Edwards:

Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity and Inability.

THAT Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural Necessity.

I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse.

The phrase, Moral Necessity, is used variously: sometimes it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, from which he cannot be discharged. So the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connection of things, which is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, Moral Necessity, in the following discourse.

By Natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity men’s bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.

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Alexander:

Some excellent men, who saw the danger of so insisting on the inability of man as to furnish an apology for the careless sinner, borrowed a little aid from the Arminian scheme, and taught that if the sinner would do what was in his power, and continue faithfully to use the outward means of grace, the Spirit of God would assist his endeavors: and thus a connection was formed between the strivings of the unregenerate and the grace of God. But this was not consistent with the other opinions of these men, and involved them in many practical difficulties, and contradicted many clear passages of scripture, which teach that " without faith it is impossible to please God:" and it seemed to be obviously absurd, that the promise of grace should be made to acts and exercises which, it could not be denied, were in their nature sinful. Some, indeed, spoke of a kind of sincerity which they supposed an unregenerate sinner might possess; but it was found difficult to tell what it was; and another difficulty was to quiet the minds of those convinced sinners who had been long using the means of grace. Such persons would allege that they had prayed, and read, and heard the word for a long time, and yet received no communications of grace. To such, nothing could on this plan be said, but to exhort them to wait God’s time, and to entertain the confident hope that no soul ever perished, that continued to the last seeking for mercy. The inconvenience and evil of these representations being perceived, many adopted with readiness a distinction of human ability into natural and moral. By the first they understood merely the possession of physical powers and opportunities; by the latter, a mind rightly disposed. In accordance with this distinction, it was taught that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God required of him; but that every sinner labored under a moral inability to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the heart, for which every man was responsible. Now this view of the subject is substantially correct, and the distinction has always been made by every person, in his judgments of his own conduct and that of others. It is recognized in all courts of justice, and in all family government, and is by no means a modern discovery. And yet it is remarkable that it is a distinction so seldom referred to, or brought distinctly into view, by old Calvinistic authors. The first writer among English theologians that we have observed using this distinction explicitly, is the celebrated Dr. Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and the able opposer of Arminianism, and advocate of the Supralapsarian doctrine of divine decrees. It was also resorted to by the celebrated Mr. Howe, and long afterwards used freely by Dr. Isaac Watts, the popularity of whose evangelical writings probably had much influence in giving it currency. It is also found in the theological writings of Dr. Witherspoon, and many others, whose orthodoxy was never disputed. But in this country no man has had so great an influence in fixing the language of theology, as Jonathan Edwards, president of New Jersey College. In his work on "The Freedom of the Will," this distinction holds a prominent place, and is very important to the argument which this profound writer has so ably discussed in that treatise. The general use of the distinction between natural and moral ability may, therefore, be ascribed to the writings of President Edwards, both in Europe and America. No distinguished writer on theology has made more use of it than Dr. Andrew Fuller; and it is well known that he imbibed nearly all his views of theology from an acquaintance with the writings of President Edwards. And it may be said truly, that Jonathan Edwards has done more to give complexion to the theological system of Calvinists in America, than all other persons together. This is more especially true of New England; but it is also true to a great extent in regard to a large number of the present ministers of the Presbyterian church. Those, indeed, who were accustomed either to the Scotch or Dutch writers, did not adopt this distinction, but were jealous of it as an innovation, and as tending to diminish, in their view, the miserable and sinful state of man, and as derogatory to the grace of God. But we have remarked, that in almost all cases where the distinction has been opposed as false, or as tending to the introduction of false doctrine, it has been misrepresented. The true ground of the distinction has not been clearly apprehended; and those who deny it have been found making it themselves in other words; for that an inability depending on physical defect, should be distinguished from that which arises from a wicked disposition, or perverseness of will, is a thing which no one can deny who attends to the clear dictates of his own mind; for it is a self-evident truth, which even children recognize in all their apologies for their conduct. We do not assert, however, that the dispute between the advocates and opposers of this distinction has been a mere logomachy. There is one important point of difference. They who reject the distinction, maintain that if we have lost any physical ability to perform our duty by our own fault, the obligation to obedience remains, although the ability to execute it is utterly lost; while the advocates of the distinction between natural and moral ability hold that obligation and ability must be of equal extent; and although they admit that we are accountable for the loss of any faculty which takes place through our fault, yet the guilt must be referred entirely to the original act, and no new sin can be committed for not exercising a faculty which does not exist, or which is physically incapable of the actions in question. To illustrate this point, let us suppose the case of a servant cutting off his hands to avoid the work required of him. The question then is, is this servant guilty of a crime for not employing those members which he does not possess? It is admitted that he is chargeable with the consequences of his wicked act, but this only goes to show the greater guilt of that deed. It is also true, that if the same perverse disposition which led to this act is still cherished, he is virtually guilty of the neglect of that obedience which was due. Sin consists essentially in the motives, dispositions, and volitions of the heart, and the external act only possesses a moral nature by its connection with these internal affections. But it cannot be truly said that a man can be guilty of a crime in not using hands which he does not possess. Let us suppose this servant to have become truly penitent, and to have nothing in his mind but a strong desire to do his duty; can any impartial man believe that he commits a sin in not doing the work which he has no hands to execute? We think not. The case will appear more evident, if the faculty lost should be one which is essential to moral agency; as if a man should by his own fault deprive himself of reason. It is manifest that a man totally destitute of reason is incapable of any moral acts; and this is equally true, however this defect may have been contracted. If a man performs an act by which he knows reason will be extinguished or perverted, he is guilty in that act of a crime which takes its measure, in part, from the consequences likely to ensue. Thus in the case of the drunkard; he who destroys his reason by ebriety, may be considered as guilty of an act, the guilt of which has respect to all the probable consequences. In human courts we are aware that intoxication cannot be pleaded as a justification of crime; but on this subject it may be observed, that drunkards are not commonly so destitute of a knowledge of right and wrong as to be deprived of their moral agency. And again, it would be of dangerous consequence to admit the principle, that a man might plead one crime in justification of another; and it would be exceedingly liable to abuse, as a man might become intoxicated for the very purpose of committing a great crime, or he might affect a greater degree of intoxication than was real; so that it is a sound political maxim, that a man shall be held responsible for all acts committed in a state of ebriety. But in foro conscientiae, we cannot but view the matter in a different light. If by an intoxicating liquor reason is completely subverted, and the man is no longer himself, we cannot judge that he is as accountable for what he does, as when in his sober senses. You may accumulate as much guilt as you will on the act of extinguishing or perverting his reason; but you cannot think that what he madly perpetrates under the influence of strong drink, is equally criminal as if committed while reason was in exercise. This we take to be the deliberate judgment of all impartial men….

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Richards:

LECTURE XXII.
ABILITY AND INABILITY.

JOHN vi. 44. “No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him.”

IT is good for us to be humbled and God has declared it to be a leading design of the Gospel, to stain the pride of all human glory. Every part of this wonderful scheme, in its origin, in its progress, in its consummation, tends to exalt God and to lay man in the dust ! We cannot turn to a page of the Gospel record, without finding something of this character. Do we glory in the dignity or strength of our natural powers, in our acquisitions, or in our enjoyments? The Gospel teaches us that we have nothing but what we have received, and that it is God alone who causes us to differ. Do we think favorably of our moral dispositions, or secretly flatter ourselves with our virtues? The Gospel declares that we are, by nature, children of wrath and disobedience, having no power to please God; because, with all our good qualities, we possess nothing in our unrenewed state which he dignifies with the name of virtue. Do we think ourselves safe because the Word of life is preached to us–or because we hear the voice of our Redeemer calling to us to come unto him and be saved? Our Lord confounds this self-deluding imagination, with all the vain hopes attached to it, by declaring, as in the words before us: ‘ ‘ No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him.”

But will not many object to this declaration? Will they not say, “If we cannot come to Christ, how are we to blame for not coming? And if we can come, what need of being drawn by the Father? Are not these things strange and contradictory?” Strange and contradictory as they may seem, the Divine Teacher will not take back his words, nor soften their import. He lays down his doctrine with great clearness and strength: He speaks with the authority of one who came forth from God, and who is God himself. Whatever may be our opinions or our feelings, his Word will stand in broad and legible characters when the fire, which consumes all things, shall have dissolved this earth and these heavens. It is in vain to contend against what is written; the reck will not be removed out of its place for us. But though we may not contend, we may lawfully inquire; and sure I am, the more diligent and humble our inquiry, the more cheerfully shall we subscribe to what God has revealed.

In attending to the words before us, I propose, in the First place, briefly to consider what it is to come to Christ.

Second. To notice our Lord’s assertion, that no man can come to him unless drawn by the Father.

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Payne:

ELECTION.

THE PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.

WE have shown in the preceding lecture, that the Arminian notion of a dispensation of the Spirit to all men, or of common grace conferred upon all men, to enable them to secure their salvation, does really involve in it the doctrine of election; and, further, that it does not sufficiently guard the doctrine of salvation by grace. I now proceed,

Thirdly, to observe, that this notion of common or universal grace is, as held by them, and as far as they have explained it, a self-contradictory, not to say, an absurd notion. It restores to man the ability (such is the view they give of it) to obey God’s law, to believe the gospel, and so to work out his own salvation. “Man,” says Bishop Tomline, “cannot, by his natural faculties and unassisted exertions, so counteract and correct the imperfection and corruption derived from the fall of Adam, as to be able of himself to acquire that true and lively faith which would secure his salvation.” He proceeds to state, in substance, that, as it would not be just in God to do more with a view to effect the salvation of one man than another, this ability to acquire true and lively faith is actually communicated to all men,–to those who believe not the gospel, and never will believe it, as well as to those who cordially receive it. In short, though his Lordship is not a proficient in the art of presenting an idea in a few unambiguous words, he evidently means that man has lost by the fall, not merely his disposition to do what God commands, and to believe what God reveals; but, in the true, and proper, and literal sense of the term, his power also. This is much more fully and distinctly stated by Mr. Watson, who, in perspicacity, infinitely surpasses the bishop, though, I fear, not in candor, especially when Calvinism rises upon his view, which almost invariably produces misrepresentations so gross, that, if the “Theological Institutes” have exalted my estimate of the intellect of the Writer, I am constrained to add–and I do it with deep and unaffected sorrow–they have diminished my previous conceptions of the moral dignity of his character.

I have hinted at an ambiguity which lurks in the words, power, ability, &c., when used in reference to man, and to what God requires of him. It may be expedient briefly to illustrate this point, before I lay before the reader the statements of Mr. Watson, as that illustration is adapted to show the inconsistent nature of those statements. A man then, let it be observed, may be destitute of power to perform a certain action, in two radically different senses;–in the sense of being destitute of the physical capacity of performing the action; and in the sense of wanting the disposition to perform it. A man who has not money, cannot give it to the destitute; a man who has not the present disposition to be liberal, cannot give it either, but the cannot in the two cases is radically different. No entreaties, or promises, are in the slightest degree adapted to remove the former, but they are eminently fitted to remove the latter, cannot; and may, accordingly, be consistently employed. Everyone recognizes and acts upon this distinction in the everyday occurrences of life; we require, therefore, that it should be recognized in religious subjects. The generality of Calvinistic divines make this distinction. They maintain that the power to obey God’s laws, of which unconverted men are destitute, is not physical capacity, but disposition. They affirm, that the Scriptures address no command to the human family at large, with which any man, unless he be an idiot or a madman, would be unable to comply, provided he had the disposition to comply. They hold, that all that Adam lost, for himself and his posterity, was the disposition, and not the physical capacity, i. e., power, in the proper sense of the word, to do what God commands: and, on the affirmed fact, that the human race, after the fall, retain their physical power to obey God’s law, though they may not choose to obey, they found their belief in the great doctrine of human accountability.

Mr. Watson, on the other hand, supposes that the race lost more than disposition–that they lost power, in the proper sense of the term, to obey; that this power is re-communicated to them by what we have designated common grace; and that this imparted grace is the foundation of accountability. 1 refer to the following passages in proof of these statements. ” All men, in their simply natural state, are dead in trespasses and sins, and have neither the will nor the power to turn to God.” (Vol. iii., p. 193.) In an attempt to show that absolute and unconditional reprobation (which doctrine 1 reprobate as strongly as does Mr. Watson) is contrary to the justice of God, he takes the ground, that “the reprobates must have been destroyed for a pure reason of sovereignty or for the sin of Adam–or for personal faults, resulting from a corruption of nature, which they brought into the world with them, and which they have no power to correct.” (Vol. iii., p. 69.) “All except Adam and Eve have come into the world with a nature which, left to itself, could not but sin.” (Vol. iii., p. 61.) Again, he tells us that the promise of the Spirit finds man “without the inclination, or the strength, to avail himself of proclaimed clemency.” (Vol. i., p.242.) Further; we are assured, (Vol. ii., p. 261,) “That a power of consideration, prayer, and turning to God, are the gifts of the Spirit; of course it does not exist in the simply natural state of man.” Now let it not be said that these statements of Mr. Watson contain no more than we every day assert, when w, say that man has lost his power to obey God’s law; because every reflecting Calvinist, at least, understands the term power in a sense different from that in which it is used by Mr. Watson. With the latter, the loss of power means, if not the loss of physical capacity, (I use this phraseology for a reason which will appear presently), at least more than the loss of disposition. With the former, it is the loss of disposition, and the loss of disposition only. Yet power to obey God’s law must be possessed by man, even in the opinion of Mr. Watson, for the unconverted, he himself tells us, “cannot be guilty of rejecting the gospel, if they have no power to embrace it;.” (Vol. iii., p. BO.) And, again, the unconverted are required to believe for their salvation; he consequently infers that they must have power to believe. (Vol. iii., p. 4.) This power common grace communicates, and its communication forms, as I have said, in Mr. Watson’s system, the ground of human accountability. The following extracts establish both these points. “The Scripture treats all men to whom the gospel is preached as endowed with power, not indeed from themselves, but from the grace of God, to turn at his reproof,” &c. (Vol. iii., p. Ill.) ” It follows, then, that the doctrine of the impartation of grace to the unconverted, in a sufficient degree to enable them to embrace the gospel, must be admitted,” &e. (Ibid.) “In consequence of the atonement of Christ, offered for all, the Holy Spirit is administered to all,” &c. (Vol. ii., p. 259.) “The presence of the Holy Spirit is now given to man, not as a creature; but is secured to him by the mercy and grace of a new and a different dispensation, under which the Spirit is administered,” not on the ground of our being creatures, but as redeemed from the curse of the law by him who became a curse for us.” (Vol. ii., p.257.) The virtues of the unregenerate are not, he says, “from man, but from God, whose Holy Spirit has been vouchsafed to the world through the atonement;.” (Ibid., p.261.) “It is thus,” he adds, finally, i. e., on account of the universal dispensation of the Spirit, “that one part of Scripture is reconciled to another, and both to fact; the declaration of man’s corruption, with the presumption of his power to return to God, to repent, to break off his sins, which all the commands and invitations to him, from. the gospel, imply;” without which power, thus communicated by grace, Mr. Watson imagines, these commands and entreaties could not be addressed to him.

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