God’s will of decree (voluntas decreti) and his will of desire or of good pleasure (voluntas beneplaciti)–between what his mind, on a consideration of all interests, actually determines, and what his heart, from its very nature, if we may venture the expression, must prefer and wish. The types, or expressions, of these two wills respectively, are to be found in the two texts commonly quoted to illustrate them;–the first, Rom. ix. 10:66 Who hath resisted his will?” the second, Matt. xxiii. 37 : “How often would I have gathered you, and ye would not!” (See also Ps. lxxxi. 18-16, and various other passages). This latter, as distinguished from the former, denotes the pure complacency with which God approves of a certain result as just and holy in itself, and delights in it, and therefore will to enjoin it on the creature, as his moat bounden duty; and, in enjoining it, cannot but add the assurance of his willing acceptance of it, whensoever, wheresoever, and howsoever realized.

Even in a human agent, some such distinction must be recognized. Knowing hie character and his heart, you at once can specify what would be most agreeable and welcome to him as the scene or spectacle which he would most delight to contemplate. But you must know a great deal more respecting his opinions, and the circumstances with which these come into contact or, in a word, respecting his mind–his judgment as to what, in certain contingencies, he is to do, and the reasons of his judgment–before you can be qualified to understand the whole of his procedure. Still, if he were a straightforward man, you would act without hesitation, in any case in which your personal interest was concerned, on what you knew of his heart, although you might have much perplexity in discerning all the views which, in certain difficult cases, entered into the making up of his mind. Thus, to take a familiar instance, a man of undoubted and notorious beneficence to the industrious poor, or the poor willing to be industrious, has peculiar opinions on pauperism generally, and on the right mode of dealing with certain instances of pauperism, which involve his conduct in some degree of mystery to the uninitiated, and might give rise to various questions in regard to some parts of his procedure. Now, if I am a beggar, perishing without his aid, shall I perplex myself with difficulties arising out of my ignorance of the reasons that determine his resolution in these particulars?–or shall I proceed upon my acquaintance with his acknowledged goodness, and, on the faith of his own express invitations, appeal at once to his generosity and truth for what is needed to meet my case? Evidently, in such a state of matters, I would practically draw the distinction. Knowing my friend’s character, and frankly interpreting his frank assurances to me, and all situated like me–without reference to any inquiries that might be raised respecting his actual treatment of particular cases not, as yet, fully explained to me–I would venture confidently to make my appeal to him, and feel no anxiety as to the issue. So is it with God; his will, as determining what, in every cage, in to be the actual result, is an act of his omniscient mind, which he need not explain to us; but his will, as defining what, in every case, would be the result most agreeable and welcome to him, is an inherent part of his nature, and, as it were, a feature of his heart. In the one view, his will is consistent with many being impenitent and lost; in the other, it would have all men everywhere to repent and be saved.

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Boyce:

2. A far better explanation is given by Dr. A. A. Hodge in the following question and answer:

“Ques. 17. State first negatively, and then positively, the true doctrine as to the design of the Father and the Son in providing satisfaction.”

“I. Negatively–1st. There is no debate among Christians as to the sufficiency of that satisfaction to accomplish the salvation of all men, however vast the number. This is absolutely limitless. 2d. Nor as to its applicability to the case of any and every possible human sinner who will ever exist. The relations of all to the demands of the law are identical. What would save one would save another. 3d. Nor to the bona fide character of the offer which God has made to ‘whomsoever wills’ in the gospel. It is applicable to every one, it will infallibly be applied to every believer. 4th. Nor as to its actual application. Arminians agree with Calvinists that of adults only those who believe are saved, while Calvinists agree with Arminians that all dying in infancy are redeemed and saved. 5th. Nor is there any debate as to the universal reference of some of the benefits purchased by Christ. Calvinists believe that the entire dispensation of forbearance under which the human family rests since the fall, including for the unjust as well as the just temporal mercies and means of grace, is part of the purchase of Christ’s blood. They admit also that Christ did in such a sense die for all men, that he thereby removed all legal obstacles from the salvation of any and every man, and that his satisfaction may be applied to one man as well as to another ‘if God so wills it.'”

James P. Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology (Florida: Den Dulk Foundation, n.d.), 338.

Amyraut:

Now all of this–that God displays his mercy and the hope of salvation to men in any manner at all–arises from the fact that his justice has been appeased by the sacrifice of his Son and that he has thus removed the barrier that sin placed before the grace of forgiveness, if men do not show themselves unworthy.

Moyse Amyraut, “Brief Treatise on Predestination and its Dependent Principles,” trans., by Richard Lum Richard. Th.D. diss, 1986, 41.

Sclater:

The second argument was, as I conceived it, on this manner: To faith justifying, all men are bound: To particular persuasion, of God’s will to pardon sins, all are not bound: For God binds no man to believe an untruth: there are some of whom it never was, nor shall be true, that God will pardon their sins as Reprobates: Ergo. Answ. That which is the ground of his Argument I confess I found amongst our Divines, more resolutely determined, then distinctly explained. Their conclusion is, that all men, even Reprobates, are bound to believe, that they are in Christ Elected to Salvation [Zanch. de natura Dei, lib. 5.c.2.]. These reasons seem to make against it. First, for that there are, and ever have been many, to whom the name of Christ, or the benefits in him conveyed unto us, were never known. And Paul seems to say “of such, as sin without the Law, they shall perish without the law.” By proportion we may say, “They that sin without the Gospel, shall perish without the Gospel.” The not giving credit thereto shall not be imputed to their condemnation, in as much as it was never revealed unto them. By consequence therefore, there is no bond upon their conscience to believe. Moreover, particular assent rises from that particular Testimony of God’s Spirit with ours, Rom. 8:16. Which who can say to be vouchsafed to Reprobates? But yield ex abundanti that Reprobates at least in the Church are bound to believe it. What then? Answ. An untruth in the thing, No untruth to them, except by their own default; because, that howsover God has revealed that there are some Reprobates; Yet reveals he to no man, in this life, his own Reprobation. And as the rule of our actions is not God’s secret, but revealed will; so the rule, and measure of Faith is not truth secreted, but truth revealed. S^t. Augustine sticks not to say, that a man may will what is contrary to the will of God [August. Enchirid. Laurent.]. He means his secret will, and yet in so willing Not sin. For example, A child in the mortal disease of his father, may desire the life of his father; such desire the proves contrary to the will of God; yet is no sin; because God’s will revealed warrants such desire to us. Let us see, whether we may find some semblance i this the point of Believing. In Hezekiah his sickness, the Lord sends Isaiah with that message: “Thou must die,” [Isa. 38.]. An untruth in the event, and according to God’s secret purpose; yet can we doubt, but Hezekiah therein was bound to give credit to the Prophet? Similiter, To make full answer: Thus let us conceive; Look as God’s promises are propound to be believed in the particulars; so and no otherwise are we bound to believe them. How are they propounded? Hypothetically, rather, then Categorically; with limitation, rather than Absolutely. For example, How to believe, I shall be saved? To wit, Hypothetically: if I keep precisely the way that leads unto life. Separate the Hypothesis, either in mine understanding, or practice, I am bound not to believe it. For there is no mandate in the word, that types an impenitent sinner, so continuing, to believe, that his sins are forgiven; nay, there is something equivalent to a mandate, enjoining, in such case, to believe the contrary; inasmuch as God has revealed, that he will not be merciful to such an one, as goes on still in his wickedness. The sum is this, Reprobates are bound to particular faith Hypothetically; Absolutely they are not bound. Shall we say now, their binding to such belief binds them to believe an untruth? Nothing less. For it is true, of every particular, “if he repent, His sins shall be forgiven him:” This is even true, and thus only are promises propounded to faith of particulars. And it is never true, that God will pardon any man’s sins except he repent, and believe the Gospel. Thus far by the way, in answer to these Arguments; rather wittily couched, then foundly concluding the purpose.

William Sclater, An Exposition on The Whole Fourth Chapter to the Romanes (London: Printed by J.L. for Christopher Meredith at the sign of the Crane in Pauls Church-yard, 1650), 173-174.

[Notes: Some spelling modernized, some reformatting; underlining mine. I have edited some of Sclater’s frequent use of the colon, replacing it with a period which is followed by a new sentence. Sclater is here cited primarily for his recognition of Zanchi’s position, rather than his particular rebuttal. Lastly, I would suspect that Sclater has misread Zanchi on this point, as it is probable that when Zanchi claimed that “all men are bound to believe they are elected”: this was an election according to the revealed will. That is, all men must believe they are appointed to life, in and by the Gospel, such that no man may exclude himself from salvation.  And this “appointment” or “election” to life is conditional, or hypothetical to use more classic terminology.]