Wollebius:

XXIII. While Christ’s passion is minimized by the foregoing errors, those who teach that he died for all human beings [pro omnibus et singulis] broaden the object of his passion more than is allowable.

Of course, if we take into consideration the magnitude and worthiness of the merit, we admit that it would suffice for the redemption of ten worlds; but if we take the plan of God and the intention of Christ into consideration, then it is false to say that Christ died for every person. For this reason others say that his death was sufficient for all, but not effective for all;1 that is, the merit of Christ, because of his worthiness, is sufficient for all, but it is not effective for all in its application, because Christ did not die with the intention that his. death be applied to all. Why should he die for those for whom he would not pray? But he told us that he did not pray for the world On. 17 :9). Those who oppose us argue from passages in which there is reference to the whole world, or to all men, [ Timothy 2:4 and 1 John 2:2, in which all men in general are named. But in I John 2:2 the meaning of "the whole world" is, by metonymy, "the elect scattered throughout the whole world," and in 1 Timothy 2: 4 "all men" means men of every sort, whether gentiles or Jews, kings or private citizens, and so not individuals in a class, but classes of individuals, as the words that follow make plain. The word "all" is used in the same sense in Genesis 6: 19 and Joel 2:28.5

1. The other aspect of Christ’s satisfaction is the perfect righteousness which, by his conformity to the law and the perfect obedience which he performed, acquired for us the status of heirs of eternal life. 2. This righteousness is partly original and partly actual. 3. The original righteousness of Christ is the conformity to the law in which he was conceived and born.

Johannes Wollebius, Compendium Theolgiae Christianae trans. John W. Beardslee in Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1965), 105-106.

[Underlining mine.]

Read the rest of this entry »

Wollebius:

(2)

1. Sin is either the first sin or the result of it.

2. The first sin is the disobedience of the first parents, by which they transgressed God’s prohibition concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

PROPOSITIONS

I. The cause of the transgression of Adam and Eve was neither God nor a decree of God, nor the withholding of any special grace, nor the permission to fall, nor any naturally incited motive, nor the providential government of the fall itself.

It was not God, because he had most strictly forbidden the eating of the fruit of that tree. It was not his decree, because that carries only an immutable, not a coercive necessity, nor does it lead anyone toward sin. It was not the withholding of some special grace by which man might have remained innocent, for there was no obligation to give even the grace that God did give man; he received, in fact, the ability to act as he willed, although not that of willing as he could. It was not any naturally incited motive, for a motive in itself is not sin. It was not the providential government of the fall, for to bring good out of evil is to be the source of good rather than of evil.

II. God both did, and did not, will the first sin. He did not will, in so far as it is sin, but he willed and decreed it, in so far as it is a means of revealing his glory, mercy, and justice.

III. The immediate cause of original sin was the instigation and persuasion of that old serpent, the devil.

IV. Its antecedent cause was the will of man, which by itself was indifferent toward good and evil, but, when convinced by Satan, was turned toward evil.

V. There are five stages of the fall, by which man fell from God one step at a time, not all at once: (1) Thoughtlessness and meddlesomeness when Eve conversed with the serpent in her husband’s absence; ( 2 ) unbelief, as little by little she began to agree with the lies of Satan, who called into doubt the goodness of God toward man, so that she distrusted God; (3) desire for the forbidden fruit and for divine glory; (4) the deed itself; ( 5 ) the temptation of Adam and the arousing of undisciplined desire also in him.

VI. If all the aspects [pars] of this sin are taken into account, it is rightly called transgression of the entire natural law. Man sinned by unbelief, distrust, ingratitude, and idolatry, as he fell from God and set about making an idol of himself. He also sinned by despising God’s word, by rebellion, homicide, and intemperance, by the secret taking of what was not his without God’s permission, by assent to false statements, and finally by the desire for higher dignity, indeed, for the dignity that belongs only to God. Whence it is too narrow a definition to call this sin intemperance, ambition, or pride.

Johannes Wollebius, “Compendium Theologiae Christianae,” in John W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1977), 67-68.

17
Sep

Johannes Wollebius on Reprobation

   Posted by: CalvinandCalvinism   in God who Ordains

Wollebius:

XI. Those who teach the doctrine of election in such a way as to deny reprobation, are clearly wrong.

Scripture teaches reprobation no less than election. Isaiah 41:9 “I chose you and do not abandon you.” Malachi 1:2-3: “I loved Jacob; I hated Esau.” Romans 9: 18: “He has mercy on whom he will, and he hardens whom he will.” Romans 11:7: “The elect attained it; the others were hardened.” I Thessalonians 5:9: “God has not destined us for wrath, but for salvation.” 2 Timothy 2: 20: “Vessels for noble use, and for ignoble.” Jude 4: “Some men long destined for damnation came in secretly.” XII. Just as Christ is the cause not of election but of salvation, so faithlessness is the cause not of reprobation but of damnation.

Damnation differs from reprobation as the means of carrying out a decree differs from the decree itself.

XIII. Not damnation, but the revelation of the glory of the justice of God, is the purpose of reprobation.

Therefore man cannot properly be said to have been created in order to be damned; for damnation, by which the person who has been rejected brings about evil for himself, is not the purpose but the means of achieving the purpose of God.

XIV. For purposes of instruction, two acts of reprobation may be assumed: the denial of unmerited grace, which is called preterition, and deliverance to merited punishment, which is called precondemnation.

Johannes Wollebius, “Compendium Theologiae Christianae,” in John W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1977), 52-53. [Originally published in 1626.]

Wellebius:

VIII. Original sin consists not only of inability to do good, but also of a tendency [proclivitas] toward evil; nor is it merely the loss of the good originally given, but also the addition of the corresponding evil.

IX. By original sin natural goods are corrupted, and the supernatural good completely [penitus] taken away. X. There remain, therefore, the intellect, but it is beclouded; and the will, which has lost its rectitude; and the lower desires, which are totally corrupted. XI. Therefore, even in natural and civil affairs unredeemed man can do good only by special grace. XII. Without this special grace of God nothing significant was done by the pagans [gentiles]. XIII. Whatever they did accomplish was so mingled with multiform futility, that even their greatest virtues are merely magnificent sins [splendida peccata] before God. XIV. Good works are not merely actions that are good in themselves, but actions that are performed from right motives. The phrase “good works” may be used either univocally or equivocally. It is used univocally of actions that are good simply with respect to all circumstances, but equivocally of actions good in themselves but corrupted with respect to the object, or subject, or means, or purpose. If one examines the purpose of the actions of the pagans, it will be evident that they were concerned over their own glory rather than that of God XV. Although the passions of the reprobate are restrained by God a! with a bridle, they are not made whole. XVI. The supernatural gifts, namely clarity of intellect, rectitude of will and conformity of passion to reason, are completely lost. XVII. Thus in spiritual matters, man has within himself no principle of knowing or acting, either as a concrete fact or as a possibility. XVIII. Therefore, those who attribute to unredeemed man either free will or other powers by which he might do good or prepare himself for conversion and God’s grace, are seeking a house in ashes. This is the error of the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians. XIX. The will remains free from coercion, but not free to choose between good and evil. XX. The will has been made so evil [factum est ad malum] that it is better described as enslaved than as free. So far as intellect is concerned, “the natural man cannot understand the concerns of the Spirit of God” (I Cor. 2: 14). As to will, “the imagination of man’s heart is evil” (Gen. 8: 21). Finally, Scripture declares that man as a whole has lost spiritual life, “to lie dead in sin” (Eph. 2: I). XXI. Even when this sin has been forgiven to pious parents, it is nonetheless passed on by generation to their children. Because the stain is not completely removed by forgiveness, although the guilt is removed. The gift of faith is not given by generation, but by regeneration, so man generates man not as regenerate, but simply as man, just as seed cleansed of beard, chaff, and husk, still produce these when it grows.

Johannes Wollebius, “Compendium Theologiae Christianae,” in John W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1977), 70-71. [Originally published in 1626.] [Note, by the term “special grace” Wollebius means special common grace, cf, Calvin, Institutes 2.2.17; Institutes, 2.3.4.]

Wollebius:

But that which is included in the popular jingle,

He commands and he forbids,
Permits, advises, and fulfills,

may be loosely called by the designation of divine will. Just as the edicts of a magistrate are called his will, so the designation of will may be given to precepts, prohibitions, promises, and even deeds and events. Thus the divine will is also called that which God wants done [voluntas signi], because it signifies what is acceptable to God; what he wants done by us. It is called “consequent” because it follows that eternal antecedent; “conditional” because the commandments, prohibitions, warnings, and promises of God all have a condition of obedience or disobedience attached to them. Finally, it is called “revealed,” because it is always explained in the word of God. It must be observed that this sort of distinction does not postulate either really diverse, or contradictory, wills in God.

Johannes Wollebius, Compendium Theologiae Christianae,” in John W. Beardslee III, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1977), 48. [Originally published in 1626.]