Wollebius:

III. Besides the will of God, there are no causes which can be contrary to his will. Many things indeed can be contrary to what God wants [voluntas signi], which nevertheless conform to the divine plan [voluntas beneplaciti]. God did not will man’s sin, and indeed most strictly forbade it. Nevertheless, at the same time he decreed it according to his will [beneplaciti], as a means of revealing his glory.

IV. Both good and evil, therefore, result from the decree and will of God; the former he causes, and the latter he permits.

V. Nevertheless, the decree and will of God are in no sense the cause of evil or sin, although whatever God decrees takes place of necessity. Since evils are decreed not effectively, but permissively, the decree of God is not the cause of evil. Nor are the decrees of God the cause of evil on account of the inevitability of their result, since they bring about results not by a coercive necessity but merely by an immutable one.

Johannes Wollebius, “Compendium Theologiae Christianae,” in John W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1977), 48. [Originally published in 1626. Keep in mind this is a smaller dogmatic work and so his comments on various topics will not be extensive.]

Aquinas:

Article 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?

Objection 1. It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.

Objection 2. Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.

On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Psalm 110:2: “Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.” Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.

I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (13, 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: “Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven” (Matthew 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

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Aquinas:

1)

Article 9. Whether God wills evils?

Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): “Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.” Therefore God wills evil things.

Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): “Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): “Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.” But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Objection 3. Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God’s will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): “No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.” Therefore it is not by God’s will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.

I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (5, 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

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Bullinger:

Furthermore as the wise man gives counsel: seek not or search not for things that are greater & harder then thou art able to do. And such things as are commanded thee of God, those devoutly consider of, and be not curious in many of his works, for it is not needful that thou should behold his secrets with thy eyes. For many have been deceived and confounded through their own vain persuasion. And he that loves danger shall perish therein. Wherefore the best & plainest way is to believe that God is just, and to confess that he wills not that which is evil, much less does evil. For when as he forbad man the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he would not doubtless that man should be eating transgress the law and due.

For David says: “Thou art not that God whom wickedness pleases, and with whom the evil are familiar, thou hatest all them that work evil.” And Solomon says that God made man good, but men entangle themselves with infinite questions: and the same Solomon says, God neither made death nor destruction, neither is delighted with the death of the living. For God created man unto immortality, and made him after his own image, but through the envy of the devil death entered into the world.

But if these and other such like places of Holy Scripture come to any man’s remembrance, namely that GOD hardens the hearts, blinds the eyes, gives up unto a reprobate mind &c., the Christian reader must consider that God does all things justly, and that he does wrong to no man. Saint Paul in this controversy puts back men’s objections in these words, “what art though O man that reasonest with God? shall the work say to the workman that made it, ‘why hast thou made me so?’” As though it were not lawful for the Potter of the same lump of clay to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? And David says: “God is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works.”

Henry Bullinger, Common Places of Christian Religion, (Imprinted at London by Tho. East, and H. Middleton, for George Byshop, 1572), 48-49.