Wardlaw:

XXIV. ON THE CALVINISTIC VIEWS OF THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

THE present discussion is to be occupied with the sentiments of Calvinists on the subject of the extent of the atonement the second of the five points of the Arminian Controversy, viz., particular redemption.

It ought here to be borne in mind that when, in this controversy, the phrases particular and universal redemption are used, they are not at all to be understood in the same sense as particular or universal salvation. The doctrine of the Universalists is quite a different thing from the doctrine of those who maintain universal redemption. The former falls properly to be considered when we come to discuss the final states of men. Arminians, though maintaining general or universal redemption, are not Universalists, but agree with Calvinists as to the matter of fact, that all are not ultimately saved. They differ from the Calvinists respecting the cause of that limitation, denying it to arise at all from any sovereign or special purpose of God. Perhaps the word redemption is not the most happily chosen in the statement of this doctrine, inasmuch as, generally speaking, it is understood of the effects or results to men from the work of Christ, or the ransom paid by Him in His death, rather than of that ransom itself. Yet, being used in both senses, it might be vindicated. It expresses the result to us.¹ But we have an instance, I rather think the only one, of its meaning the ransom by which the redemption is effected.² And in this acceptation it is that the word is now used, when the dispute is, whether the redemption was particular or general. It is the same as the question: Whether the atonement was restricted or universal, for some or for all.

We shall consider the Calvinistic views under three modifications:–1. Hyper-calvinism; 2. Calvinism as more generally held by the orthodox; and, 3. Moderate, or what may be designated modern Calvinism, as held and ably elucidated by the late Andrew Fuller, Dr. Edward Williams, and others, and now embraced by a growing proportion of Calvinistic ministers and professing Christians.

1. Of the hyper-calvinistic views on the present subject I have already indicated my opinion. They are the views of the exact equivalentists, of those who hold a limited atonement in the sense of its being sufficient only, in the way of legal compensation, for the salvation of the elect; so that, if more in number had been to be saved, more suffering must have been endured; that Christ, standing in the room of the elect, and appearing as their substitute and representative, bore their sins exclusively, making an atonement adequate for their remission and for no more; paying precisely (to use the ordinary but much abused phraseology) their amount of debt. This view of the atonement has been held by not a few, and has been advanced anew, and maintained as the only just and scriptural view, by some modern writers.

I have before expressed my unqualified reprobation of this doctrine, as having in it a littleness, a meanness, and an utter incongruity with the divine dignity of the Mediator, utterly revolting to both my judgment and feelings. My objections to the doctrine are these:

(1.) That it is altogether irreconcilable with the infinite worth of the Savior’s sacrifice as arising from the infinite dignity of His person. The union of the divine and human natures imparted to it this infinitude of value. It was infinite, because it was divine. But every system which proceeds upon the supposition of its rising or falling in its amount of value, according as the substitute suffers for a greater or a smaller number, for a larger or a less amount or aggregate of guilt, is entirely at variance with this. That cannot be unlimited in intrinsic value, that is susceptible of increase and diminution. It may possibly be objected to this, that in that case any measure of suffering, howsoever small, might have sufficed. And perhaps we might be warranted in saying that whatever was done or suffered by a person sustaining the dignity of Godhead must in itself have possessed infinite value. But in the proper idea of atonement there is included, we ought not to forget, not the mere payment of a debt or settlement of an account, which equally cancels all claim, whatever may be the degree of either privacy or publicity with which the settlement is made; but a visible and impressive manifestation of the evil of sin, and an open and public vindication of the righteousness of God in its forgiveness. Now, in order to this, it would seem, the substitute must not only suffer, but appear to suffer, and to suffer deeply and shamefully, and in a way with which the idea of curse was implicated. This was necessary to effect what the apostle calls "declaring God’s righteousness for the remission of sins;"³ making such a public manifestation of it as should fully maintain and even augment its credit in the eyes of the intelligent creation; making it conspicuous, and deepening the conviction and impression of it. God Himself knew best the degree of visible and apparent suffering requisite for securing this end. That which makes the atonement of Jesus sufficient is not the fact that sufferings were endured in His human nature (which alone could suffer) equal in degree to the concentrated sufferings of the multitude of the finally saved. Were that the case, then it would not be from the association of divinity with humanity that the real value of His sacrifice arose; but the sole use of that association must have been merely to enable the human nature to bear this required equivalent of suffering. If it be granted, as it generally is, by the advocates of atonement, that it was from the divinity of Jesus that His sacrifice derived its value; I might, I apprehend, go a step further, and affirm the idea of an exact equivalent for the deserts of the elect alone an impossibility in the very nature of things. The infinite dignity of His mediatorial person put it necessarily and for ever out of the question that the value of His propitiatory sufferings should be measured and bounded by the amount of penalty due to finite creatures. His substitution and obedience unto death must, of necessity, have infinitely exceeded an equivalent for the penal sufferings of any conceivable number of the race of men.

(2.) If this pitiful process of commercial reckoning, this weight-and-measure system of atonement, be admitted, it will follow that the eternal perdition of all mankind would have been a greater manifestation of the divine righteousness and detestation of sin than the sufferings of the Son of God. For it is evident, more would have been endured; and if the satisfaction and manifestation of justice are to be calculated upon this principle, to be estimated by the quantum of suffering actually borne, I see not how the inference can be evaded. To remind me that Jesus was a divine person, will not repel or elude it. It is a truth, indeed, an all-important truth. But it is, at the same time, a truth, that, if this consideration be taken into the account, it makes the value of His sacrifice unlimited, and therefore proves too much for the exact equivalent hypothesis, of which the principle is, a limited amount of suffering for a limited amount of sin. There is, indeed, one way in which the cases might be reduced to an equality. On the supposition of exact equivalent, the proportion of suffering endured in the person of the surety for the sins of the saved, is the same with the proportion endured in their own persons for the sins of the lost. But still it holds good, that the penal sufferings of all mankind, taken collectively, must have contained a greater manifestation of the evil of sin and the righteousness of God, than the sufferings of the Son of God, taken by themselves. But I shrink from saying more on a subject that sickens my very soul.

(3.) That the exact equivalent hypothesis renders the salvation of any besides the elect a natural impossibility. We are accustomed to say, and we say truly and scripturally, to sinners of mankind without exception, that if they are not saved, the fault is entirely their own, lying solely in their own unwillingness to accept the salvation offered to them, or to have it on the terms on which it is presented. But on the supposition of limitation in the sufficiency of the atonement, this is not true. Indisposition, indeed, on their part there is, and it is their sin. But if the atonement be in its intrinsic amount limited, it becomes, in the nature of the thing, absurd and contradictory so much as to imagine any beyond the number, to the desert of whose sins it has been restricted, deriving any benefit from it. All others are necessarily excluded by the limitation of the remedy. For them to seek salvation would be to seek an impossibility. A payment has been made, but it is only to a certain amount; and it is no more possible that they should have the charges against them cancelled on the ground of such payment, than it is possible, by the advance of one thousand pounds, the exact amount of the debts one has contracted, to provide a fund from which the twenty thousand of the debts or as many others may be discharged on their applying for their remission. On the principle of this equivalent system, were other sinners ever so desirous to obtain salvation, they could not; inasmuch as the impossibility would arise, not from anything in themselves, but in the very nature and constitution of the plan of redemption. If the atonement be necessary to forgiveness, and if at the same time it has been so constituted as to be equivalent only for a certain amount of sin; then it is clear, that beyond that limited amount no sin can be forgiven. Ere it can, a new atonement must be offered for it.

(4.) This being the case, it will be more than difficult, on this hypothesis, to vindicate the sincerity of those addresses in which sinners universally are invited to believe and be saved. If in the propitiation made, there do not exist what has, with sufficient appropriateness, been termed objective sufficiency for all, there really exists no ground on which such universal invitations can consistently be founded, no foundation on which sinners generally can be called to trust. Such invitation amounts to no more than a tantalising of poor perishing creatures with the offer of what has no existence. There is no fund from which their debts can be paid; no provision for them at the feast to which they are invited; no water for them in the wells of salvation. The phrase, an all-sufficient Savior, becomes, in addressing sinners indiscriminately, a designation destitute of truth, a mere "swelling word of vanity."⁴

(5.) It is necessary to repeat that, in the view which this hypothesis takes of the substitution and atonement of Christ, nothing is taken into account but the desert of the sinner. It balances a certain proportion of deserved punishment on the part of the transgressor, by a corresponding proportion of vicarious suffering on the part of the atoning substitute. But it appears to be entirely forgotten that there is another party, a party whose claims are infinitely superior in importance to any interests of the sinning creature; that the glory of God, violated by transgression, requires to be secured, and vindicated, and displayed, irrespectively of the mere numerical amount of sinners and of sins; that, in truth, this was the grand end of atonement; that the question is not one of commutative or commercial justice, what measure of suffering must be endured, to be a precise equipollent for the measure of sin to be forgiven; how many drops of expiatory blood for so many trespasses to be remitted? that it has no such principle in it of wretched day-book and ledger calculation, but that the principal and most essential part of its object (as already more than enough insisted upon), was to give such a manifestation of the united glories of the truth and love, the righteousness and mercy of Jehovah, as would fully secure the honor of His character and government in forgiving sin and saving sinners; and that the true question was: What was requisite for this end?

I might have added to these considerations, that if the atonement were to be regarded as proceeding on the principle of commutative or commercial justice, or of the strict and proper payment of debt, the only room for grace must have been in the appointment of the surety to take upon Him the payment of it; there could be none for the subsequent exercise of it, in pardoning sin for the sake of the atonement, any more than there is grace in not exacting a debt that has been actually paid.

II. But there is a second class of Calvinists, by whom an atonement of limited sufficiency is strongly disapproved and disowned, and the very arguments pleaded against it which have now been mentioned, who yet hold the doctrine of what they denominate a definite atonement. They are not satisfied with the view we have before given of the restriction in the actual efficacy of the atonement arising from the sovereign pleasure of God in its purposed and actual application. They contend for restriction in the atonement as arising from what they denominate its destination; that is, its being, in itself, in the intention of God, only a certain number, in whose room Christ was appointed and voluntarily undertook to stand, and for whom, and for whom alone, He made propitiation. As an appropriate and most respectable specimen of this numerous class, comprehending the large majority of the Presbyterian dissenters in Scotland, and of the evangelical party in the Establishment, I may select Dr. Symington, formerly of Stranraer, now of Glasgow. In his work on Atonement and Intercession, he sets forth and argues this representation of the case at great length, not only against the general redemptionists, but against the abettors of the view which places the restriction in the sovereign application of the remedy. By no one can the infinite value and unlimited sufficiency of the atonement be more distinctly and amply admitted and pleaded for than they are by this writer.

The inherent worth of Christ’s atonement arises, not from the nature, continuance, and intensity of His sufferings, but from His personal dignity and other concurrent circumstances, which stamp a character of infinite value on all that He endured. On this ground we hold, that the sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ possessed an intrinsic value sufficient for the salvation of the whole world. In this sense it was adequate to the redemption of every human being, able to procure the expiation of every man’s sins that ever lived, or ever shall exist till the end of time. Here we feel no hesitation, nor can we qualify these assertions in the slightest degree. We shall yield to none in our estimate of the intrinsic worth of Christ’s atonement. That worth we hold to be, in the strictest sense of the term, INFINITE, ABSOLUTE, ALL-SUFFICIENT.⁵

And in similar terms of warm repudiation of the opposite sentiment, he proceeds, adopting as his own some of the strongest terms of others. Yet, in opposition to those who hold the restriction of the atonement as to actual efficiency to arise from the sovereignty of its application, he contends for the idea of a definite atonement in the sense we have just explained.

Now, I conceive the difference between this view and the third, or that of the moderate or modern Calvinists, on this subject, to be so exceedingly slight, while the latter appears to me decidedly the more consistent of the two with itself, that I think it better to notice the third before proceeding to discuss the second, and to compare and argue the merits of the two respectively.

III. The third view, then, as has been already observed, holds the atonement to have been a general remedy, with a particular application; a vindication or display of the righteousness of God, such as to render forgiveness honorable to that perfection of the divine character; leaving the supreme Governor and Judge, in the free exercise of the mercy in which He delights, to dispense it according to His sovereign pleasure, more or less extensively. Dr. Symington states the difference between the two theories thus; and, with very slight exception, we should not object to the statement:

On the extent of Christ’s atonement, the two opinions that have long divided the church are expressed by the terms definite and indefinite. The former means that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, and made atonement, only for such as are saved. The latter means that Christ died, satisfied divine justice, or made atonement for all mankind without exception, as well those who are not saved as those who are. The one regards the death of Christ as a legal satisfaction to the law and justice of God, on behalf of elect sinners; the other regards it as a general moral vindication of the divine government, without respect to those to whom it may be rendered effectual, and of course equally applicable to all.⁶

The extent of such exception to the view given in this statement may appear in discussing the respective claims to preference of the two theories, which, while they differ in expression, come as near to one in reality as can well be.

Let it be observed, then, that by denying the restriction of the atonement’s efficiency to be in its application alone, he must be considered as affirming the definiteness to be, in some sense, in the atonement itself. Now, I must at once acknowledge myself at a loss to conceive how an atonement admitted to be infinite, can with any consistency be, at the same time, affirmed to be a definite atonement; how the atonement can be held to have been made "only for such as are saved;" "as a legal satisfaction to the law and justice of God on behalf of elect sinners;" while yet, in the atonement made, a value is admitted to have been contained, infinitely beyond the actual amount of salvation that shall arise from it. The explanation given is, that it is definite in its destination. But does not this come as near as possible to a purposed restriction in its application? The difference appears to me very slender; and, so far as there is a difference, the latter view seems to be the more self-consistent of the two. For observe the sense in which the restriction is in the atonement. It is not in its value, but in its destination, that is, in the circumstance of God’s having meant it as an atonement for a certain number only, and of its having been made for them alone. But, with all deference, this is a very different thing from definiteness in the atonement itself. With what propriety can the epithet definite be applied to that of which the author writes in the following terms:–

For these reasons, [reasons urged against the exact equivalent scheme], we reject the theory of atonement against which the objection is pointed, and hold by the view already explained, namely, that the sufferings of Christ are to be regarded in the light of a moral satisfaction to the law and justice of God, which would have been requisite had there been but one sinner to be saved, and had that sinner had but one sin; and which would have been adequate had the number to be saved been to any conceivable extent greater than it is.⁷

Is there any propriety in calling this a definite atonement, which must have been the same for one sin as for the sins not only of the actually saved, but of any indefinite number more? Does it not follow, that the definiteness must lie in the purposed application, seeing in itself it was so indefinite as to be necessary for one and enough for millions? Is the difference at all material, or deserving of the eagerness and the copiousness with which it is insisted upon, between the purposed application of the atonement and its divine destination? It seems to me a hardly divisible hair’s breadth, and to approach as near as may be to a logomachy. This may the more appear to you, when you hear a few sentences more:–

It, [the exact equivalent scheme] is at variance with what we have before established, namely, the infinite intrinsic value of the atonement of Christ. It overlooks the grand design of the atonement, which was, not simply to secure a mere commutative satisfaction to the justice of God, but to glorify all the divine perfections, and to make an illustrious manifestation of the principles of His government before the whole universe of moral creatures. It leaves no room for such an unlimited offer of Christ in the Gospel, as to render without excuse those who reject Him; for if the atonement of Christ bore an exact proportion, in point of worth, to the sins of those who are actually saved by it; then the salvation of any others was a natural impossibility, and no blame could attach to such for neglecting to embrace the proffered boon: indeed there would be no ground on which such an offer could be made.⁸

This is surely as near as it is possible to come to the hypothesis of a general remedy with a limited application, or, as he defines an indefinite atonement, a "general moral vindication of the divine government," such a vindication as leaves the Divine Governor free to extend the benefits of it to whom He will. When the definiteness is made to lie in the atonement itself, and in answer to the question, "What is the atonement of Christ?" the following answer is given:

It has been already defended and explained as that perfect satisfaction to the law and justice of God, on account of which sinners are delivered from condemnation. Or, in other words, it is that which removes the offence subsisting between God and men, and procures a reconciliation. It supposes a compensation to be made to the lawgiver, in consideration of which certain specific blessings flow out to men. From its very nature, then, all for whom the atonement is made must reap its fruits. It is no atonement without this.

When the admissions made are remembered, namely, of the infinite value of the atonement, and of its grand design as being "to glorify all the divine perfections, and to make an illustrious manifestation of the principles of His government before the whole universe of moral creatures," what more can this mean, consistently with itself, than that all those whom it was the sovereign purpose of God to save on the ground of the atonement, must be saved. If it does go further, if it means that there was any thing in the atonement itself by which this limitation was necessitated, no matter by what designation it be called, then does it come under the objection formerly shown to hold against the commutative justice, the personal compensation, the debt and credit system; the same objection which contributes to the explosion of the scheme of exact equivalent. And, accordingly, as might also have been anticipated, the idea of destination in the atonement, or of its being an atonement exclusively for the elect considered individually, comes to be so associated, I might say identified, with that of personal compensation, as naturally to lead to the placing of the actual virtue of the atonement in procuring the pardon and salvation of those whom the destination included, and for whom alone it was intended, on the ground of commutative justice. The following passage will show this. The object of it is to show that the distinctive and limited destination of the atonement is required by the rectitude of the divine character:

Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? A God of truth and without iniquity; just and right is He. Reason, conscience, revelation, providence, all concur in attesting the perfection of His nature. The Supreme Being gives to every one his due. This principle cannot be violated in a single instance. He cannot, according to this, either remit sin without satisfaction, or punish sin where satisfaction for it has been received. The one is as inconsistent with perfect equity as the other. If the punishment for sin has been borne, the remission of the offence follows of course. The principles of rectitude require this, nay, peremptorily demand it. Justice could not be satisfied without it. Agreeably to this reasoning, it follows that the death of Christ being a legal satisfaction for sin, all for whom He died must enjoy the remission of their offences. It is as much at variance with strict justice or equity that any for whom Christ has given satisfaction should continue under condemnation, as that they should have been delivered from guilt without a satisfaction at all. But it is admitted that all are not delivered from the punishment of, sin,–that there are many who perish in final condemnation. We are, therefore, compelled to infer that for them no satisfaction has been given to the claims of divine justice, no atonement has been made. If this is denied, the monstrous impossibility must be maintained, that the infallible Judge refuses to remit the punishment of some for whose offences he has received a full compensation; that He finally condemns some, the price of whose deliverance has been paid to Him; that, with regard to the sins of some of mankind, He seeks satisfaction in their personal punishment, after having obtained satisfaction for them in the sufferings of Christ; that is to say, that an infinitely righteous God takes double payment for the same debt, double satisfaction for the same offence, first from the surety and then from those for whom the surety stood bound.⁹

On this statement I offer the following strictures:–

(1.) It must not be forgotten, that, on the hypothesis now under review, there is the admission of atonement infinite in value; more, therefore, even by infinitude, than a compensation for the sins of the actually saved. There exists, then, this infinite atonement. The question is:–Whence the limitation in its actual efficiency, or saving results? This hypothesis answers:–It arises from the divine destination of the atonement. The third hypothesis, that of modern Calvinism, regards the atonement as indefinite, a transcendently glorious manifestation of the united perfections of the Godhead, more especially of His pure and holy righteousness, such as to render the exercise of mercy (still free, or only bound by engagement to the substitute) honorable to all God’s other attributes, and consistent with the full maintenance of the rightful and necessary authority of His moral government and His eternal and immutable law; and affirming the restriction in its final results to spring entirely from the divine will in its application. Here you see at once the full amount of the difference between the two. It lies simply in this, namely, in the difference between a divine purpose in the making of the atonement, and a divine purpose respecting the application of the atonement when made. And let it be remembered, that when we speak of a purpose respecting the application of the atonement when made, the words have a prospective as well as a retrospective import; including the application of it before the fullness of time as well as after it, and indeed the designed application of it from eternity. Thus narrow is the difference. The question, then, comes to be:–Whether of the two is the more consistent with itself and with admitted general principles, leaving Scripture passages to be afterwards examined in the light of both, or rather both in the light of them.

(2.) The limited destination scheme, as stated in the preceding quotation, is identical, to a great extent, with the personal compensation scheme; and as far as it is so, it is exclusive of all grace from the application of the atonement, and confines it entirely to its appointment. There is grace in the fact of an atonement being appointed at all, when all were guilty and deserving death; but the atonement having been made, made in destination for a certain number only, and made in the way of "legal compensation" for their offences, grace ceases. There is no grace in the bestowment of pardon, or of any of the blessings of salvation, on those for whom the compensation has been made. The whole tenor of the passage, both in the spirit and the letter of it, maintains this; that God is bound in justice to pardon those sinners, "the price of whose deliverance has been paid to Him;" and it is reprobated as a "monstrous impossibility" that the Just One should be guilty of the injustice of exacting twice the payment of the same debt, of inflicting twice the punishment of the same offences. It is surely very clear, then, that there can be no grace in bestowing what it would be an act of injustice to withhold. I confess myself, with Andrew Fuller, more than disposed to doubt whether we should consider "the Moral Governor of the world as laid under such a kind of obligation to show mercy to sinners as a creditor is under to discharge a debtor, on having received full satisfaction at the hands of a surety." The terms in which justification is spoken of by the inspired writers harmonize better with the scheme which regards the atonement as leaving the Sovereign Ruler free in the exercise of His mercy to whom He will, on the ground of it, as the grand manifestation of His righteousness in the remission of sins.¹⁰ Grace is represented, not merely as appointing the atonement, but as exercising itself in the justification of sinners on account of it, "through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." But, according to the present hypothesis, the grace must have lain exclusively in the sovereign determination of God that the redemption price or ransom should be paid. When it had been paid, God could not, consistently with this hypothesis, be said to "justify freely by His grace" those for whom it had been paid, but was laid, by the payment of it, under an obligation of justice to pardon and save them. There might be grace in admitting the proposal of a surety to pay the debt; but there was no grace, when the debt had been paid, in absolving the debtor. There might be grace in allowing a voluntary substitute to bear the merited penalty; but there could be none, when the substitute had borne the penalty, in remitting it to the transgressor. But–

(3.) The vindicator of the hypothesis under review admits the exact equivalent scheme to be inconsistent with the universality of Gospel invitations, and to leave no consistent ground on which they can be addressed to sinners of mankind at large. Now, it appears to me more than questionable whether his own hypothesis be not encumbered with a similar difficulty. Observe how the case stands. According to the hypothesis, the Divine Being, acting on the principles of justice, "cannot either remit sin without satisfaction, or punish sin where satisfaction for it has been received." On the ground that satisfaction has been received for the sins of the elect, he concludes, as we have seen, that it would be a violation of justice to punish them in their persons. And on the principle just stated, he consistently infers from the fact "that all are not delivered from the punishment of sin, that there are many who perish in final condemnation," that "for such no satisfaction has been given to the claims of infinite justice, no atonement has been made." But, if so, and if God "cannot," consistently with justice, remit sin without a satisfaction; then it follows that the pardon or salvation of a single individual beyond the number of the elect was prevented, not merely by a sovereign limitation in the divine purpose, but by a barrier of a different kind; that it is rendered impossible by the principles and claims of justice. God could not, on this hypothesis, save an individual of those who shall actually perish, on the ground of the atonement actually made, without a violation of these principles and claims; no satisfaction having been given, no atonement having been made for them. But, if so, if the restriction of the atonement by destination has been such as to render the salvation of more than those for whom it was destined impossible in justice; as impossible, that is, as that the Just One should act unjustly; do not we feel ourselves as much tied up in making the universal offer of pardon, as we did on the scheme of exact equivalent or limited sufficiency. If in such a sense no atonement has been made for mankind, so that it would be actually unjust in God to save one of them, how can we feel at liberty, in proclaiming the grace of the Gospel as free to all? If, no atonement having been made for them, they cannot be saved without an infraction of divine justice, is not the natural impossibility as real and as great as on the principle of exact equivalent and limited sufficiency? If no atonement has been made for them, is not the exclusion from the possibility of salvation as complete, as on the supposition of an insufficient atonement having been made for them? Do we not, on either supposition, invite them to what has no existence? tantalize them with the offer of what the very justice of God interdicts their obtaining? An atonement, it is true, has been made, and an atonement infinite in the amount of its value; but it has been made for a certain definite number only; and although there is an infinite superfluity of merit in it, there stands between them and an interest in that superfluity the insuperable barrier of the justice of heaven, which would be violated were they to obtain it. In these circumstances, do we not feel as if the word stuck in our throat when we say:–"Whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely?"

On such grounds it appears to me much more consistent and satisfactory to regard the atonement as a great moral vindication of the divine character, and especially of the divine righteousness, not binding God to forgive any, but rendering it honorable to His perfections and government, should He so will it, to forgive all; leaving no insuperable barrier in the way of the forgiveness of any, whether arising from limited sufficiency in the atonement itself, or from such restriction in its destination as to leave the claims of justice unsatisfied beyond the extent of the destination; both suppositions equally involving natural impossibility in the existence of no atonement beyond a certain limit.

Dr. S. startles greatly at the idea, as if it were almost or even altogether an anti-scriptural heresy, that the atonement was made for sin rather than for sinners–an idea which he conceives to be implied in atonement that is indefinite. Yet I am incapable of discerning any heresy in such an idea. I fully concur with Dr. Payne when he says:–

Strictly speaking, the atonement was not made for one man, or for all men; it was made to God for sin, i.e., on account of sin. It was designed to remove those obstacles which sin had set up to any gracious communications from God to man. There was doubtless a speciality of intention in reference to the individuals to whom the highest species of such communications should be made; but the breaking down of the barrier permitted the free access of mercy to every individual of the human family.¹¹

I am far from saying that by this view of the matter all difficulties are removed, all metaphysical puzzles solved. But I cannot but regard it as by much the most simple and self-consistent hypothesis, and the one that is embarrassed with the fewest and the smallest of the "things hard to be understood." If we take along with us the idea of this "speciality of intention," the idea, that is, of election or sovereign restriction in the application of the general or indefinite atonement, the following language of Dr. Dwight is quite in harmony with that of Dr. Payne:–

If the atonement of Christ consisted in making such amends for the disobedience of man, as should place the law, government, and character of God in such a light that He could forgive sinners of the human race without any inconsistency; then these amends, or this atonement, were all absolutely necessary, in order to render such forgiveness proper or consistent with the law and character of God: in a single instance the forgiveness of one sinner without these amends would be just as much a contradiction of the declarations of law as the forgiveness of a million. If, then, the amends actually made were such that God could consistently forgive one sinner, He might, with equal consistency and propriety, forgive any number, unless prevented by any other reason. The atonement, in other words, which was necessary for a world, was equally necessary, and in just the same manner and degree for an individual sinner.¹²

If this be the true statement of the doctrine, I am at a loss to imagine the atonement definite in any other sense than as it precisely corresponded to what the infinitely wise God saw to be necessary for the maintenance of the claims of His law in the remission of its penalty. If, in the accurate language of Dr. Payne, “to make satisfaction for sin is to do that which shall preserve to the moral government of God that powerful control over its subjects which the entrance of sin endangered, and which its unconditional forgiveness would have entirely destroyed;" then this end is answered by an atonement which, in itself considered, is altogether independent of the numbers to be actually benefitted by it. It is the necessary preparation or clearing of the way, to the exercise of forgiveness at all, on the part of the righteous Lawgiver, Ruler, and Judge; whether that forgiveness shall be extended to one individual, or to a "multitude which no man can number."¹³ "He that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much."¹⁴ In either, principle is violated; and with God the least is as impossible as the greatest. The atonement is made "that He might be just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus."¹⁵ Not that He might be just in justifying a certain number, but that He might be just in justifying any, in justifying "whom He will." In order to this, the supposition of special and limited destination in the atonement itself, restricting it as an atonement for a specific number, so as to render their justification consistent with justice, (their merited penalty having been borne for them, but their justification alone), so that justice would be violated were the pardon to extend even to one individual more, (that individual’s penalty not having been borne for him); the supposition, I say, of such destination is altogether unnecessary. It is enough that, by an indefinite atonement, an atonement for sin, that is, such an atonement as to render the pardon of sin consistent with divine justice, and so an atonement for sinners–such an atonement as to render the pardon of sinners (of any or of all) consistent with divine justice, the way has been opened for the free and honorable exercise of that mercy in which Jehovah delights; and then, Jehovah being left to the exercise of His sovereignty, after having provided for the security of His righteousness, the limitation arises from this source alone He "has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and compassion on whom He will have compassion."¹⁶

The view which I have thus given does appear to my mind much more self-consistent and free from embarrassing difficulties than either the exact equivalent scheme or the special destination scheme. Its great advantage is, that it leaves all open; and thus, by introducing no previous restrictions having reference to the atonement itself, it preserves, free of all encroachment, a basis for the universal obligation of sinners of mankind to accept the offered mercy, and for the sincerity of the universal offer of it, in order to such acceptance. On neither of the other schemes do we feel our way clear; the restriction, whether in the way of limited sufficiency or of limited destination in the propitiation itself. The following statements of the late Dr. Williams appear to me substantially correct, and, in a great degree, applicable to the principles of both the schemes we have been reviewing:–

Every one to whom the Gospel is addressed is under obligation to seek the blessings it proposes, as well as to obey the precepts it contains such as remission of sin by repentance, acceptance into divine favor by faith, gracious assistance by prayer, holy conformity to Jesus Christ by the use of all appointed means, and everlasting life by walking in the ways of wisdom and universal obedience. These blessings flow through ‘Jesus Christ and Him crucified.’ And were there no sense in which Jesus Christ ‘gave Himself a ransom’ for all those who are morally obliged to seek these blessings for His sake, I acknowledge that there would not be an adequate basis for their obligation to do so. If Jesus Christ in no sense lived and died for their sake, how can they be obliged to seek these blessings for His mediation’s sake? Without adequate means, or objective sufficiency of merit ready to be laid to their account on compliance, how could they be consistently exhorted to seek them; since it is unworthy of God to propose to them, on any terms, what was in no sense intended for them? It is idle to say that they are obliged to obey the command of God, until it can be shown that He requires men to believe a falsehood. I know it has been observed, that God requires no man to believe that Christ died for him in particular, but for sinners. But if He died for sinners indefinitely, is not each individual included in that indefinite number? And if by ‘sinners’ be meant a definite number, how can every sinner to whom the Gospel comes be laid under an indefinite obligation to seek those blessings for the sake of what Christ has done and suffered?

These considerations, among many others, constrain me to regard the blessed Savior, in the whole of His mediatorial undertaking, as the great ordinance of God, proposed to mankind without limitation, for the sake of whom they are encouraged to seek all the blessings which they require. If they need an atoning sacrifice, a justifying righteousness, in short, a perfect meritorious character as their substitute, these blessings are proposed to the destitute sinners indefinitely, and consequently to them. If it be said that the proposal is made to those who feel their need, and on this condition; if they experience their case to be miserable, and sincerely desire to obtain the blessing; it is granted that there are special encouragements to such characters, as in our Lord’s sermon on the mount. But how can others be threatened for rejecting what was never in any sense intended for them? If it be again urged that no sinner knows but that Christ died for him, or does not know but that he is included in the atonement made, I reply: Does God require the ignorance of His creatures as the basis of His government, or is it worthy of His character to make it the ground of human obligation?

The question is not, whether special promises are made to persons under certain gracious exercises of mind, but whether any impenitent and unbelieving persons are condemned, finally condemned, for not accepting what God graciously offers, or for not seeking to obtain Gospel blessings through the mediation and meritorious sufferings of Christ? If none were in any sense designed for those who eventually perish, how can they be said to reject them? or how can they be condemned for not seeking an impossibility, and an impossibility, too, founded in the appointment of God, and not merely in their own impotence?

We may seem now to be speculating without a sufficiently direct appeal to our only light; following our own course of thought, without our guide. Where has been the question all this while: "What saith the Scripture?" "What is written in the law; How reads thou?" But we have not forgotten these primary and most essential questions. Our general answer to them is: That in the word of God there are two classes of texts which seem as if they spoke opposite language; some employing terms of universality, others the terms of limitation.

XXV. ON THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

WE are to bring under our review those passages of Scripture which relate to the controversy respecting the extent of the atonement; and to see whether, when they are arrayed on either side, we can discover any principle or principles of harmony between them.

I am the more solicitous to enter into the consideration of such passages, because there have been undue stretching and straining, to a greater or less extent, on both sides.

I begin by mentioning such passages as are usually adduced in support of the doctrine of particular redemption, or restricted and definite atonement. They are numerous and familiar, and in the terms of them, it cannot be denied, do sound restrictively.¹⁷ There is also a considerably numerous class of texts, in which the pronouns we and us occur, in connections which show that the reference is not to mankind generally, but specially to believers.¹⁸

The passages on the other side are many. They may be divided into three classes:

1. Those in which the universal terms occur, all, all men, every man.¹⁹

2. Those in which other terms, not less comprehensive, the world, the whole world, are used.²⁰

3. Those in which it seems to be intimated, that Christ died for some who yet may perish.²¹

It is at the very first glance obvious that these texts seem as if they spoke a different language. Are they, then, on any fair principles of interpretation, capable of reconciliation? One reply must, in the first instance, be made by every believer in the divine inspiration of the Bible; namely, that there must be such a principle, since by so "many infallible proofs" this inspiration has been ascertained. The inspired volume cannot contradict itself. The writers cannot speak what is inconsistent with the testimony of each other; far less can any of them contradict themselves. The "far less," indeed, might have been spared; for, if the Bible be inspired, it is, throughout, the testimony of but one witness, conveyed through different organs; namely, of the Spirit of that God with whom it is "impossible to lie," who "abides faithful, and cannot deny himself?" Observe then:–

1. There is one way of producing harmony resorted to by the advocates of restricted atonement, which is, indeed, effectual, but which, to no candid mind, can ever be satisfactory. I refer to the supplementing of those verses and phrases that represent the end of the death of Christ in universal terms, with restrictive epithets. The usual supplement is the word "elect." "The world," is, in those texts which have been cited as containing it, conveniently limited by the insertion of this epithet; and the elect world, an elect world, the whole world of God’s elect, are, in old divines, amongst the voces signatae of a thorough-paced orthodoxy; and have been by many employed with as much matter-of-course freedom and confidence as if they really were to be found in the sacred word. But they are not there. They belong to human systems merely; and they who use them should at once be sensible that in so doing they expose their systems to just suspicion. The supplement is by much too arbitrary to be at all tolerated. On two grounds I object to it in terms of indignant reprobation. It is forced and unnatural; and it introduces into some statements of the sacred penmen inconsistency and absurdity.

[1.] It is unnatural and forced. It is, a priori, most unlikely that the term ‘world ‘ should ever, by the inspired writers, be used to designate the elect. The word has different meanings. Sometimes it signifies the habitable globe, the common residence of the human race; sometimes the race itself, mankind, the inhabitants of the globe. As to these meanings there is no difficulty and no dispute. There is a third meaning, which is peculiar to Scripture phraseology, but so frequent and so marked there as to be, equally with the two preceding, out of the range of debate. No one can question its signifying the great mass of mankind in contradistinction to the people of God, the redeemed from amongst men.²² The use of the word in this sense, when it is recollected how large a majority, when compared with believers, the ungodly portion of mankind has all along constituted, will at once and easily be accounted for. It is quite natural. But on this very account it seems in the very highest degree unnatural, and unlikely that the case should be reversed; that the same general designation, which is used to distinguish mankind at large from believers, should, in the same book, by the same writers, and even in the same context, be used to distinguish believers from mankind at large; that the same word which designates the majority in distinction from the minority should be employed to designate the minority in distinction from the majority! We are ready to say, if this be the case, how is anything definite or intelligible to be made of the Bible? They who have recourse to principles of interpretation so loose are not aware of the mischief they are doing. They may, by such means, succeed in solving, or rather in forcing out of the way, a difficulty which embarrassed and perplexed them; in cutting a knot which they found it hard to loose: but they make other difficulties, and still greater. And by subverting the principles of sound and candid criticism, and exposing those which they adopt to the smile and sneer of the sceptic, they contribute to harden his scepticism into infidelity. Few things can have more of this tendency than the introduction of principles in the interpretation of language, such as make it manifest that the object is, by whatever monstrous deviations from simple and established rules, to bring the required meaning out of the phraseology; "playing fast and loose" with the same terms, so as to make them, on all occasions, speak what we like, what we have previously fixed to be right.

[2.] Inconsistency and absurdity are introduced into the statements of the sacred writers by the very means intended to explain and harmonize them. The proposed supplement, in some cases, produces neither more nor less than sheer nonsense. And yet I have heard such texts cited with the supplement, with all the tones of devout orthodoxy, without the least apparent consciousness of the insult thus put upon the Spirit of truth. To give you an example or two. I have heard the words quoted:–"God so loved an elect world," etc.²³ Now surely by no one possessing even ordinary understanding will it be questioned that in the sentence the word "whosoever " (pas ho, every one who) has less extent of meaning than the more comprehensive word "the world" which precedes it. It restricts and limits the comprehensive term, signifying evidently "whosoever of the world." Suppose, then, the supplement admitted, and the world to mean the world of the elect, or, more briefly and simply, "the elect," see what kind of statement we have got: "God so loved the elect, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever" (of the elect) "believeth on Him," etc. This is absurdity.

The same may be said of another passage:²⁴–"I pray not for the world," etc.; yet, in the latter, Arminians allege He does pray for the world: "That they all may be one," etc.; "that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." Now, without taking up at present the object of the Arminians in this, I wish it to be considered what some Calvinists have said in reply. They have actually understood "the world," in this last occurrence of it, as meaning the elect, God’s chosen people of all nations; and the petition as a prayer that they might all of them, in successive generations, be brought to the knowledge and faith of His name! In this way, it is alleged, the two verses are at once reconciled. And so, it must be admitted, they are. But the reconciliation is effected even still more than in the preceding case, at the expense of all fair and sound criticism, by making the same term express first one thing, repeatedly and in direct and specific distinction from another; and then, all at once, and without warning, to mean the very thing from which it had been distinguished, and that not only in remote parts of the prayer, but in the very same sentence! "The world" is used in express discrimination from the people of God;²⁵ and in the very verse in question the distinction is marked: "That they also may be one in us, that the world may believe," etc. And that "they all" does not mean the proportion of the elect then, or at any time, existing, as the means, by their union, of bringing the remainder in succession to the belief of the truth, is evident from the preceding verse, where the Redeemer expresses the comprehensiveness of His petition as including all His people prospectively to the end of time:–"Neither pray I for these alone," etc. Thus the world is clearly distinguished from them all. So that this extraordinary principle of interpretation makes those whose union was to be the means of conviction, and the world who were to be convinced by it, one and the same.

But there is not the least occasion for having recourse to a process so anomalous. The principle of interpretation is simple. In the explanation just given, and others of a similar character, it is assumed that the phrase, "that the world may believe," can have no other sense than that every individual in the world should be brought, in actual result, to true and saving faith. But the meaning seems sufficiently simple. The prayer is for the unity of His disciples. Things are spoken of according to their proper tendencies. And this unity is sought, as an evidence to the world of His divine mission. That is all. The tendency of all evidence is to produce conviction. And in all cases, the general design of every person by whom evidence is presented, must be the same; corresponding with the tendency. It must be to convince. Such is the tendency, and such we are warranted to consider as the design, of all the evidence of the Gospel, or of the divine mission of Jesus and the truth of His doctrines. The petition under consideration is framed, in the expression of it, upon this simple principle; signifying no more than that in the union and mutual love of His disciples, the world might have evidence of the truth, such as, whether the effect actually resulted or not, should tend to the production of faith, that is, to the conviction of His having come from God. And there are other cases in which the application of the same simple principle is necessary, as the key of interpretation.²⁶ No one ever imagines that in these words an absolute purpose is expressed, that by what He was then saying all who heard Him should be brought to actual salvation. He only expresses the proper tendency, and the general design of the various descriptions of evidence, to which, in the context, He makes His appeal.²⁷ The same principle must be applied to John i. 7. The words express the tendency and design of the Baptist’s commission and testimony. Who ever fancied that "all," or "all men," here means the elect?

2. I venture to propose, then, as the most satisfactory principle of reconciliation and harmony between these classes of passages, the twofold capacity under which Jehovah is, in the atonement, to be considered as acting, and the twofold design corresponding to the twofold capacity. There was a double object. There was an object pertaining to the general administration of His government as the Moral Ruler of the universe; and there was an object of a more special kind belonging to the dispensation of His Favour as a Sovereign Benefactor. And in correspondence with this twofold purpose, there is a more general and a more peculiar love. I have endeavored to show that when our Savior says:–"God so loved the world,"²⁸ etc., "the world" cannot be understood in any restricted sense, but evidently signifies the world of mankind, the race at large. We have, in the words, a declaration from the lips of the Savior Himself, that His own mediation is to be regarded as a manifestation, on the part of the Godhead, of love to man; a display of benevolence and grace towards this revolted province of His empire, this community of apostate creatures. In the same interesting light is it represented by Paul, when he applies to it the single but emphatically appropriate word, philanthropia: "After that the kindness and love of God our Savior towards man appeared," etc.²⁹ The divine word informs us of another order of fallen creatures besides man, for whom the divine benevolence (for reasons unrevealed, and about which, therefore, conjecture is presumptuous and idle) has not been pleased to provide any means of deliverance. It is on man that He has set His love. He has made our world the theater for the glorious manifestation of His infinite benevolence; and has expended here the munificence of His boundless grace. It is not the angelic nature, but the human, that He has honored and blessed by the assumption of it into union with the divine. And His assuming it has been to work salvation, not for angels but for men. The angelic song that announced the arrival of a Savior was sung on earth, not in hell. The peace is "on earth," the good-will "towards men."³⁰ The Redeemer by whom "glory is brought to God in the highest "is "the Son of Man; "and they are the children of men whom "He is not ashamed to call His brethren."³¹ It is in this sense, then, that "God so loved the world." The grand manifestation of His delight in mercy has had our world for its theater, and men for its objects. The scheme in which He has embarked the glory of His name, has been a scheme of grace to the fallen family of Adam.

I cannot but think the interpretation of our Lord’s language to Nicodemus to be incomparably more natural on this principle, as having reference to the great general rectoral design of God as the Supreme Ruler, than when His words are restricted to the elect, and are taken in their strict acceptation as referring to the actual and final salvation of each individual in the world that is spoken of; as in the following passage:

The latter expression in it,³² [namely, "that the world through Him might be saved”], explains what is meant by the world. We have only to ask whether every individual in the world is actually saved by God’s only begotten Son, to ascertain the extent of that world which is the object of God’s redeeming love; for it must be blasphemy to suppose, that the design for which God sent His Son into the world could, even in the slightest degree, be thwarted.³³

But neither the preceding nor subsequent context, any more than the words themselves, will admit of any such restriction. The whole passage proceeds upon the assumption, that, by the mediation of Jesus, salvation is provided for the world, while the general provision becomes actually available to them that believe. This distinction pervades the whole.³⁴ To show how inconclusive the reference to verse seventeenth is, in proof of the elect alone being intended by the world, I would further refer to the words:–"I came not to judge the world, but to save the world."³⁵ It would surely be a very strange principle of criticism, that would insist on taking the word world in this declaration of our Savior, in two senses, a wider and a more restricted. No one, it may be presumed, will think of alleging that, in the first of its occurrences, it means the elect; and if not in the first, neither can it in the second. Ye have, therefore, in these words, a clear instance of the generic use of the word; and the representation of the design of Christ’s work is not in regard to any secret purpose of personal salvation, but in regard to the provision of the means of salvation for mankind, for the fallen race. In regard, then, to the rectoral design of God, His purpose in the atonement as Moral Governor, the propitiation was general–a propitiation for sin; and for the public declaration of the divine righteousness in the bestowment of pardon. It was a part of His intention, that the offer of salvation should be freely made to mankind universally on the ground of it. In order to this, it was indispensable that it should have in it a sufficiency for all, and that it should be free of all restriction. In this sense, it is to be regarded as for all, for all men, for the world, the whole world. But we mentioned that there is, at the same time, a collateral and more special design of God, in His capacity of Sovereign Benefactor–the design, namely, of giving actually saving efficacy to the great general scheme in the case of a certain number, the objects of His sovereign electing love. And those passages in which the object of the atonement is stated with a seeming limitation appear to be capable of a sufficiently simple and consistent interpretation on this principle. The death of Christ is for the church, for the sheep, and "to save His people from their sins;" inasmuch as, according to the sovereign purpose of God’s grace, its saving virtue is to be effectually theirs. This distinction between the rectoral design of Jehovah as universal Moral Governor, and the secret and definite purpose of Jehovah as a Sovereign Benefactor, is sufficiently intelligible; and we cannot but regard it as of special importance. But to enter largely into the discussion of it would anticipate the illustration of the doctrine of election. I must remark further, however–

3. That in insisting upon this distinction, I would not be understood to represent it as the only principle to be taken into account in the interpretation of the universal phraseology so frequent with the sacred writers, when speaking of the design of the death of Christ. There are others which require to be mentioned, and to be kept in remembrance; inasmuch as, in the exposition of different passages, different principles may he required; by which I do not mean, that we frame principles of interpretation according to the exigency of each case; but only that, the different principles being all natural and reasonable in themselves, one of them may be more suitable for the explanation of one passage, and another for that of another:–each passage in general suggesting the most natural principle of its own explanation. Of these other principles I may mention three:–[1.] The difference between mankind individually and without exception, and mankind collectively and without difference. The distinction is simple, and of frequent applicability.³⁶ The words of Jesus, in reply to the communicated request of certain Greeks, who had come up to worship at one of the Jewish feasts, for an introduction to Him, are:–"I… will draw all men unto me." And if any key were necessary to their interpretation, this very circumstance might furnish it. The words were not true of all men without exception; but they were true of all men without difference. Jesus has not drawn all men to Him without exception; but He has drawn all men without difference or discrimination, men of "every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation." So as to the other passage, He who wills that all men should be "saved," wills also that all men should "come to the knowledge of the truth." The meaning can be nothing more than that His salvation is designed for all men indiscriminately, and His truth for universal diffusion and universal influence. The context, indeed, evidently favour the interpretation of all men as meaning men of all sorts, without difference of rank or condition.³⁷

[2.] The distinction between the Jews, the peculiar people of God under the former dispensation, and mankind inclusive of Jews and Gentiles alike, according to the more comprehensive character of the New Testament economy. This is a distinction which, from the circumstances of the case, we should naturally expect to find influencing to no small extent the phraseology of the inspired penmen of the latter. Formerly, the knowledge of the true God and of His salvation was, in a great degree, confined exclusively to the one chosen people; latterly, there was to be a general extension of that knowledge to the whole Gentile world. This was to be one of the distinguishing features of the new era; one of the most remarkable differences between it and the one which had preceded it. No reader of the Acts of the Apostles or of their Epistles can fail to remark the frequency with which this change is directly spoken of, or indirectly alluded to. Nothing, therefore, can be more natural, than that, when the designs of God by the Gospel are the subject, such phrases as "all men," and "the world," and the "whole world," should be used to signify men of all nations, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles.³⁸ Nothing is more common than the use of a general designation in circumstances when that which is affirmed is not true respecting each individual included in the designation; but when the truth of it respecting even a comparatively small number ascertains or illustrates a general principle.³⁹ "The Gentiles," is a designation of comprehensive import, including the whole of the nations of the world, except the Jews. I need not say, that God had riot, in this extensive sense, granted saving repentance to the Gentiles; but the house of Cornelius were Gentiles, and in their case a principle was ascertained. The mind of God was, in that example, made apparent, that thenceforward, under the economy of Messiah’s reign, there were to be no exclusive distinctions; that the messengers of the Cross, the preachers of the Gospel, were to "know no man after the flesh."⁴⁰ "Repentance and remission of sins" were now to be preached, in. the name of Jesus, to all nations, "beginning at Jerusalem."⁴¹ On the same principle on which, in this case, the Gentiles do not signify every individual in the Gentile nations, but the rest of mankind generally, as distinguished from the Jews, the phrases the world and all men may be interpreted as meaning, not all men, all Adam’s descendants, considered individually; but the race generally, as composed of Jews and Gentiles.

[3.] The simple and universally recognized canon of interpretation, that a general or universal term ought to be understood as corresponding, in the extent of its import, with the subject of which the author at the time is treating. Throughout the fifteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, the apostle’s subject is, not the general resurrection but the resurrection of the just; and the “all” should probably be taken thus restrictedly:–"As in Adam they all die, so in Christ they shall all be made alive."⁴² If any should be of opinion, that the terms in this verse must be understood unrestrictedly of mankind, then we know assuredly that they cannot, with regard to all, mean resurrection to life, the only resurrection that can possibly be regarded as a benefit or a blessing.⁴³ On this supposition (and it is the common one), the meaning can be no more than that the general resurrection forms a part of the great scheme connected with the mediatorial work of Christ: arising from it and necessary to the full accomplishment of the divine ends in it. In any other sense, it would be a flat contradiction to other parts of the word of God. And the general sentiment there seems no reason to deny. But whether this particular application of the canon be admitted or not, there can be no doubt about the legitimacy of the canon itself. It might fairly be ranked among points whose authority is self-evident, points of which no proofs could well be clearer than themselves.

It is quite unnecessary to press the application of any one of these principles in all cases. One of them may suit one passage or one class of passages, and another another. I formerly considered the proper import of the phrases, ‘the world’ and the ‘ whole world,’ on this subject; and showed the arbitrariness of introducing into those phrases limiting epithets, the elect world, the whole world of the elect, etc. And I showed you that there is no necessity whatever for interpreting them as meaning the elect, considered as consisting of all nations, an aggregate from the world at large, not from the Jews alone. I shall now offer a few remarks on one very important and prominent passage in this controversy, and then briefly notice the different ways in which the different principles that have been mentioned are applicable to others. The passage is one to which I called your attention formerly, when on the subject of the imputation of Adam’s first sin to his posterity, or the extent to which the race was involved in its penal consequences. I now confine my remarks to the meaning of the universal terms which are used in it on both sides, both as to the sin of Adam and the obedience of Christ.⁴⁴ The apostle runs a parallel between Adam and Christ in some points, and a contrast in others. The principal point of parallelism consists in the public capacity sustained by both respectively, and in the resulting of consequences to others corresponding to the part acted by each in that capacity: consequences from the transgression of the first Adam and from the obedience of the second. In tracing this parallelism, the principal difficulty lies in ascertaining the import of those phrases by which the extent of the injury from the former and of the benefit from the latter is here expressed. The fact is undeniable that they are both expressed by the very same terms. "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men (pantas anthropous) to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men (pantas anthropous) unto justification of life. For as by one man’s disobedience many (hoi polloi, the many) were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many (the many, hoi polloi) be made righteous." Now, surely, if there can be found a principle of interpretation which admits of these phrases being understood on both sides in the same extent of meaning, such principle should bid fair to be the true one; inasmuch as it cannot, with any candour, be denied that such agreement is greatly more simple and natural than explaining the same phrases with a latitude of import so much larger on the one side than on the other, as the ordinary Calvinistic exposition requires. I do not mean to deny or question the substantial truth yielded by that exposition; but to me it is far from appearing sufficiently easy and natural to consider "all men" and "the many" as directly signifying, on the one side, all Adam’s natural seed, and, on the other, all Christ’s spiritual seed; that is, the two seeds or bodies of which they are respectively understood to have been the representatives. Even if two modes of interpretation bring out ultimately the same, or nearly the same truth, yet that is to be preferred which brings it out with the least degree of force upon the apparently plain meaning of the terms; and which assigns to these their most natural meaning. There is a class of modern commentators, the advocates of universal pardon, who find no difficulty. They explain the curse as involving no more than the dissolution of soul and body, or natural death; and the curse, consequently, according to them, is removed by the resurrection. And as the resurrection is common to all, the difficulty vanishes. All is simple. All die in Adam; all are made alive in Christ. The death came by the first Adam; the resurrection comes by the second. It is the death of all; it is the resurrection of all. There is one insuperable objection to such a view, fatal to it, were there no other, namely, that it represents the resurrection of the wicked as a benefit, as a deliverance from the curse. I cannot now enter into the enlarged exposure of this monstrous dogma, which separates the mere resurrection from its consequences, and regards that as a blessing which is only the necessary prelude to the completion of eternal misery! But, apart from this, I would observe that, without the most flagrant outrage on all just principles of exegesis, the phraseology of the passage itself, especially when compared with that of Scripture generally in regard to the benefits resulting from the obedience of the second Adam, cannot possibly be understood as limited to the mere resurrection of the body, irrespectively of the eternal life of happiness succeeding it; nor can the various expressions used be, with any consistency or truth, applied to all mankind, considered individually and without exception. "The free gift," "the gift by grace," "justification," and "justification of life," and these as opposed to "judgment" and "condemnation," "receiving the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness," "and reigning in life by one, Jesus Christ," are expressions which are evidently employed with the same extent of application as to the recipients of the blessings signified by them. "The grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ," is said⁴⁵ to have "abounded unto many (unto the many);" and as this corresponds to the other phrases,⁴⁶ "the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness," it follows that ah1 who are meant by "the many" shall "reign in life by one, Jesus Christ." But nothing can be more fatuous than to interpret all these expressions, the strongest that can be used respecting the results of the work of Christ to believers, as having been fulfilled to all men, indivi dually and without exception, in the mere fact of their common resurrection from the grave. There is evidently no Scriptural sense, I might go further and say there is really no sense at all, in which the expressions in the passage can be considered as verified in all men, the wicked and righteous indiscriminately. The two classes are invariably distinguished from each other in reference to the very particulars. How can "justification" and "justification" of "life" be alike the portion of the two descriptions of persons spoken of?⁴⁷

We apply to this passage, then, as the most simple principle of interpretation, the distinction between all men without exception and all men without difference. We have already given exemplifications of the distinction. And in vindication of the introduction of it here, I would observe, that this view of the passage accords well with the apostle’s object. The Jews "made their boast in the law." They looked on "sinners of the Gentiles" as lying under God’s curse, simply because they were not of God’s chosen people, and were "without law." But the apostle shows his deluded and high-minded countrymen, that there was a lineage more remote than that of Abraham, a lineage common to them with the Gentiles, Gentile and Jew alike having descended from the same common progenitor; that there must have been a law antecedent to the Mosaic, by the transgression of which the common doom of death had been incurred,–death, although the penalty of guilt, having "reigned" before as well as after the time of Moses: that the connection of all, Jews as well as Gentiles, with the first man was the same; and that all, the one as well as the other, were involved in the consequences of his fall. He shows them, then, on the one hand, that "by the offence of one judgment came upon all men," that is, not upon the Gentile only, but upon the Jew equally with the Gentile, "unto condemnation;" that, in this respect, there is "no difference." And in like manner, on the other hand, he shews them that "by the righteousness of one the free gift comes upon all men," that is, as before, upon Jew and Gentile alike, "without difference," "unto justification of life." In a word, he shows them, that in the offer and in the actual bestowment of divine grace, in all its eternal fruits by the Gospel, "there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek," the "same Lord over all being rich unto all that call upon him."

Should it be objected to such an interpretation, that, in point of fact, the death and the curse do come upon all men without exception; and, therefore, if this is not the case on the other side of the alternative, the analogy, or comparison, is not fair; my answer is this:– That it does not follow from the fact being so on the one side that it must necessarily be in this sense that the comparison is instituted. When a parallel case is drawn, and the same terms are used on both sides of it, if there be two senses in which these terms may be understood, and the question is, which is the true one; it is surely a fair principle of decision, that if, when understood in one of the senses, there is one side of the parallel to which they cannot, without, unnatural straining, be applied–while, when taken in the other, they are, with equal truth and equal simplicity, predicable of both, and, at the same time, the parallelism brought out is equally suitable to the purpose of the writer,–the latter should be adopted as the preferable explanation. Thus the present case stands. All men without exception is true on the one side of the parallel, but it is not true on the other. All men without difference is equally true on both. And the sense produced by so understanding it is remarkably appropriate to the writer’s purpose and the general scope of his discourse. Ought it not, then, on this simple principle, to have the preference? And that this is the point of parallelism which the apostle intends, we have strong evidence in a previous portion of the same epistle.⁴⁸ In one verse,⁴⁹ we have the unlimited term "all" in a connection where it may with truth be understood as meaning without exception:–"All have sinned." Yet that the really intended and equally true import is, all without difference, is clear from what immediately follows: "Being justified freely," etc.⁵⁰ For you will at once perceive, that, were we to carry forward the universal term all, in the sense of all without exception, we should have a statement contrary to palpable fact, namely, that all who have sinned are actually made partakers of justifying grace; and this too, although, in the very sentence, the justification is affirmed to be through faith in the propitiatory blood of Christ. To show this, it is only necessary to run the verses together. The meaning evidently is, that all, without difference, who are justified are justified in the same way, that is, "freely, by His grace," etc; that the Jew cannot be justified otherwise than the Gentile; and that the blessing was equally free to the Gentile as to the Jew. And in confirmation of this as the true meaning, we need only to look forward to the remaining verses of the chapter, where the writer, in the clearest manner, presents us with his own exegesis:⁵¹ the obvious meaning being, that God justifies Jew and Gentile without difference, in the same way.

XXVI ON THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

ENOUGH, I think, has been said on the different principles of interpretation applicable to passages in which universal or restrictive terms occur on the subject of the extent of the atonement, to enable you to make the application intelligently in each particular case; especially as to those in which the world and the whole world are the expressions used. There are still two or three in which the terms all and all men occur, on which a remark or two may be offered on account of their special character.

1 Tim. iv. 10. This is a peculiar instance. The explanation of it does not turn upon the sense of the universal term, but on the true meaning of that translated "Savior." It ought, I presume, to be understood here in the more general sense of preserver. The connection evidently favors this view; relating as it does to the difficulties and trials of their official life, in the midst of which they committed themselves, in fiducial reliance, to the preserving care of "the living God." That this is the true principle of interpretation is further evident from the consideration that, in regard to salvation, the word "specially" has no consistent application. It is very clear that when God is called the Savior of "them that believe," actual salvation must be meant. But in the sense in which He is the Savior of them that believe, He is not the Savior of any others. He saves none but them that believe. He does not save them especially and others partially or conditionally; He saves them exclusively. In a sense that pervades the Bible, there is a speciality of providential care extended by the Universal Preserver over His own people, the fearers of His name, the lovers of His Son, the righteous. Titus ii. 11, 12. There are two ways of translating these words, both strictly in accordance with the syntactical practice of the original language. I am inclined, with Bloomfield and others, to think the construction of soterios with pasin anthropios on the whole preferable, partly on account of the occurrence of the same verb epephane in the subsequent chapter, in the same absolute form;⁵² and partly because it does not appear so natural to speak of the grace that brings salvation having appeared unto all men, teaching us, etc. What we wish observed, however, is, that in whichsoever way we construe the words, they will not be true if understood of all men without exception. It was far from true then, and it is far from true even still, that the Gospel had appeared or had been made known, even in the proclamation of its tidings, to ah1 men in this sense. But both its appearing and its bringing salvation were strictly true as to all men without difference; while in regard to the actually efficacious results of the death of Christ, the very context suggests the limitation; and suggests it in terms which, at the same time, seem to indicate the speciality of purpose.⁵³

2 Pet. iii. 9. There are two ways in which these words may be explained. [1.] The apostle may be considered as speaking of the elect, of those whom it is God’s purpose to bring to salvation, and of them as constituting a community of which he was himself a member, "long-suffering to ns-ward," in the same way in which Paul uses the expression:–"We who are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord."⁵⁴ This community is composed of many who are yet to live in the successive generations of mankind. God is "not willing that any" of these, the objects of His gracious purpose of salvation, "should perish," etc.: the very purpose for which the world is spared being that they may all be brought in due time, and put in possession of the covenant blessings. [2.] Much depends on the sense affixed to the term willing, "not willing that any should perish," etc. Hence a most general and comprehensive interpretation of the words may be fairly maintained. We have already viewed God as a Sovereign Benefactor, and as a righteous Governor. Under the former character He wills, that is, He absolutely determines, the salvation of a certain member, and secures the accomplishment of His gracious purpose. But it does not follow that in the latter character He wills the perdition of any. I mean, that as a Governor, in awarding punishments, He does not at all act in sovereignty. Sovereignty relates to the bestowment of good, not to the infliction of evil. A sovereign purpose to save we can understand; but a sovereign purpose to destroy is revolting and contradictory. It is not in consequence of any absolute sovereign act of His will that any sinner perishes. In no such sense does He will the death of the sinner. In the rectoral administration of God, salvation is set before all without difference, and is put within their reach, and pressed upon their acceptance. If any perish in these circumstances, they owe their perdition to the free, unconstrained, and uninfluenced choice of their own will rejecting the offer. God is under no obligation to save them; and they wilfully destroy themselves. Again: Repentance is obviously in itself right and good. It must be in accordance with the rectoral will of God as the moral Governor of His creatures. All are by the Gospel called to repentance. There must, therefore, be a sense in which He is willing that all should come to repentance. This is His general will, His moral will, His rectoral will. And in this light, it is equally true of all His fallen creatures. It is true of devils as well as of men. If it was wrong for the angels to sin, it must be right for them to repent of their sin. It is impossible that God can ever will any thing else than what is in its own nature right and good; and repentance cannot in any case, where sin has been committed, be denied to be self-evidently right, and in this sense the holy God must will it. He "commands all men, everywhere, to repent."⁵⁵ And if He wills repentance, He cannot will perdition, excepting as the merited consequence of impenitence and perseverance in sin.

Having already said as much as seems necessary on other universal terms, I may now offer a few observations on the third class of passages, those, namely, in which the possibility is supposed of persons perishing for whom Christ died.⁵⁶ In explanation of such passages, let the following observations be attended to:–

(1.) Men are frequently spoken of in Scripture, not according to any secret purpose of God concerning them, but according to their profession and appearance. Every one was esteemed and spoken of as "a brother for whom Christ died,"⁵⁷ who professed the faith, and did not by his conduct manifestly contradict the profession. That such should be the style of expression was indispensably necessary. It never would have done to have spoken of individuals, not according to the appearance they presented to men, but according to the absolute divine knowledge of them, or the divine purpose concerning them; to have spoken of them as elect or non-elect; to have thus disclosed the secrets of the divine Mind; to have let the light of Heaven fall upon the true character and final destinies of individual professors; this would have superseded judgment to come. To professors it would have rendered useless all the admonitions to vigilance, and diligence, and self-examination, and prayer, and perseverance. It would have put an end to the exercise of the judgment of Christian charity in the reception into the fellowship of the church of those who professed the faith; and it would have been a style of discrimination, which, unless the miraculous gifts had been continued in the church, would never have been maintained. The apostles themselves were sometimes mistaken as to the real characters of men. They judged of professions from the indications of their state, as apparent from the manner of their profession and in the conduct which accompanied it: concluding favorably or unfavorably, or standing in doubt, according to the circumstances of each.⁵⁸ Even when Paul says of certain brethren: "Whose names are in the book of life,"⁵⁹ he is not, I should apprehend, to be understood as delivering any divine intimation; but as speaking of them according to the conviction of his own mind, arising from all the evidence of their character and state which he had had the opportunity to know.⁶⁰

(2.) Things are spoken of, not always according to their actual effects, but according to their tendencies. Whatever has in it a tendency to prejudice the spiritual interests of ourselves and others, and so to prevent final salvation, is represented as having in it the same criminality, on our part, as if such were its actual ultimate result; although by the grace of God the result should be counteracted. This, too, is a general, and an obviously righteous and essential rule of judgment. It is the rule of divine judgment as to the actions of men in general. To judge them according to the results actually arising in God’s providence from their actions, and not according to the principle and motive of them in the heart of the agent, and according to their own proper tendency, would convert the most nefarious crimes into the most laudable virtues. The highest of all possible results, both as to God and man, arose from the death of Christ; that is, taking a single step back to its proximate cause, from the unhallowed passions by which His murderers were driven on to imbrue their hands in "the innocent blood." But the passions were not on that account the less unhallowed, nor was it the less "by wicked hands" that He was "crucified and slain." The principle of the deed was the very essential element of all evil; and its immediate tendency was to accomplish, of men; not the will of God, but the malignant wishes of the wicked one. The conduct reprehended in Rom. xiv. and 1 Cor. viii. stands in the same category with the temptations of Satan. The rule by which we must judge of both is the same. The principle of his temptations is the most inveterate opposition to the glory of God and the present and eternal well-being of men

and their tendency is to ruin souls and rob the Redeemer of His honor in saving them. Their guilt, surely, is not the less, that the souls which he tempts and seeks to ruin are rescued from that ruin by interposing grace. In like manner, the reprehended conduct includes in it a temptation to evil. The principle of it is utterly at variance with Christian love; and its tendency is to the destruction of those who are tempted by it. If God by His interposing grace prevents the injury, no thanks to those who by their conduct expose to it.

(3.) Perseverance is always associated with the use of the appropriate and appointed means of establishment and growth in grace, and with the avoidance of whatever has an opposite tendency; and, this being the case, there is no difficulty, in regard to the passages quoted, either different in kind or greater in degree, than there is in those which warn us of our own danger. As these are admonitions to shun the temptations ourselves, so are they, necessarily, to avoid presenting temptations to others; they, our brethren, being in the same danger. All the arguments, therefore, on the subject of the "perseverance of the saints," connected with such warnings, might, with equal propriety and force of application, be introduced here. It follows:–

(4.) That all that is meant in such passages is, that we should scrupulously beware of being a stumbling-block and temptation to our brethren,–to those who give the evidence which should satisfy Christian charity of their being the objects of Christ’s redeeming grace and sovereign purpose of mercy; that we should; as we value either their salvation or our own, sacredly avoid whatever might tend to lead them into sin, with its ruinous consequences.

(5.) With regard to 2 Pet. ii. 1, I shall not enter into any discussion about the application of the designation translated "Lord" to Christ or to the Father. It is not the ordinary word so rendered, not kurios but despotes. The only other occurrences of it in the New Testament are where it is used of the Father,⁶¹ and where it may be either the Father or Christ, though the probability is in favour of the latter;⁶² and another,⁶³ where our translators make it refer to the Father, "the only Lord God," in distinction from "our Lord Jesus Christ," but which, on certain ascertained principles regarding the use of the Greek article, Mr. Granville Sharpe renders thus:–"Denying our only Master, God, and Lord, Jesus Christ;" and Bishop Middleton and Dr. Bloomfield, on the supposition that theon belongs to the original text, both concur in the reference of the whole to one person. Had it been otherwise, the ton would have been repeated before kurion, etc.; and Middleton refers to the Syriac and the Coptic versions as so understanding it. In the passage under consideration no doubt the words might be interpreted of God as the providential deliverer of Israel;⁶⁴ natural enough when the "false prophets" had been spoken of, who, in common with the Jews generally, boasted of Jehovah in this character. And in support of this it has been urged, that in the passage no mention is made of the blood or death of Christ, as is usually done when redemption by Christ is meant. But, supposing it to be meant, the words may be easily explained on the principle of the first in this series of observations that men are spoken of according to professions and appearances, and according to the credibility of the profession, in the estimate of Christian charity, when originally made. We may, in confirmation of this, compare the passage with two others of the same writer, which show the style in which he was wont on such subjects to express himself.⁶⁵ The former passage clearly refers to profession, to what the person had professed of his faith in the atonement, and of his sense and confidence of pardon; and the latter passage is the more likely to be of parallel import to the text under comment, from its relating to the same description of persons.

Allow me to say, in concluding this subject, that, in all our interpretations of Scripture, it is, in every view, of the very highest consequence that we assign to words and phrases, as far as possible, their most natural and obvious meaning; avoiding whatever is arbitrary, and wears the appearance of our feeling that we cannot hold our ground without force and straining, an appearance which is always very detrimental. It is true it is in human nature, and consequently accords with every man’s experience, that habitual attachment to a particular system will, to a mind under its influence, make many things seem natural enough, which, to one holding opposite views, appear utterly perverse and inadmissible. I have ever thought that Calvinists in general, in supporting the doctrine of particular redemption, have laid themselves greatly open to animadversion for the unnatural interpretations which they have put upon some parts of Scripture phraseology, to some of which we have had occasion to make pointed reference. That principle of interpretation should certainly be adopted as the right one, which, with the least appearance or reality of forced and unnatural explanation of words and phrases, harmonizes the various and, at first view, seemingly conflicting passages of the divine word. I have already so much at length set before you the principle which, on the present all-interesting subject, best answers this end, that I feel ashamed to repeat it. It is to view the atonement of Christ as a grand general remedy, glorifying all the divine perfections in the forgiveness and salvation of the guilty on account of it; possessing sufficiency of value for the salvation of ah1 , and, on this ground, proclaiming and offering salvation alike to all; but limited as to its actually saving efficacy by the sovereign purpose of God in the election of grace: in the former view, answering the rectoral design of God, as moral governor of the world; and in the latter, the sovereign purpose of God in the free and unfettered exercise of His everlasting mercy. Other principles of interpretation I have mentioned in connection with this, as suiting the explanation of different texts. But the one just repeated is the most general and important.

Having been necessarily led, in considering the questions relative to the extent of the atonement, to refer repeatedly to this distinction between the general design of God in reference to the race of mankind at large, and the more special purpose of His grace in regard to those who are actually saved, I conceive the present to be quite as natural a place as any other for introducing the doctrine of election. In one sense, it might be ranked among the blessings arising from the mediation of Christ the election being in Him and might, therefore, have found its place at a future period of our course. Yet, with greater propriety, the blessings may be considered as the benefits, present and eternal, to which the elect are chosen; and come naturally to be considered after we have finished what we have to say of the work of the Redeemer, their procuring cause. At the same time, however, the doctrine of perseverance, although enumerated by the Assembly of Divines at Westminister as the last among the "blessings which in this life do either accompany or flow from justification, adoption, and sanctification,"⁶⁶ is so inseparably connected with that of election, so interwoven with it, so almost, in some points, identical with it, forming in its essential principles an integrant part at least of it; that any observations I have to make on that doctrine may most naturally, and with most effect, be introduced in connection with it. This will, it is true, draw us longer away than may seem reasonable or desirable from what remains respecting the work of Christ, His resurrection, ascension, intercession, and reign. But the intimacy of the associations of the subject with what has come in our way must plead my apology for this. We shall now take up and discuss the doctrine of election, the lessons which the Bible teaches us on the subject, and the objections by which those lessons have been assailed.

Ralph Wardlaw, Systematic Theology, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1857), 2:438-484. [Some spelling modernized, footnote values modified and reformatted; original parentheses converted to brackets; and underlining mine.]

___________________________

¹Eph. i. 7; Rom. viii. 23; Heb. ix. 12, etc.

²Rom. iii. 24.

³Rom. iii. 25.

⁴2 Pet. ii. 18.

⁵Symington, p. 238.

⁶Symington, p. 237.

⁷Symington, p. 269.

⁸Symington, pp. 268, 269.

⁹Symington, pp. 244, 245.

¹⁰Rom. iii. 24.

¹¹On Divine Sovereignty, etc., pp. 213, 214.

¹²Theology, Serm. xxx.

¹³Rev. vii. 9.

¹⁴Luke xvi. 10.

¹⁵Rom. iii. 26.

¹⁶Rom. ix. 15.

¹⁷Acts xi. 28; John x. 11; Eph. v. 25-27; Isa. liii. 8, 11; Mat. xx. 28; xxvi. 28.

¹⁸Tit. ii. 14; Rom. v. 8; viii. 32; 1 John iv. 7-10.

¹⁹Rom. v. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 22; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; 1 Tim. ii. 4; ii. 6; iv. 10; Tit. ii. 11, 12; Heb. ii. 9; 2 Pet. iii. 9.

²⁰John i. 29; iii. 16; iv. 42; vi. 51; 2 Cor. v. 19; 1 John ii, 2.

²¹Rom. xiv. 15, 20; 1 Cor. viii. 12; 2 Pet. ii. 1.

²²John vii. 7; xv. 19; 1 John v. 18, 19.

²³John iii. 16. Happening to turn up Cruden for texts in which the word ‘world’ is used for the mass of mankind, in distinction from the people of God, I found the following:–After citing John xv. 18 correctly, as an instance in which the word is used for "the wicked in the world, unregenerated, unrenewed persons," we have two passages cited in proof of its being also used for "God’s chosen people, whether Jews or Gentiles." Of these, the second is this very text: "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son to die in their stead, and give satisfaction for their sins. Believers are called the world, both because they are taken from among Jews and Gentiles, and do participate in the corruption of the world." Strange! As if the army should be called the nation, because the soldiers have been taken from among the nation; or the general’s body guard the army, because chosen from the ranks. Nay, still more incongruous, as if those who "come out from the world and are separate," and by their very separation have a distinctive character, "not touching the unclean thing," should be called the world still, as a designation of distinction from the world!

²⁴John xvii. 9, 21.

²⁵John xvii. 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 23, 25.

²⁶John v. 34.

²⁷Vs. 31-37.

²⁸John iii. 16.

²⁹Tit. iii. 4.

³⁰Luke ii. 14.

³¹Heb. ii. 11.

³²John iii. 16, 17.

³³Symington, pp. 284, 285.

³⁴Vs. 14-19.

³⁵John xii. 47.

³⁶John xii. 32; 1 Tim. ii. 4.

³⁷Vs . 1.4

³⁸Col. iii. 11; Rom. x. 12, 13, etc.

³⁹Acts xi. 18.

⁴⁰2 Cor. v. 10.

⁴¹Luke xxiv. 47.

⁴²1 Cor. xv. 22.

⁴³John v. 28, 29.

⁴⁴Rom. v. 12-21.

⁴⁵V. 15.

⁴⁶V. 17.

⁴⁷John iii. 18, 19, 36.

⁴⁸Rom. iii. 22-24.

⁴⁹V. 23.

⁵⁰V. 24.

⁵¹Vs. 27-30.

⁵²Ch. iii. 4.

⁵³V. 14.

⁵⁴1 Thess. iv. 15, etc.

⁵⁵Acts xvii. 30.

⁵⁶Rom. xiv. 15, 20; 1 Cor. viii. 12; 2 Pet. ii. 1.

⁵⁷Rom. xiv. 15.

⁵⁸Acts viii. 18-33; Gal. iv. 11; xix. 20.

⁵⁹Phil. iv. 3.

⁶⁰Thess. i. 2-6.

⁶¹Acts iv. 24.

⁶²Rev. vi. 10, 10, 17.

⁶³Jude 4.

⁶⁴Deut. xxxii. 2.

⁶⁵2 Pet. i. 9; ii. 20.

⁶⁶Assembly’s Catechism, Quest. 36.