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Calvin and Calvinism » Conditional Decree/Conditional Will

Archive for the ‘Conditional Decree/Conditional Will’ Category

Twisse:

Zanchius” (he says) “tells us roundly, that every man that is called, is bound to think he is elected;” but why does he not speak out and say, “that everyone is bound” (in the opinion of Zanchius) “to believe he is elected,” as formerly related to it. I grant to believe is to think, for credere, is defined to be cum assensione cogitare, but thoughts he knows are very wild, they have their course in dreams; as a hungry man may dream that he eats and drinks, but when he awakens, his soul is empty. And as for that doctrine of Zanchius, I have already given a fair interpretation of it, upon consideration that he speaks it of election not unto faith, but unto salvation: seeing God has manifested in his word his determination to give salvation to everyone that believes, it follows herehence, that everyone is bound to believe, that as many as do believe shall be saved: and consequently everyone that hears the Gospel is bound to believe, “that God has determined to bestow Salvation on him, in case he found to believe.” The like consideration may be given to Bucer’s Doctrine; namely, that God has predestinated him to obtain salvation in case he believe, not otherwise. For God has not predestinated any man of ripe years to obtain salvation, whether he believe or not. And seeing God has plainly professed that whosoever believes shall be saved. Mar. 16.16. If I do not accordingly believe, that God has predestinated me to obtain salvation in case I do believe, I do hereby make God to delude me saying, “Whosoever believes shall be saved.” And whereas this Author upon the back of this adds, “that a man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute reprobate,” when he is called to salvation is but deluded; and that this is the necessary result of our speeches.” All the color of this his inference, depends merely upon confusion of things that differ. For he distinguishes not between absolute predestination unto salvation, and predestination unto salvation absolute: likewise he distinguishes not between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation absolute: neither does he distinguish between predestination unto faith, and predestination unto salvation; nor between reprobation from faith, and reprobation unto damnation. And the absoluteness of predestination appears only in predestination unto faith, not predestination unto salvation. For salvation on being bestowed on none of ripe years, but by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good works; hence it follows, that God predestinates none unto salvation of ripe years, but by way of reward of their obedience. But as for predestination unto faith, it is clear, that God purposes absolutely to bestow faith on whom he will. So on the other side, damnation being inflicted on none, but for sin God has destinated no man unto damnation but for sin. But as touching obduration, like as God hardens whom he will, so he decreed to proceed herein, to wit, in hardening of men according to the mere pleasure of his will, that is, absolutely. Now let us not suffer a cauterized conscience, to smother a plain truth, with the confusion of things, which are to be distinguished. Read the rest of this entry »

6
Jun

Amandus Polanus (1561-1610) on the Will of God

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

[“Amandus Polanus vons Polansdorf studied at Tubingen, Basel, and Geneva. He was appointed professor of Old Testament at Basel in 1596 and served as dean of the theological faculty from 1598-1609. His dogmatic works are Partitiones theologicae, pars I (1590), pars II (1596); Syntagma theologiae christianae (1609).” Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:44 (first edition).]

Polanus:

And this much touching the wisdom of God. Now follows concerning his will.

The will of God is an essential property of God, by which he wills all things that he wills, and that from all eternity, of himself also, and that by one constant act.

And this will is most free, so that God does not anything, or command or suffer it to be done, but freely willing it: whereupon also it is called God’s most free will.

And because it does not depend of any other former beginning out of itself, it alone properly deserves to be called free will.

And indeed and truth it is but one will, because it is the very essence of God. Howbeit in respect of us, it is sundry, ways distinguished.

1. The will of God is either his will of effecting, or of permitting only.

His will of effecting, is that according to which God effects all good things, whether it be by himself or by others.

The will of permitting is that, according to which God suffers sin to be committed: for God certainly does willingly permit sin, and not unwillingly, that is to say, against his will and enforced (for who can constrain God?). And this he does for a double end: first that he might manifest the infirmity and weakness of the creature, because it cannot stand, unless it it be every moment upheld in uprightness by God. Secondly, that by this occasion, God might declare, either his mercy and power, in delivering the elect from sin, or else his justice and power in punishing the reprobate for their sin.

2. Again the will of God is either absolute or conditional.

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3
Jun

Edward Leigh on the Will of God

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism

Leigh:

God wills:1

1. Most freely: for as liberty is essential to every will, so it is chiefly proper to the Divinity, because it is a will especially: yet God wills good necessarily with a necessity of Immutability, but not with a necessity of coaction: for he is necessarily and naturally Good, and that which he once willed, he always wills immutably, and yet freely.
2. God wills efficaciously: for no man resists, nor can resist his will. Dan. 4.32. Rom. 9:19. Voluntas Dei semper impletur aut de nobis aut a’ Deo in nobis. Augustine.

Will is taken:

First properly.

1. For a faculty or power of the soul whereby we will; so we say, there are these faculties in the soul, the understanding, and the will. So for that faculty of willing which is in God, so it is one with God’s Essence.
2. For the act of his willing, called Volitio: so it is one with his Essence. For as he is Eternal and Immutable, so is also his will.

Secondly, Metonymically.

For the Object or thing willed, so John 6. “This is the will of my Father,” that is, that which he wills and has decreed. “Thy will be done,” 1 Thess. 4.3. So we say, It is the Princes will, that is, that which the Prince wills; he wills his own glory chiefly.

God’s will is his Essence, whereby he freely wills good, and nills evil: or it is a faculty whereby God chooses all and only good, and refuses all and only evil. Voluntas in Deo nihil alind est, quam Deus volens. Zanchi. de natura Dei. L.3. c. 4. Quest. 1.

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Hall:

Neither is this election, according to the plea of the opponents, made ever the more uncertain by this pre-requisition of our faith: since they profess to teach it supposed in our election, not as a condition whose performance God expects, as uncertain; but as a gift, which God, according to his eternal prescience, foresees in man, present and certain: as the decree of sending Christ into the world did not depend upon a conditioned and uncertain expectation of what man would do, or would not do; but upon the infallible notice of God, who foresaw man as presently sinning or fallen: so as the election of God is not suspended upon the mutability of man s will; but upon the infallible certainty of the foreknowledge of God, to whose eyes our faith and perseverance is not more doubtful than future, and whose prescience hath no less infallibility than his decree. If therefore God may have the sole glory of this work in the gift of that faith which he foresees, and our election hazards no certainty, as they profess to hold, what is there that should need to draw blood in this first quarrel?

But what need I labour to reconcile these opinions, which have no reason to concern us? The church of England, according to the explication of R[ev.] B[ishop] Overal, goes a midway betwixt both these. For, while the one side holds a general conditional decree of God to save all men if they believe, and a particular decree of saving those who he foresaw would believe; and the other side, not admitting of that general conditionate decree, only teaches a particular absolute decree to save some special persons, for whom only Christ was given, and to whom grace is given irresistibly, all others being by a no less absolute decree rejected: our church, saith he, with St. Austin, maintaineth an absolute and particular decree of God to save those whom he hath chosen in Christ, not out of the prescience of our faith and will, but out of the mere purpose of his own will and grace: and that there upon God hath decreed to give, to whom he pleaseth, a more effectual and abundant grace, by which they not only may believe and obey if they will; but whereby they do actually will, believe, obey, and persevere, without prejudice to the rest, to whom he hath also given gracious offers and helps to the same purpose, though by their just fault neglected.

What can the synod of Dort in this case wish to be said more? Indeed, withal he addeth a general conditionate will of God, or a general evangelical promise of saving all if they do believe: since God doth will and command that all men should hear Christ and believe in him; and in so doing hath offered grace and salvation unto all: declaring how well these two may agree together, that, first, God hath propounded salvation in Christ to all if they believe, and hath offered them (within the church especially) a common and sufficient grace in the means that he hath mercifully ordained, if men would not be wanting to the word of God and his Holy Spirit; and that to ascertain the salvation of man, he hath decreed to add that especial, effectual, and saving grace unto some: neither of which truths can well and safely be denied of any Christian: only the sound of a general and conditionate will perhaps seems harsh to some ears; whereto yet they should do well to inure themselves, since it is the approved distinction of worthy, orthodox, and unquestionable divines.

Zanchius, in his book De Praedest. Sanct. hath it in terminis., with a large exposition. "That God willeth some things absolutely," saith he," it is manifest, and plainly confirmed by scriptures: so he absolutely willed the world should be created and governed: so he absolutely willed that Christ should come into the world and die for the salvation of his elect. He wills also absolutely that the elect shall be saved; and therefore performs to them all things that are necessary to their salvation." "That the same God willeth some things conditionally, the scriptures also teach us: for God would have all men to be saved, if they would keep the law, or believe in Christ: and therefore I call that first an absolute will, this latter a conditional." And in the next leaf to the same purpose he saith, "It is also true that God would have all men to be saved in his revealed and conditionate will; scil. if they would believe in Christ and care fully keep his law: for by this will no man is excluded from salvation and knowledge of the truth." So Ambrose interprets that place of I Tim. ii. 4. "He would have all to be saved," saith he, "if themselves will: for he hath given his law to all; and excepts no man," in respect of his law and will revealed, "from salvation." For the further allowing whereof, the same Zanchius cites the testimonies of Luther, Bucer, and others. Neither doth it much ablude from this, that our English divines at Dort call the decree of God, whereby he hath appointed in and by Christ to save those that repent, believe, and persevere, Decretum annunciativum salutis omnibus ex cequo et indiscriminatim promulgandum.1

Surely it is easy to observe that we are too fearful of some distinctions, which carry in them a jealousy of former abuse; and yet both may well be admitted in a good sense, and serve for excellent purpose; as that if we labour, for our better under standing, to explicate the one will of God by several notions of the antecedent and consequent will of God; (which Paulus Ferrius, a reformed schoolman, approves by the suffrages of Zanchius, Polanus, and other orthodox divines;2) to look at it a little running, as that which gives no small light to the business in hand.

As there is wont to be conceived a double knowledge of God: the one, of mere understanding, whereby he foreknows all things that may be; the other, of vision or approbation, whereby he foreknows that which undoubtedly shall be: so there is a double will to be conceived of God, answerable to this double know ledge; an antecedent will, which answers to the mere understanding, whereby God wills every possible good, without the consideration of the adjuncts appertaining to it; a consequent will, answering to the knowledge of approbation, whereby, all circumstances prepensed, God doth simply will this or that particular event as simply good to be, and which is thereupon impossible not to be. The one of these is a will of complacency; the other, of prosecution: the one is, as it were, an optative will; the other, an absolute. In the first of these, God would have all to be saved; because it is in a sort good in itself, in that the nature of man is ordainable to life, and man hath by God common helps seriously offered for the attaining thereof: neither can we think it other than pleasing to God, that his creatures should both do well and fare well. In the latter, he willeth some of all to be saved; as not finding it simply good, all circumstances considered, to extend this favour to all: this appears in the effect; for, if God absolutely willed it, it could not fail of being. Neither doth aught hinder but these two may stand well together; a complacence in the blessedness of his creature, and a will of his smart: for both that which we will in one regard we may not will in another; as we may wish a felon to live as a man, to die as a malefactor; and besides, the possibility of one opposite doth not hinder the act of another, as he that hath power to run perhaps doth sit or lie.

Learned Zanchius, methinks, gives at once a good satisfaction, as to this doubt so to the ordinary exception, whereat many have stumbled, of the pretended mockage of God s invitations, where he means not, as some have misconceived, a serious effect. "In the parable of the gospel," saith he, "those which were first bidden to the marriage feast, and carne not, were they therefore mocked by the king, because he only signified unto them what would be acceptable unto him, and what was their duty to per form? and yet he did not command them to be compelled, as he did the second guests, to come to the wedding. Surely no: yet in the meantime there was not the same will of the king in the inviting of the first, and of the second: for in these second, there was an absolute will of the king, that they should without fail come, and therefore he effectually caused them to come: in the former he only signified, and that fairly and ingenuously, what would be pleasing to him." Thus he. The entertainment of this one distinction, which hath the allowance of orthodox and learned authors, to be free from any danger or inconvenience, would mitigate this strife; since it is that which the opponents contend for, and which the defendants may yield without any sensible prejudice.

As for the envy of that irrespective and absolute decree of reprobation wherewith the defendants are charged, it is well taken off, if we distinguish, as we must, of a negative and positive reprobation; the latter whereof, which is a preordination to punishment, is never without a respect and prevision of sin: for, although by his absolute power God might cast any creature into everlasting torment, without any just exception to be taken on our parts; yet, according to that sweet providence of his, which disposeth all things in a fair order of proceeding, he cannot be said to inflict or adjudge punishment to any soul, but for sin, since this is an act of vindicative justice, which still supposeth an offence. If this be yielded by the defendants, as it is, wherein also they want not the voices even of the Romish school, what needs any further contention? especially while the defendants plead, even those that are most rigorous, that upon the non-election of some, damnation is "not causally but only consecutively" inferred. Sure I am that by this, which is mutually yielded on both parts, all mouths are stopped from any pretence of calumniation against the justice of the Almighty; and we are sufficiently convinced of the necessity of our care to avoid those sins which shall otherwise be rewarded with just damnation.

Let this be enough for the first article. Less will serve of the rest.

Concerning the extent of Christ’s death, the Belgic opponents profess to rest willingly in those words of Musculus: Omnium peccata tulit, &c: "He hath borne the sins of all men, if we consider his sacrifice according to the virtue of it in itself, and think that no man is excluded from this grace but he that refuses it. So God loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, to the end that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life; John iii. 16. But if we respect those which do so believe and are saved; so he hath borne only the sins of many." Thus he.3 Neither will the opponents yield any less. What is this other than the explication of that usual distinction which we have, whether from St. Austin or his scholar Prosper, of the greatness of the price, and the propriety of the redemption?4 that equal to all, this pertaining but to some. That common word seems enough to the Belgic opponents: "The price of Christ’s blood is sufficient to save all:" and if this may serve their turn, who can grudge it? Contrarily, while they do willingly grant, that in respect of the efficacy of power, Christ died not for all; and that Christ was given only with this intention of his Father, that the world should no otherwise be saved by his Son than through faith; what need we urge more?

Both will grant that the apothecary’s shop hath drugs enough for the cure of all diseases, which yet can profit none but those that are willing to make use of them. Both will accord in this position, which B. Overall commends, as in effect the words of worthy Mr. Calvin: So Christ died for all, that there is no man, if his incredulity did not hinder him, but were redeemed by his precious blood: neither is there, as is willingly confessed by the defendants, any man living to whom it may be singularly said, Christ died not for thee.5 Seeing therefore whole mankind doth but result of singular and individual men, why should we fear to say unto all, that Christ died for them?

Now what should we stand upon a niggardly contestation of words, where so much real truth is mutually yielded? Who can think there can be any peril to that soul who believes thus much? The rest to the schools.

But whatever have been the nice scruples and explications of foreign divines, we have no such cause of strife, if we admit that which our learned bishop commends for the voice of the church of England! who, having laid down the two extreme opinions of the opposite parts, brings in the church of England as sweetly moderating betwixt both: that she, supposing the death of Christ for all men, and God’s conditionate intention of the general grace of his evangelical promise, adds moreover the special intention of God to apply the benefit of Christ’s death, by a more abundant and effectual grace, absolutely, certainly, and infallibly, to the elect alone, without any diminution of that his sufficient and common favour; which as we see so yields to both parts what they desire, as that in the meantime it puts upon both what they are not greatly forward to admit: yet that which it puts upon them may be admitted without any complaint, except perhaps of excess of charity; and that which is yielded is abundantly enough for peace.

Joseph Hall, “Via Media: The Way of Peace,” in The Works of the Right Reverent Joseph Hall, (New York, Ames press, 1969), 9:505-511. [Note: Hall was one of the English delegates to Dort. For a brief biography see wikipedia I have not included all the Latin footnotes except those which are of particular interest. I cannot verify the one Calvin citation as of yet. Credit to Marty for the find. ]

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1"The declarative decree of salvation is to be equally and indifferently proclaimed unto all men." Act. Syno. in [Explic. Thes. Heterodox, i. ut supra, p. 6.] 2[Ferrii "Scholastici Orthodoxi Specimen." Gotstadii 1616, p. 386.] 3[Musculi Comment, in Esaiam. [liii. 5.] Basil. 1570. pp. 705,6.] 4Magnitudinem pretii distinguit a proprietate redemptionis. ["Quod ergo ad magnitudinem et potentiam pretii,sanguis Christi est redemptio totius mundi, &c. Prosper! Reap, ad Object. Vincent. Opp. August, vol. x. App. col. 208.] 5Nulli hominum singulariter denun- turn pro ipso mortuum non esse. Ibid. Iciatur, [neque ulli denunciatur ] Chris- p. 155.

Twisse:

Thirdly therefore consider we the constant Doctrine of Divines, not that reprobates are bound to believe, but that all that hear the Gospel are bound to believe: but in what sense? Piscator says, as I remember, that the thing, which all such are bound to believe, is the Gospel; according to that Mar. 1. “Repent ye and believe the Gospel.” Now to believe the Gospel is one thing, the sum whereof is this, “That Jesus Christ came unto the world to save sinners;” but to believe in Christ is another thing, which yet this Author distinguishes not, though it appears by the course of his argumentation, that he draws to this meaning, and that in a particular sense, which is this, “to believe that Christ died for them;” as appears expressly in the latter end of this Section. And no marvel if this Author carry himself so confidently in this, being, as he is, armed with such confidence. But I am glad that in one place or other, he springs his meaning, that we may have the fairer flight at him, to pull down his pride, and sweep away his vain confidence: though we deal upon the most plausible argument of the Arminians, and which they think insoluble. My answer is; first, Look in what sense Arminius says Christ died for us, in the same sense we may be held to say (without prejudice to our Tenet) of absolute reprobation, that all who hear the Gospel are bound to believe that Christ died for them. For the meaning Arminius makes of Christ’s dying for us, is this, Christ died, for this end, that satisfaction being made for sin, the Lord now may pardon sin, upon what condition he will; which indeed is to die for obtaining a possibility of the redemption of all, but for the actual redemption of none at all.

Secondly, But I lift not to content myself and this; therefore, I farther answer, by distinction of the phrase dying for us, that we may not cheat ourselves by the confounding of things that differ. To die for us, or for all, is to die for our benefit, or for the benefit of all: Now these benefits are of a different nature, whereof some are bestowed upon man only conditionally (though for Christ’s sake) and they are the pardon of sin and Salvation of the Soul, and these God does confer only upon the condition of faith and repentance. Now I am ready to profess, and that, I suppose, as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who hears the Gospel (without distinction between Elect and Reprobate) is bound to believe that Christ died for him, so far as to procure both the pardon of his sins, and the salvation of his soul, in case he believe and repent. But there are other benefits, which Christ by his obedience has merited for us, namely, the benefit of faith and repentance…

Now I demand from this Author can say truly, that this the constant opinion of our Divines, that all who hear the Gospel, whether elect or Reprobate, are bound to believe that Christ died to procure them faith and repentance. Nay does any Arminian at this day believe this, or can he name any Arminian that does avouch this? Now does himself believe this? If he does not, if he cannot show any Arminian that does, with what face can he charge this opinion upon us, as if we should extend the obligation to believe, much farther then the Arminians doe, whereas usually they criminate us, for not extending it so far as we should…

And here first I observe, Zanchy is not charged to maintain, that every hearer of the Gospel, is bound to believe, that he is elect in Christ unto faith and repentance, but only to salvation: that puts me in good heart, that Zanchy & I shall shake hands of fellowship in the end, and part good friends. Secondly I distinguish between absolute-Election unto Salvation and election unto Salvation-absolute. The first only removes all cause on man’s part of election, the latter removes all cause on man’s part of salvation. By cause of salvation I mean only a disposing cause, such as faith, repentance, and good works are, as whereby (to express it in the Apostle’s phrase) we are “made partakers of the inheritance of the Saints of light.” Now albeit Zanchy maintains as we do, that all the elect are absolutely elected unto salvation, there being no cause on man’s part of his election, as we learned: yet neither Zanchy nor we maintain that God does elect any unto salvation absolute, that is to bring him to salvation, without any disposing of him thereunto by faith and repentance. Now to accommodate that opinion of Zanchy, I say it may have a good sense, to say that every hearer is bound to believe, both that Christ died to procure salvation for him, in the case he do believe, and that God ordained that he should be saved, in case he do believe; where belief is made the condition only of salvation, not of the Divine ordination; and the confusion of these by the Arminians, does usually make then confident and insolent, and in a word, Magnas Tragaedias excitare. But take away the confusion of things that differ, their combs are cut, their locks are shorn, and they are bit as another man. Now having showed in what sense every hearer is bound to believe that Christ died for him, and in what sense not, let us consider of what worth this Author’s arguments are, breathing nothing but smoke and fire, I will not say, like the great potan, but like fell dragon; but I nothing doubt we shall pair his nails, and make him calm enough ere we have done with him, so that a child shall be able enough to lead him.

1. The first is, because it is God’s will that the shall not believe, because “it is his peremptory will, that they shall have no power to believe.” I answer, it is indeed the will of God’s decree, that is, he has decreed not to give any Reprobate a justifying faith, but hence it follows not, that both Christ has merited, and God has ordained, that as many as do believe shall be saved. For this, as I take it, is not usually account by our Divines a justifying faith, but rather it comes within the compass of such a faith, as is commonly counted faith historical.

William Twisse, The Riches of God’s Love unto the Vessels of Mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the Vessels of Wrath, (Oxford, 1653), 1:153-155. [Some of the spelling is modernized, underlining mine.]