[Explanatory notes: Most of what Bavinck says here is excellent and thought provoking. However, a couple of cautionary comments. 1) it is very doubtful that Calvin was a supralapsarian. For Calvin, While God is the ultimate cause of a man’s reprobation, the man is the proximate cause. Further, it is on the supposition of corruption that God predestines the reprobate to destruction. 2) Bavinck’s discussion of permission is problematic. At one point he says the one who permits sin is just as guilty as the one who commits sin. This is problematic because God is not bound to prevent sin. And if what he says holds good, then election itself is undercut and seen as seriously unethical. 3) Supralapsarian, though held by many Reformed theologians, is theologically unhealthy. It distorts one’s perception of God’s revelation to mankind. For sure, so does infralapsarianism, but supralapsarianism magnifies the distortion. 4) The so-called Amyraldian order of the decrees is also suspect given the denials and explanations of Amyraut himself.]

Bavinck:

In Christian theology, however, the word “predestination” (poorosmos)h as been used in very different senses. Meanings varied from broad to narrow. On the Pelagian position it is nothing other than the decree to grant eternal salvation to those whose faith and perseverance God had foreseen, and to consign others, whose sins and unbelief he had foreseen, to eternal punishment. The creation, the fall, Christ, the preaching of the gospel and the offer of gate to all, a persevering faith or unbelief–they all precede predestination, are not included in it but excluded from it. This decree is restricted to the decision to predestine some to eternal life and others to eternal punishment. Here predestination is understood in the most restricted sense and is totally dependent on the bare foreknowledge of God. It is uncertain and undeserving of the name “predestination.” Not God but humans make history and determine the outcome of it. This view has been sufficiently rebutted above and needs no further discussion here.

What does need further consideration is the important difference between infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism. This, in fact, consists in nothing other than a more restricted or broader definition of the concept of predestination. Augustine, to cite a major figure in this discussion, restricted the word in two ways. In the first place, in the order of the decrees he had the decree of predestination follow that of creation and the fall; second, he usually construed the word in a favorable sense, equated foreordination with election, and favored describing the decree of reprobation with the word “foreknowledge.” Predestination tells us what God does, that is, the good; but foreknowledge refers to what humans do, that is, evil. Generally speaking, scholasticism Roman Catholicism, and Lutheranism followed this latter usage. The infralapsarians among Reformed theologians similarly had the decree of creation and fall precede that of election and reprobation. But while the majority of them were willing to include reprobation in the decree of predestination-provided it follows that of the fall–and hence spoke of “double predestination,” others preferred to restrict predestination to election and to treat reprobation separately under a different name. Now if the word “predestination” is not construed in a Pelagian sense and reprobation is not withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the divine will, as was done in the thinking of later Catholic and Lutheran theologians, this difference is not material but merely verbal. Still, it is characteristic for the infralapsarian position that the decree of creation and fall precedes that of election and reprobation. Supralapsarianism, by contrast, so expanded predestination that it includes the decree of creation and the fall, which are then considered as means leading to an ultimate end: the eternal state of rational creatures.

Read the rest of this entry »

Berkouwer:

It is necessary to occupy ourselves with that well-known dispute within the Reformed doctrine of election which is usually called the struggle between supra- and infralapsarianism. This controversy of the seventeenth century often reveals profound aspects, and although it was usually regarded as an intra-confessional dispute, the controversy sometimes revived with great sharpness as each opposing side discovered in the view of the other a total theological concept that exerted its influence on the understanding of the gospel as a whole. And it was certainly not because it wished to penetrate more deeply into the mystery of God’s election, but rather to keep peace, that the Synod of Utrecht in 1905 saw itself compelled to give a brief synopsis of this theological dispute. But also afterwards it has become clear that this difference in view does not belong merely to the past, for in the controversy about the Covenant questions were raised which were very reminiscent of those problems of the past even though the concepts supra and infra were not used. And for those who thought that this was only a matter of scholastic hairsplitting, it must come as a great surprise that Barth in his doctrine of election discusses this old struggle very thoroughly and attempts to trace its deepest motives.

But in spite of this renewed interest, many are aware of the fact that we face here a subtle controversy which owes its existence to a trespassing of the boundaries set by revelation. The terminology employed (supra-infra) sounds strange, and it has been asked whether theology has not become a gnosis which can never become quite transparent to the Church and can never really affect the Church’s belief.

There is also the fact that in the discussion of this dispute we often hear of partialities, both in supra and infra, and of the insolubility of this struggle. But we cannot brush these questions aside by appealing to the simplicity of the gospel. The Reformed churches have been, responsible for keeping this struggle alive, and if we now think that this burden is really too heavy, and that at least this one problem of the many can be thrown off, it will be at least necessary to see why that is possible and also necessary. This matter is all the more urgent since it touches upon the doctrine of election the heart of the Church and no speculation is permissible here.

Is it perhaps true that this controversy never reached a satisfactory solution because it was purely speculative? In other words, must we indeed choose between supra and infra? Or is it possible to say with Spanheim that in the pulpit we are supra, but in preaching and teaching infra? This strange way of putting the problem evokes the question whether we are here really confronted by a dilemma of faith and if we are not obeying the teaching of Scripture if we refuse to make a choice here.

Read the rest of this entry »

Supralapsarian Scheme.

The first suppose that in a rational mind, that which is ultimate as end, is first in design; and that, in the process of planning, the mind passes from the end to the means, traveling as it were backwards. Hence,God first designed His own glory by the salvation of a definite number of men conceived as yet only as in posse, and the reprobation of another definite number; that then He purposed their creation, then the permission of their fall, and then the other parts of the plan of redemption for the elect. I do not mean to represent that they impute to God an actual succession of time as to the rise of the parts of the decree in His eternal mind, but that these divines represent God as planning man’s creation and fall, as a means for carrying out His predestination, instead of planning his election as a means for repairing his fall.

Sublapsarian Scheme. The Sublapsarian assigns the opposite order; that God determined to create man in His own image, to place him under a covenant of works, to permit his fall, and with reference to the fallen and guilty state thus produced, to elect in sovereign mercy some to be saved, passing by the rest in righteous judgment upon their sins, and that He further decreed to send Jesus Christ to redeem the elect. This milder scheme the Supralapsarians assert to be attended with the vice of the Arminian, in making the decree conditional; in that God’s decree of predestination is made dependent on man’s use of his free will under the covenant of works. They also assert that their scheme is the symmetrical one, in that it assigns the rational order which exists between ultimate end and intermediate means. Both Erroneous.

In my opinion this is a question which never ought to have been raised. Both schemes are illogical and contradictory to the true state of facts. But the Sublapsarian is far more Scriptural in its tendencies, and its general spirit far more honorable to God. The Supralapsarian, under a pretense of greater symmetry, is in reality the more illogical of the two, and misrepresents the divine character and the facts of Scripture in a repulsive manner. The view from which it starts, that the ultimate end must be first in design, and then the intermediate means, is of force only with reference to a finite mind. God’s decree has no succession; and to Him no successive order of parts; because it is a contemporaneous unit, comprehended altogether, by one infinite intuition. In this thing, the statements of both parties are untrue to God’s thought. The true statement of the matter is, that in this co-etaneous, unit plan, one part of the plan is devised by God with reference to a state of facts which He intended to result from another part of the plan; but all parts equally present, and all equally primary to His mind. As to the decree to create man, to permit his fall, to elect some to life; neither part preceded any other part with God. But His purpose to elect had reference to a state of facts which was to result from His purpose to create, and permit the fall. It does not seem to me that the Sublapsarian scheme makes the decree conditional. True, one result decreed is dependent on another result decreed; but this is totally another thing. No scheme can avoid this, not even the Supralapsarian, unless it does away with all agency except God’s, and makes Him the direct author of sin.

Objections To the Supralapsarian. But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.

(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.

(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect “out of the world,” John 15:19, and out of the “same lump” with the vessels of dishonor (Rom. 9:21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non–elect, in the common state of sin and misery.

(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. 1:4; 3:11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thess. 2:13). (d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. 9:15 16, 11:5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. 9:22). Now as mercy and goodness simply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turrettin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.

1. “By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.

2. “It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as
supremely wise and just.

3. “It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.

4. “It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them.”

Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology, 232-234.

Heppe:

B.–REPROBATION.

22.–The other side of God’s predestinating decree is the rejection of those, on whom God will not have mercy. “Reprobaftion is the decree of God, by which out of the mere good pleasure of His will He, has resolved to leave fixed men, whom He does not elect, in the mass of corruption and piling up sins on sins and, when they have been hardened by His just judgment, to visit them with eternal punishments, in order to display the glory of His righteousness” (HEIDEGGER V, 54). Or: “(Reprobation is) that by which God has resolved to leave certain men whom He has not elected in the mass of corruption and to condemn them eternally because of sin” (RIISSEN, VI, 16). That there really is such an eternal and unalterable reprobatio of individual men is clear from H. Scripture, which teaches that God chose a part of men from eternity, whence the remainder :are not chosen, but purposely passed over; which H. Scripture likewise expressly attests. If there were no reprobatio, absurdities would have to be inferred, which would contradict essential truths of faith. A part of men would in that case have a life quite undetermined and aimless. In that case God’s punishing righteousness could not be revealed, and Christ would not have been justified in expressly not interceding for a part of humanity, those namely who. are of this world.–HEIDEGGER (V, 55): “It cannot be doubted that from eternity God has reprobated some. Election itself also teaches this. He who elects some passes over those whom he does not elect, leaves and appoints them to merited judgment, as sinners not elected for giving to Christ for redemption, left to themselves and to the increases of their corruption. Apart from such appointment the majority of men would run down to their end without any counsel of God and would be allowed an unfixed outcome, and God could not have resolved anything from eternity anent the exercise of righteousness and judgment. Without impiety this cannot be thought of God, the supreme Lord of all things and of good and bad men, alike a merciful and a just distributor. In addition, God thelon, willing to show His wrath against vessels of wrath Rom. g. 22, held it necessary to set up an example of some, when He spared others. . The righteous is delivered out of trouble, and the wicked cometh in his stead (Prov. II. 8). And this very fact also does not a little to illumine oppositely the glory of God’s mercy.”–WALAEUS 357: “The election of some necessarily supposes the preterition and rejection of others”.

By the following arguments POLAN proves that there is a decree of God, in accordance with which God “from eternity has reprobated and passed over certain rational creatures”, and that accordingly a number of men are rejected (IV, 10): (i) from the Scripture passages Jer. 6. 30 (refuse silver shall men call them, because the Lord hath rejected them) Mt. 7. 23 (and then will I profess unto them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity) Jn. 17. 9 (I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me; for they are thine) Rom. 9. 22 (what if God, wiling to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction?) I Pet. 2, 7–8 (for you which believe is the preciousness, but for such as disbelieve, The stone which the builders rejected… was made… a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence) Jude 4 (of old set forth unto .condemnation) Rev. 13.8, (everyone whose name hath not been written in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world) 17.8 (they whose name hath not been written in the book of life from the foundation of the world) 20. 15 (if any was not found written in the book of life, he was cast into the lake of fire); also (2) from the following arguments: “(a) If not all are elected to eternal life, then the rest are reprobate; but the former stands, therefore so also the latter.– (b) Whomsoever Christ drives from himself in the last judgment, these are forthwith reprobated from eternity by God. This proposition is fixed, because Christ will not drive from himself those who are elect In. 6. 37 (all that which the Father giveth me shall come unto me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out). But Christ will reject many in the last judgment Mt. 7.23 (and then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity) 8. 12 (the sons of the Kingdom shall be cast forth into the outer darkness) 25. 41 (depart from me, ye cursed, . . . ).–(c) If not all are sheep, but many are goats or disgraceful, who shall depart into eternal punishment, then there are those reprobated by God. But the former is the case as Mt. 25 (the judgment) teaches. So Christ says to the Jews, (In. 10. 26) “Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep”.–(d) If there are some for whom Christ did not pray, for whom he did not die effectually, who are of the world; then they are reprobated by God. But the first is true, as Christ testifies In. I7; therefore so is the last.–( e) If some are reprobate, then there is reprobation. Illud est, ergo et hoc. The assumption is proved by the examples of Cain, Ham, Ishmael, Esau, Judas Iscariot.”

Read the rest of this entry »