Mr. T.’s second topic of argument is taken from the universality of divine love to man, and the willingness of the blessed God that all should turn, and live. It is admitted, that God’s love to man is, in one sense, universal. He beam good will towards them, as the work of his hands; but it does not follow from thence, that he must do all that he could do for their salvation. If God loves all mankind, he must have loved the inhabitants of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom, as well as those of Chorazin and Bethsaida: but though, as Mr. T. thinks, (XIII. 25.) if the same things which were done for the latter without effect, had been done for the former, they would have been done for the former, they would have been effectual; yet they were not done. As to God’s willingness that all should turn, and live, God’s will, as has been observed, sometimes expresses what he approves, and sometimes what he purposes. God wills, approves, and desires a sinner’s turning unto him. It is that which, through the whole Bible, is required of him; and whosoever thus returns shall live. I may add, God is willing to receive and forgive every sinner that returns to him through Jesus Christ. He desireth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he would repent, and live. But he has not purposed the salvation of every sinner, or to incline his heart to embrace the salvation exhibited in the gospel. In this sense, the salvation of some is neither desired nor designed: if it were, it would be effected; for his counsel shall stand and he will do all his pleasure.–Whatsoever his soul desireth, even that he doeth. Isa. xlvi. l0. Job xxiii. 13. “But can God,” says Mr. T. “will that which he knows to be impossible? which never was possible? which none could make possible, besides himself? which he was never willing to make possible?” (XIII. 120.) If by impossible, Mr. T. means, that which is naturally impossible, it is granted he cannot. But that he wills what is morally impossible, Mr. T. himself must allow. God wills that Christians should be holy, as he himself is holy; and that, in the present life, or he would not have enjoined it upon them. 1 Peter iv. 16. Matt. v. 48. But Mr. T. does not pretend that this is possible, even by the assistance of divine grace. (XIII. 61.)

Andrew Fuller, “The Reality and Efficacy of Divine Grace,” in The Works of the Rev. Andrew Fuller, in Eight Volumes, (Philadelphia: Printed by Anderson and Meehan, for William Collier, 1820), 1:414-5.

Turretin:

FIFTEENTH QUESTION

May the will be properly distinguished into the will of decree and of precept, good purpose (eudokias) and good pleasure (euarestias), signified, secret and revealed? We affirm.

I. Although the will in God is only one and most simple, by which he comprehends all things by a single and most simple act so that he sees and understands all things at one glance, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects, it thus happens that in our manner of conception, it may be apprehended as manifold (not in itself and intrinsically on the part of the act of willing, but extrinsically and objectively on the part of the things willed).

II. Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do or permit himself; the latter what he wills that we should do. The former relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God’s external acts; the latter is concerned with precepts and promises and is the rule of our action. The former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled: “Who hath resisted his will?” (Rom. 9:19). The latter is often violated by men: “How often would I have gathered you together, and ye would not (Mt. 23:37).

III. As there are various passages of Scripture in which the will of God is taken either for the decree (Rom. 9:19; Eph. 1:ll) or for the precept (Ps. 143:10; Rom. 12:2), so there are also some in which both wills of God are signified at the same time (i.e., Jn. 6:38, where Christ says, “I came down to do the will of him that sent me” [i.e., to fulfil the things decreed by God and to obey the command of the Father]). And when we say in the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done,” we ask that our lives may correspond to his precepts and his decrees be fulfilled.

IV. Although the precept falls also under the decree as to proposition, still it does not fall as to execution. Thus they may be properly distinguished from each other, so as the will of decree may be that which determines the event of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes to man his duty. Therefore God can (without a contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release).

V. Hence it happens that although these wills may be conceived by us as diverse (owing to the diversity of the objects), yet they are not contrary. For as was just said, they are not occupied about the same thing. Undoubtedly if God by the power of his decree would impel men to do what he has by his law prohibited, or if when attempting to obey the law he would by an opposite impediment recall them from obedience, he would will repugnancies and be himself opposed to his own will. But the decree of God does not contend with his command when he prescribes to man his bounden duty (for the performance of which, however, he does not will to give the strength because he wills indeed the thing as to the proposition of duty, but yet not as to the execution of the event).

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Rutherford:

It’s much worthy of observation, how that sweet evangelic invitation is conceived, Isaiah 55:1, Ho, every one that thirsts; the Heb. word ‘hui’ is alas, or ah, every one that thirsts, come to the waters, and he that hath no silver, come, buy, and eat: as if the Lord were grieved, and said, woe is me, alas that thirsty souls should die in their thirst, and will not come to the waters of life, Christ, and drink gratis, freely, and live. For the interjection, (Heb. Hui) Ho, is a mark of sorrowing… it expresses two things, 1. A vehemency, and a serious and unfeigned ardency of desire, that we do what is our duty, and the concatenation of these two, extremely desired of God, our coming to Christ, and our salvation: This moral connection between faith and salvation, is desired of God with his will of approbation, complacency, and moral liking, without all dissimulation, most unfeignedly; and whereas Arminians say, we make counterfeit, feigned, and hypocritical desires in God, they calumniate and cavil egregiously, as their custom is.

What the revealed
will of God is.

2. The other thing expressed in these invitations, is a sort of dislike, grief, or sorrow; (’tis a speech borrowed from man, for there is no disappointing of the Lord’s will, nor sorrow in him for the not fulfilling of it) or an earnest nilling and hating, that these two should not go along, as approved efficaciously by us, to wit, the creatures obedience of Faith and life eternal. God loves and approves the believing of Jerusalem, and of her children, as a moral duty, as the hen does love to warm and nourish her chickens; and he hates, with an exceeding unfeigned dislike of improbation and hated, their rebellious disobedience, and refusing to be gathered: but there is no purpose, intention, or decree of God holds forth in these invitations called his revealed will, by which he says that he intends and wills that all he makes the offer unto, shall obey and be saved….

Now this desire of approbation is an abundantly sufficient closing of the mouth of such as stumble at the gospel, being appointed thereunto, and an expression of Christ’s good liking to save sinners.

The Lord’s wishes,
Expostulations and
crying, bold
forth, how earnest in
drawing sinners
to himself.

Expressed in his borrowed wishes, Deut. 5:29. O that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep my commandments. Ps. 81:13. O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel walked in my ways. Which wish, as relating to disobeying Israel, is a figure, or metaphor borrowed from men, but otherwise shows how acceptable the duty is to God, how obligatory to the creature. But the Lord’s expostulations, Ezek. 18:31. Why will ye die, O house of Israel? Verse 32. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dies. In the Lord’s crying to sinners, Prov. 1:20. Wisdom cries, she utters her voice in the streets. The word is to cry with strong shouting, either for joy, Ps. 81:2, or sorrow, Lam. 2:19, which expresses Christ’s desire to save sinners.

Samuel Rutherford, Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself, (London, J.D. for Andrew Crook at the Green-Dragon in Paul’s Church Yard, 1647), 443-444, and 445. [Some spelling modernized; some reformatting; marginal notes cited inline; italics original; and underlining mine.]   [Note: The pagination is irregular and jumps forward repeating some page numbers. This section is from the non-repeated page range signified by 443-445.]

Credit to Tony and to The Durham Thesis.

1) John Calvin (1509-1564):

What I have said of the precepts, abundantly suffices to confound your blasphemies. For though God gives no pretended commands, but seriously declares what he wishes and approves [Latin: vult et probat.]; yet it is in one way, that he wills the obedience of his elect whom he efficaciously bends to compliance; and in another that of the reprobate whom he warns by the external word, but does not see good to draw to himself. Contumacy and depravity are equally natural to all, so that none is ready and willing to assume the yoke. John Calvin, Secret Providence, trans., by James Lillie, Article 7, John Calvin’s reply.

2) “It would seem, at first sight, that what is said here might be without apparent reason. It is true God always knows why he commands or forbids men to do what pleases or displeases him, but we are not always informed of it.” Calvin, Sermons on Genesis, Sermon 10, Gen 2:15-17, p., 164.

3) Johannes Wollebius (1586-1629):

“Just as the edicts of a magistrate are called his will, so the designation of will may be given to precepts, prohibitions, promises, and even deeds and events. Thus the divine will is also called that which God wants done [voluntas signi], because it signifies what is acceptable to God; what he wants done by us. It is called “consequent” because it follows that eternal antecedent; “conditional” because the commandments, prohibitions, warnings, and promises of God all have a condition of obedience or disobedience attached to them. Finally, it is called “revealed,” because it is always explained in the word of God. It must be observed that this sort of distinction does not postulate either really diverse, or contradictory, wills in God.” Johannes Wollebius, “The Compendium Theologiae Christianae” in Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), 48.

4) Zacharias Ursinus (1534-1583):

There are four classes of things concerning which men give commandment. These are, first, divine precepts, which God desires, that men should propose unto themselves for their observance, not, however, in their own name, but by the authority of God himself, as being the ministers and messengers, and not the authors of these precepts.  Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans.,  G.W. Willard (Phillpsburg N.J.: P&R, 1994), 519-520.

Comments found in Heinrich Heppe’s Reformed Dogmatics:

5) 25.- The will of God directed to the world is by many distinguished as voluntas beneplaciti and voluntas signi, in the sense that it is voluntas beneplaciti by which He wills us to be saved and we understand what He has established with Himself concerning our salvation from eternity.–It is (voluntas) signi by which He requires the things which we ought to supply (SEEGEDIN, p. 23).

Many dogmaticians approve the distinction between voluntas signi and voluntas beneplacti; POLANUS (II, 19): “It is called voluntas signi, because it signifies what is pleasing to God, what belongs to our duty, what He wishes to be done or omitted by us, etc.” These “signa voluntatis, from which it is known what God wills”, are “precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, and the fulfilment of predictions.”

…Similarly WALAEUS, p. i 7 I: “A famous distinction of great importance and use, employed by the Scholastics and also accepted by ours, is the division into voluntas signni et beneplaciti“; and HOTTINGER, who (p. 80) explains that “the distinction of will into that which is of sign and that which is of good pleasure is convenient. It is confirmed by famous sayings of H. Scripture, Dt. 29. 29 (the secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law); Tobit 12, 14; 18 (not of any favour of mine (the angel Raphael) but by the will of our God I came: wherefore bless Him for ever)”. HOTTINGER identifies this distinction with the difference between voluntas revelata and voluntas arcana. For he continues “Voluntas signi is sometimes called revelala, voluntas heneplaciti arcana“. Then he says that by this distinction is expressed merely the difference between voluntas praecipiens and voluntas decernens. In this latter sense the distinction is also used by BRAUN (I, II, 3, 18): “It is also divided into voluntas heneplaciti et voluntas signi. By others rather into voluntas praecepti; which division seems more convenient.

Voluntas signi (or praecepti) is that will by which God signifies to men what He wishes to be done by them; voluntas beneplaciti or decreti, by which God has decreed what He wishes to do in man, e.g., God wills, voluntate signi vel praecepti, that parents should provide all things for their children which are necessary for long life, although He has perhaps decreed voluntate beneplaciti et decreti, that the children should die suddenly. So God willed voluntate signi et praecepti that Abraham should gird himself to sacrifice his son Isaac, although voluntate decreti et beneplaciti He willed to preserve him in life.

…BRAUN continues (19): “Yet if we would speak correctly, it is certain that no will can be called voluntas signi. Rather by a universal order we must say that it is the sign of an approving will. All injunctions, promises and threats are but signs of God’s will, i.e., of what God wishes to be done by us, but not of what He has decreed. Nor are there different wills. Every will is strictly speaking voluntas beneplaciti. When God enjoins, approves, promises and threatens, this is always done in terms of His beneplacitum. Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 85-86.

6) To meet the Arminian reproach that by such a distinction two voluntates sibi contrariae are assumed HEIDAN, (pp.136-7) insists: “(I) Strictly speaking there is but a single will of God called beneplaciti, whereby God determines by Himself what He wills to do in and concerning the creature. The second is but the sign and indication by which He shows what He wishes creatures to do. But He does not wish them to make His beneplacitum universal; but only the things which He reveals to them, Dt. 29. 29 (p. 85). Source: Heirnich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 87.

7) Reformed dogmaticians as a whole are occupied with the question, whether goodness is good because God wills it, or whether God wills the good because it is good. Recognition of the absoluteness of God seemed to many reconcilable with the former. Hence, e.g., POLAN (II, 26) says: “(i) God does, what by His own law He prohibits us; He passed the law for us, not for Himself. E.g., He does not bring it about that we admit no sin while living here, though He might most easily have done SO.-(2) The supreme rule of divine righteousness is His most perfect and infallible will God is a law to Himself. Whatever He wishes done, it is right by the very fact that He wills it. Source: Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 93-94.

8) 5–”The decree of God is the inward act of the divine will, by which from eternity He has most freely and most surely decreed concerning the things which had to be made in time” (WOLLEB 17).–Other definitions: v. TIL (4, De decret. Dei, p. 61): “God’s decree is our name for God’s eternal and immutable purpose to manifest His glory in things possible¡. concerning which, according to His Infinite wisdom and most free eudokia, He has determined both what He wished to be done or not to be done in time, both in setting up natures and also in appointing their futurition”. –PICTET (III, i, 2): “By the decree we understand the firm and unchangeable purpose in God’s mind concerning what He was to make in time or to allow”.–HOTTINGER, p. 73: “The decree is God’s inward action or His eternal counsel anent things to come into being outwith Himself, which things He foreknows with an infallibility equal to the immutability with which He has predetermined them.” Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 137-138.

Francis Turretin (1623-1687):

9) XXVI. Purely personal sins differ from those which are and public. The former should not be imputed posterity. Of them, the law must be understood: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin” (Dt. 24:16). However nothing prevents the latter from being imputed, and such was the sin of Adam. (2) The law imposed upon men differs from the law to which God binds himself. Barriers are placed to human vengeance because it might be abused, but not to divine justice. In this passage, God undoubtedly shows what he wishes to be done ordinarily by men, but not immediately what he wishes [Lat.: velit] to do or what he can do from the order of justice. Otherwise he could not have said in the law that he would visit the iniquities of parents upon their children, nor would he have confirmed this by many examples. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994), 1:624.

10) XVI. It is one thing to will reprobates to come (i.e., to command them to come and to desire it); another to will they should not come (i.e., to nill the giving them the power to come). God can in calling them will the former and yet not the latter without any contrariety because the former respects only the will of precept, while the latter respects the will of decree. Although these are diverse (because they propose diverse objects to themselves, the former the commanding of duty, but the latter the execution of the thing itself), still they are not opposite and contrary, but are in the highest degree consistent with each other in various respects. He does not seriously call who does not will the called to come (i.e., who does not command nor is pleased with his coming). But not he who does not will him to come whither he calls (i.e., did not intend and decree to come). For a serious call does not require that there should be an intention and purpose of drawing him, but only that there should be a constant will of commanding duty and bestowing the blessing upon him who performs it (which God most seriously wills). But if he seriously make known what he enjoins upon the man and what is the way of salvation and what is agreeable to himself, God does not forthwith make known what he himself intended and decreed to do. Nor, if among men, a prince or a legislator commands nothing which he does not will (i.e., does not intend should also be done by his subjects because he has not the power of effecting this in them), does it follow that such is the case with God, upon whom alone it depends not only to command but also to effect this in man. But if such a legislator could be granted among men, he would rightly be said to will that which he approves and commands, although he does not intend to effect it. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994) 2:507-508.

11) XXI. The invitation to the wedding proposed in the parable (Mt. 22:1-14) teaches that the king wills (i.e., commands and desires) the invited to come and that this is their duty; but not that the king intends or has decreed that they should really come. Otherwise he would have given them the ability to come and would have turned their hearts. Since he did not do this, it is the surest sign that he did not will they should come in this way. When it is said “all things are ready” (Lk. 14:17), it is not straightway intimated an intention of God to give salvation to them, but only the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice. For he was prepared by God and offered on the cross as a victim of infinite merit to expiate the sins of men and to acquire salvation for all clothed in the wedding garment and flying to him (i.e., to the truly believing and repenting) that no place for doubting about the truth and perfection of his satisfaction might remain.  Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994) 2:509.

Hermann Venema (1697-1787):

12) (2) God wishes his laws to be obeyed, and therefore wishes also his creatures to be incited in every way to the keeping of them. This purpose is greatly served by the prospect of rewards. But justice loves and demands these rewards. Hermann Venema, Institutes of Theology, trans., by Alex W. Brown, (Andover: W.F. Draper Brothers, 1853), 172.

William Cunningham (1805-1861):

13) Many of the events that take place,–such as the sinful actions of men,–are opposed to, or inconsistent with, His will as revealed in His law, which is an undoubted indication of what He wished or desired that men should do. William Cunningham, Historical Theology (Banner of Truth, 1994), 2:452.

Thomas J. Crawford:

14) Now, without pretending that we are able to give a satisfactory answer to this question, we are not prepared to admit, what the question evidently assumes, that God can have no sincere desire with reference to the conduct of all His creatures, if it be His purpose to secure on the part of some, and not on the part of all of them, the fulfillment of this desire. For how does the case stand in this respect with His commandments? These, no less than His invitations, are addressed to all. Both are alike to be considered as indications of what He desires and requires to be done by all. Nor are there wanting, with reference to His commandments, testimonies quite as significant as any which are to be found’ with reference to His invitations, of the earnestness and intensity of His desire that the course which they prescribe should be adopted by all who hear them. Take, for example, these tender expostulations: “O that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with their children for ever!” [Deut.v, 29.]. “O that my  people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways!” [Ps. lxxxi. 13.]. “O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments; then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the wav& of the sea!” [Isa. xlviii. 18.]. Thomas J. Crawford, The Mysteries of Christianity (Edinburgh: William Blackward & Sons, 1874), 351-352. [Italics Crawford’s, underlining mine.]

John L. Dagg (1794–1884):

15) Closely allied to the last signification, and perhaps included in it, is that use of the term will, in which it denotes command, requirement. When the person, whose desire or pleasure it is that an action should be performed by another, has authority over that other, the desire expressed assumes the character of precept. The expressed will of a suppliant, is petition; the expressed will of a ruler, is command. What we know that it is the pleasure of God we should do, it is our duty to do, and his pleasure made known to us becomes a law. J.L. Dagg, Manual of Theology and Church Order, (Harrisonburg, VA: Gano Books, 1982), 100.

Of general interest:

1) 29.–Moreover this permission is not a relation of indifference in God to man, but a positive act. By it God gives man opportunity to sin, withdraws His protecting grace from Him, and hands him over to the power of sin and the devil, so that in that case sin is the necessary result.–URSIN (Explic. catech. 131): The word permissio is not to be rejected, since it is occasionally used in Scripture. This permissio is not “a cessation of divine providence and operation” but “a withdrawal of divine grace, by which God–either does not teach the acting. creature what He Himself wishes done, or Himself does not bend its will to obedience Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 275.

2) COCCEIUS (Summ. de foed. II, 45): “The covenant of works God made with Adam both on his own behalf and in him as stock, with the whole human race in virtue of the blessing on nature “.–WYTENBACH (Tent. II, 574): “The covenant which God fixed with the first man He made in his person with all his posterity: for the law of the covenant applies to all men whatsoever, and therefore God cannot avoid demanding the observation of it from all; besides in Adam the first man, or the natural head of the whole human race, all men virtually existed already, and God foreknew who and how many would arise from it, so that all were really present in person at that time. Moreover, if the law of the covenant applied to all and God required the observance of it by Adam’s posterity, who were all actually visualised as present, it follows no less that He wished the promise of the covenant to apply to all on condition of perfect keeping of the law. There is of course no reason for the law applying to all and not specifically the promise of the reward. Therefore God wished the whole covenant to apply to Adam’s successors and so He made it in his person with all his descendants”. Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), 291.