Davenant:

And last of all, absolute predestination, and absolute reprobation or non-election, do not exclude or deny the eternal intuition of faith and perseverance in the elect, nor the eternal consideration of infidelity and impenitency in the non-elect, but they deny such a consideration of good or bad acts foreseen in men as causes or precedes the different decrees of God in electing some men mercifully unto salvation, and leaving others through their own default to plunge themselves into eternal damnation.

If by casting off men for ever, you¹ mean the eternal exclusion of the damned from the blessed presence of God, and their eternal tormenting in hell, no side will deny but this is grounded upon the foresight of final continuance in sin: yet so, that as the final continuance of Peter in faith was not a cause, condition or motive foreseen, and so determining the divine will to elect him, but the divine election was the cause which afterwards produced in him that foreseen faith. So the foreseen final continuance of Judas in sin and infidelity was not it which determined the divine will to pass by him in his decree of electing singular persons unto the infallibly attainment of eternal life, but being thus passed by, God foresees that through the voluntary obstinacy of his own will (not by any necessitating violence of God’s decree) he will live and die in sin and impenitency, for his voluntary sin and impenitency deserve and undergo eternal torments.

Those who in ordering the eternal decrees, place predestination and negative reprobation before the consideration of the fall, are not few for number, nor men of any late sect. Scotus with the whole army of Scotists,² the greater number of the late School-Divines,are of this opinion: And Suarez by name, whose words are these, Probabiliorem existimo communem sententiam Theologorum asserentium electionem hominem prædestinatorum antecessisse permissionem originalis peccati.³

As for Calvin, he never troubled himself with these imaginary priorities and posteriorities in the eternal immanent operations of God: but all that he aimed at, was to prove, “That the fall foreseen could not be the cause or motive unto God of some men’s election and others’ reprobation.” As for the intuition or divine considertion of all mankind in statu lapso, Calvin in plain terms avouches it: Postquam Paulus, Deum ex perdita massa eligere & reprobare quos illi visim est docuit, quare & quomodo id fiat adeo non expedit ut potius expavescens, &c.

And this presupposition of sin considered in persons, whether elected or not elected, whether to be saved or to be damned, is most convenient for helping our understanding in this deep mystery. But if any shall thereby conceive that the eternal volitions or intuitions of God have any real posteriority or priority in the divine will and understanding, he deceives himself, and troubles others with vain jangling. Utilitas distinguendi hæc instantia rationis, non est, ut ille modus intelligendi retineater, sed ut viam aperiat veritati, quæ aperta relinquatur.

John Davenant, Animadversions Written by the Right Reverend Father in God, John Lord Bishop of Sarisbury, upon the Treatise intitled, Gods love to Mankinde (London: Printed for Iohn Partridge, 1641), 20-22.

[Some spelling modernized; italics original; and underlining mine.]

_____________________________

¹Davenant’s opponent.

²Lib. 1. dist. 41. Lib. 3. dist. 19.

³In 3. disp. 5. p. 103.

Carleton:

The author of the Appeal does often charge some men with a doctrine, which no man did ever maintain. For I say, he is not able to prove, that any have maintained the doctrine of predestination, in those terms which he proposes. Indeed, Pelagius and his followers, and amongst them this author, have made these objections against the doctrine of predestination: We use not these terms, we reject them, we need them not, we find them not in Scripture, we have enough in God’s Word to maintain this doctrine. Touching that which he says of Judas, that some should teach that by the decree of God, Judas should be condemned, without any respect to his sin. I suppose it will be hard for him to find any that teaches so in those terms. CALVIN I suppose is the man he means: but Calvin in many places says the contrary, and confesses that the wicked men are damned justly for their sins: that God’s mercy appears in them that are saved, and his justice, in other. He says, indeed, of the reprobate: Principium ruina & damnation esse in eo, quod sunt à Deo derelicti: which this author will also confess because he can say nothing against it.

But to open this point a little further. It must be confessed, that while some have strayed too far on the left hand, touching the respective decree, that God, for respects in men, has predestined them: Others in some zeal to correct this error, have gone some what too far on the right hand; teaching that predestination is a separation between men and men, as they were found even in the mass of mankind uncorrupt, before the creation and fall. But here we seek upon what ground first presupposed, this counsel of God preceded. Saint Augustine was clear in this, that God’s purpose of predestination on presupposed the fall of mankind, and the corrupt mass of mankind in sin. And verily this opinion has such firm grounds of Scripture, that (so far as I can judge) as unanswerable: For the Apostle teaches that predestination and election are in Christ, Ephesians, chapter 1, verse, 4. “As he has chosen us in Christ, before the foundation of the world:” and verse 5, “Who has predestined us to be adopted through Jesus Christ in himself.” And verse 11, “In whom we were chosen when we were predestinate.” Now if predestination be in Christ, it must be acknowledge that this counsel of God had respect to the corrupt mass of mankind. For the benefit that we have in Christ appears not in the state of innocency. Some have answered that the angels had that benefit of their standing in Christ. To this I say, granting that the angels had that blessing from Christ, yet this is a thing without doubting, and beyond all contradiction, that the doctrine of predestination, as the Apostle teaches it, is not for angels, but only for men, not for men in the state of innocency, but for sinful men. In declaring the purpose of predestination the Lord says, “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.” Then the counsel of predestination, is the counsel whereby God shows mercy where he will: but mercy does presuppose misery, and the sinful estate in man. Again, the purpose of God is conducted to his, end by such means as God has set, and the Apostle has opened: that is, by predestination, vocation and justification, to glorification, that is, to the intended end. But vocation and justification cannot be understood to angels, but of men, and not of men without sin in the estate of innocency, but of sinful men. For sinners are called to repentance, and sinners must be that are justified from their sins. None are called, but sinners. And it is also certain that none are thus called and justified, but only they that are predestinated. Therefore predestination does not look upon the mass of mankind uncorrupt and innocent, but upon the mass corrupted. These things are set in such evidences of Scripture, that for my part I know not what can be said to impeach them. Upon these grounds we must confess, that both predestination and reprobation do respect that sinful and corrupt mass of mankind.

But between predestination and reprobation, amongst many other, this is one difference, that all men for sin have deserved reprobation, but now man could deserve mercy to be delivered by predestination, Rom. 3:23, “For there is no difference, for all have sinned, and are deprived of the glory of God.” Then in the sinful estate of corruption all have found once alike, and “all deprived of the glory of God,” but to deserve reprobation? So he says, Rom. 11:30, “God has shut up all in unbelief:” so that all that are received to mercy by predestination, vocation, justification, are taken out of the corrupted state of mankind, the rest are left in their sins. These we call men reprobate, that are left in their sins, and in the end justly condemned for sin. But why some are left in their sins, other delivered form their sins by predestination, vocation, justification, of this no cause can be given. But the will of God.

George Carleton, An Examination Of those things wherein the Author of the late Appeale holdeth the Doctrines of the Pelagians, and Arminians, to be the Doctrines of the Church of England 2n. ed. (London: Printed for William Tvner, 1626), 13-18. [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

White:

44. For the first, touching predestination, we hold according to Scripture [Rom. 9, Eph. 1:4, 5; 1 Thess. 5:9; 2 Tim. 2:20; 2 Pet. 2:8.], that God from all eternity, before the world was made, has not only foreseen all things that could be or should be upon his appointment and permission, but also b an unchangeable decree has foreordained al things and persons to certain determinate ends, for his own glory: and that neither the saints were elected in Christ in Christ to infallibly and persevering grace and eternal glory for their foreseen righteousness, nor the reprobate refused or not elected to the same for their foreseen wickedness; but both the one and the other were predestined to those their several estates, according to the counsel of God’s own will, which was not moved by anything he foresaw in the parties, but most freely decreed it, according to his own pleasure, and absolute dominion that he has over the creature. And this decree of God’s will is the first and highest mover of all other wills and things in the creature, whereupon the smallest and most contingent or casual things that fall out, depend as upon their universal cause, whose influence into the second causes directs, produces, inclines, and ordains them to their effects: not by enforcing them (as the will of man for example) by any natural necessity of constraint, but by inclining them to work according their condition, so as the said EFFECTS SHALL PROCEED OUT OF THEM ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN MANNER, as a contingent effect shall go forth of a contingent cause, and a free effective issue out of a voluntary and free cause. This is the sum of that we hold touching predestination, and the influence thereof into the actions of men.

45. Whereby it is plain, that whatsoever we hold against freewill, yet do we not lay the bondage thereof on God’s predestination, but upon Adam’s fall, WHICH IS THE PROPER ROOT AND FOUNDATION WHENCE THAT IMPOTENCY THAT IS IN OUR OWN WILL ARISES. For the decree and providence of God began not after Adam’s fall, but before, and yet we think Adam’s will was perfectly free: which shows our opinion to be, that free will (though we want it) may well stand with God’s predestination, because Adam in his innocency had it, and yet was ruled by God’s predestination. And therefore our adversaries belie us, when they say, our opinion touching predestination makes us deny free will: for we think indeed our will is moved effectually by God’s will in our all our actions; which being the most effectual and universal cause of all things, qualifies our will, and inclines it to the action; yet does it not follow hereupon , that therefore we think our own will has no freedom, but oly that the freedom thereof depends upon a former freedom, which is the freedom of God’s will. And if we hold further, as some Divine do, that God’s will determine ours, and his decree flows into all the effects of our will, so that we do nothing but as he directs our will and purpose: yet this excludes not our own freedom, nor makes God the author of sin, nor implies any inevitable necessity in our doing. The reason is, because God moves not our will violently, enforcing it, but leaves an inward motive within ourselves that stirs it up, which is the act of our understanding, whereby we judge the things good or evil, that we will or nill. For in the proceeding of our will, first the mind apprehends some object and offers it to the will; then upon the full and perfect judgement of the understanding, the will follows or refuses it, as the understanding judges it good or bad. And so this act or JUDGEMENT OF OUR UNDERSTANDING, is the root from whence the free choice of our will arises, in such manner as whatsoever it be that goes before the act of our will, or sets in with it, to incline it (as God’s will does) as long as it destroys not, nor enforces this practical judgement of reason, the liberty of our will is not taken away. And herein stands true CONCORD BETWEEN GOD’S PREDESTINATION AND MAN’S FREE WILL: that the free and immutable counsel of God’s will, goes indeed in order before the operation of our will, or at least together with it, and determines and circumscribes it: but forsomuch as it neither enforces our will, nor takes away our judgement, but permits it freely to lead and persuade the will, it expels not the liberty, but rather cherishes and upholds it. For whatsoever these two concur, FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE AND NECESSITY, and THE FULL CONCENT OF REASON, there is the whole and true reason of liberty.

John White, “The Way of the True Church.” in The Workes of that Learned and Reuerend Divine Iohn White, Doctor in Diuinitie (London: Printed for William Barret, 1624), 139-140. [Some spelling modernized; uppercase emphasis original; italics original; marginal Scripture references cited inline; and marginal Latin references not included.]

Venema:

III. Let us now inquire what place this general purpose holds in the order of the divine decrees–whether the first or the third. On this point two different opinions are held–the one by the Supralapsarians and the other by the Sublapsarians.

The Supralapsarians maintain that God in forming his decree first consulted the manifestation of his justice and mercy in saving some and condemning others of the human race, that all his decrees were designed to promote this end and are to be regarded as means to its accomplishment, and that the last of these means was the gift of his Son as Redeemer to some, i.e. to the elect, all the others being absolutely destined to destruction and therefore reprobate. But in order that man might be in a condition to illustrate the mercy and justice of God in his salvation or in his final ruin, in other words, in order that his decree to manifest these perfections might thus take effect, they say that God decreed that he should fall, and that by the fall he should become miserable, and that in order to bring this about he decreed to call him into being, so that his creation might prepare the way for his fall, and his creation and fall afford an opportunity for the manifestation of his mercy in saving some and of his justice in condemning others of his posterity.

Such according to them was the order of thought in the mind of God in forming his decree–the first, namely, being the manifestation not of his perfections in general, but of his mercy and justice in particular–the second, the permission of the fall–the third, the creation of man. They thus hold that man was regarded by God in the decree of predestination not as created and fallen, but as destined to be created and to be created in order to fall. This is the reason why they are called Supralapsarians. Among the most eminent of them were Beza, Gomarus, Macovius, and Piscator. Calvin, although regarded by many as entertaining their sentiments, was in reality a Sublapsarian.

The Sublapsarian view of the doctrine of predestination is this. God, it is said, proposed as the end of his decree the manifestation of his own glory. He then purposed to create man in order to afford an illustration of his goodness, wisdom, and power, to permit him to fall, and to magnify his mercy and justice in delivering some and in leaving others to perish. They thus assign to predestination the third place–after the creation and the fall, namely, and hold that man was viewed by God in the decree as destined to fall, or as already created and fallen. On this account they are called Sublapsarians or Infralapsarians.

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