Inman:

Turretin’s Evaluation of Amyraldianism As noted in the introduction of the present study, the significance of Turretin for much previous scholarship has been his role in the Amyraldian controversy. Without question he resisted this recasting of Reformed theology both in his writings and in his official capacity in Geneva, but his estimation of Amyraldianism must not be described, perhaps anachronistically, as unmitigated rejection. Pitassi takes Turretin’s role in the querelle de fa grace as exemplaric of a suspicion and intolerance akin to Roman Catholicism in that era.⁵⁷ Dennison portrays the influence of Amyraldianism as the breaching of orthodoxy’s dam.⁵⁸ Whether this is true or not, Turretin does not seem to anticipate such effects. His two published volumes of sermons seem to reflect no conspicuous concern; instead, their primary polemical concern is pastoral refutation of Roman Catholicism.⁵⁹ Turretin rejects Amyraldianism, but he does not declare it beyond the pale.

Turretin says the question of the satisfaction’s object “has been (and still is) agitated by various persons.” He traces the universalist position from the time of Augustine to his own time, attributing it to both the Lutherans and Arminians. Lastly, he speaks of the Amyraldians. “Those of our ministers who defend universal grace yield to this position, if not entirely yet in great measure.”⁶⁰ He does not put them outside the Reformed camp. Elsewhere he refers to them as “those among the Reformed who hold to universal grace” although in their formulation of the divine decrees “in various particulars they approach to the hypotheses of the Remonstrants.”⁶¹ They describe the death of Christ as decreed and performed for all human beings, such that “[God] did not absolutely intend so much salvation in him, as the possibility of salvation." They then introduce the discrimination of divine election. Because God foresaw that human depravity would preclude faith on the part of anyone, “they contend that God (by another special decree) determined to give faith to some by which they might believe on Christ.”⁶² Though Turretin sees here similarity to the Arminians, he takes this particularism as a substantive matter: "In this they rightly differ from the Arminians.”⁶³

Contrary to Pitassi’s characterization of Turretin as intolerant, his response to Amyraldianism is moderate. Turretin apparently showed such a disposition in other areas of controversy.⁶⁴ Turretin himself studied with the Amyraldians in Saumur and Paris, and maintained a long correspondence with Jean Daille, a noted and published Amyraldian.⁶⁵ Turretin even served as editor for volumes of Daille’s sermons published in Geneva.⁶⁶ Apart from these congenial associations with Amyraldianism, Turretin’s attitude toward the Amyraldians can be best understood in terms of his estimation that their error does not harm the fundamental articles, though it is contrary to orthodoxy. Turretin played a significant role in the adoption of the The Helvetic Consensus which specifically rejects Amyraldian positions.⁶⁷ In a 1676 letter, Turretin defended the confessional exclusion of Amyraldianism. He rehearses the history of the debate at Geneva over the previous decades and the various actions to exclude Amyraldianism taken by the Venerable company. His evaluation of these opinions gives reason for his moderate tone as cited above in IET. Amyraldianism does not touch on the fundamentals of the faith, but it is more than the theological diversity that characterizes academic discussion. It comes so near to the fundamentals that it must be opposed for the sake of the church’s health. Unlike the correct views it cannot properly foster healthy piety.

There are purely doubtful questions of the School, upon which one can take the position one wishes without danger, but we do not believe that the points which they agitate are of the same nature, although we continue to agree that they are not fundamental nor absolutely necessary for salvation. Nevertheless, we think that they can’t avoid approaching the necessary doctrines and are so important that we are obliged to instruct the people regarding them.⁶⁸

Benjamin T. Inman, “God Covenant in Christ: The Unifying Role of Theology Proper in the Systematic Theology of Francis Turretin” (Ph. D diss., Westminster Theological Seminary), 390-393. [footnote values and content original and underlining mine.]

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⁵⁷Maria-Cristina Pitassi, “Evolution,” 187.

⁵⁸Dennison., Jr. "The Twilight of Scholasticism," 244-55.

⁵⁹Francois Turrettini, Sermons sur divers passages de l’Ecriture Sainle (Geneva.. 1676), and Recueil de sermons sur divers lextes de l’Ecriture Sainle pour l’elal presenl de l’Eglise (Geneva.. 1687).

⁶⁰IET, XIV. XIV. VI.

⁶¹IET, IV.XVIII.XIII.

⁶²IET, XIV.XIV.VI.

⁶³IET, XIV.XIV.VI.

⁶⁴Francois Laplanche, L Eenture, Ie saere et l ‘histoire: erudits et politiques Protestants devant la Bible en France au XVII siecle (Amsterdam: Holland University Press, 1973), 580-81. Keizer, Francois Turrettini, 92-95.

⁶⁵Correspondance de J.-A Turretinni, f105-261. Jean Daille, Vindiciae apologiae pro duabus ecclesiarum in Gallia Protestantium Synodis nationalibus (Amsterdam: Joannis Ravesteynii, 1657).

⁶⁶Correspondente de J.-A. Turretinni, f130-140.

⁶⁷Philip Schaff, "The Helvetic Consensus Formula," in The Creeds a/Christendom with a History and Critical Notes, vol. 1, The History of Creeds, ed. Philip Schaff, revised by David S. Schaff (Grand Rapids. MI: Baker Book House. from the 1931 edition published by Harper and Row; reprinted, 1990).477-489.

⁶⁸"Il y a des Questions d ‘Ecole purement problematiques. sur lesquelles on peut prendre le parti qu’on veut, sans danger, Mais nous ne croyons pas, que les points, dont il s’agit, soient de meme nature, quoi que nous demeurions d’accord, qu’ils ne sont pas fondamentaux ni absolument necessaires au Salut; Nous estimons pourtant, qu’ils ne laissent pas d’approcher des necessaires, & d’etrc asses importants pour nous obliger a en instruire le peuple. Et comme nous nous jpersadons, que les sentimens, que nous en avons, sont fondez sur la Parole de Dieu, & nce contribuent pas peu a l’a affermissement de notre Foy, & de notre Consolation, & a l’avancement de la vraye piete, nous crayons, que les autres n ‘y etant pas conformnes, ne peuvent pas produire les memes effets.” Francis Turretin, "Response de Msr. Francois Turretin. Datee de 16 Fevrier 1676," 28.

Grohman:

Also, it should be pointed out again that the doctrinal difference between the Saumur theologians and Turretin do not involve any of the fundamental tenets of the Reformed faith. Turretin himself mentions this fact in a letter to Jean Claude which we shall consider later in this thesis. As we have seen various times in this chapter, Turretin refers to the Salmurians as fellow Reformed pastors and theologians, and the Salmurians certainly view themselves as being within the Reformed tradition. In fact, Amyraut goes to great lengths in attempting to prove that the orthodox Reformed theologians are in agreement with him. Thus, even though this controversy was a serious and lengthy one, nevertheless it was entirely an internal dispute within the Reformed churches concerning nonfundamental matters.

It might seem that in a sense the doctrinal differences between the Salmurians and the orthodox theologians are only theoretical. The “universalism” of the Saumur theologians is merely hypothetical, and in the final analysis, the Salmurians accept the particularism of the Reformed doctrine of predestination: namely, that only the elect are granted faith and salvation. In fact, since hypothetical universalism was basically intended to be a new way of presenting the doctrine of predestination so as to make it seem less objectionable, it was often called a new method rather than a new doctrine. However, if one examines the arguments on both sides, it becomes apparent that there are certain real differences between the two positions.

Donald Davis Grohman, “The Genevan Reactions to the Saumur Doctrines of Hypothetical Universalism: 1635-1685″ ( Th.D. diss, Knox College in cooperation with Toronto School of Theology. 1971), 120–121.

[Note: On the same point, c.f.  Richard Muller, and Carl Truman, and the related comments by Robert Letham.]

[Credit to Tony for the find.]

Dabney:

Scriptures Ascribe To God Pity Towards Lost.

This view¹ has a great advantage in that it reveals and enables us to receive those precious declarations of Scripture which declare the compassion of God towards even lost sinners. The glory of these representations is that they show us God’s benevolence as an infinite attribute, like all His other perfection’s. Even where it is rationally restrained, it exists. The fact that there is a lost order of angels, and that there are persons in our guilty race, who are objects of God’s decree of preterition, does not arise from any stint or failure of this infinite benevolence. It is as infinite, viewed as it qualifies God’s nature only as though He had given expression to it in the salvation of all the devils and lost men. We can now receive, without any abatement, such blessed declarations as Ps. 81:13; Ezek. 18:32; Luke 19:41, 42. We have no occasion for such questionable, and even perilous exegesis, as even Calvin² and Turretin feel themselves constrained to apply to the last. Afraid lest God’s principle of compassion (not purpose of rescue), towards sinners non elect, should find any expression, and thus mar the symmetry of their logic, they say that it was not Messiah the God man and Mediator, who wept over reprobate Jerusalem; but only the humanity of Jesus, our pattern. I ask. Is it competent to a mere humanity to say, “How often would I have gathered your children?” And to pronounce a final doom, “Your house is left unto you desolate?” The Calvinist should have paused, when he found himself wresting these Scriptures from the same point of view adopted by the ultra Arminian. But this is not the first time we have seen “extremes meet.” Thus argues the Arminian, “Since God is sovereign and omnipotent, if He has a propension, He indulges it, of course, in volition and action. Therefore, as He declares He had a propension of pity towards contumacious Israel, I conclude that He also had a volition to redeem them, and that He did whatever omnipotence could do against the obstinate contingency of their wills. Here then, I find the bulwark of my doctrine, that even omnipotence cannot certainly determine a free will.” And thus argues the ultra Calvinist. “Since God is sovereign and omnipotent, if He has any propension, He indulges it, of course, in volition and action. But if He had willed to convert reprobate Israel, He would infallibly have succeeded. Therefore He never had any propension of pity at all towards them.” And so this reasoner sets himself to explain away, by unscrupulous exegesis, the most precious revelations of God’s nature! Should not this fact, that two opposite conclusions are thus drawn from the same premises have suggested error in the premises? And the error of both extremists is just here. It is not true that if God has an active principle looking towards a given object, He will always express it in volition and action. This, as I have shown, is no more true of God than of a righteous and wise man. And as the good man, who was touched with a case of destitution, and yet determined that it was his duty not to use the money he had in giving alms, might consistently express what he truly felt of pity, by a kind word; so God consistently reveals the principle of compassion as to those whom, for wise reasons, He is determined not to save. We know that God’s omnipotence surely accomplishes every purpose of His grace. Hence, we know that He did not purposely design Christ’s sacrifice to effect the redemption of any others than the elect. But we hold it perfectly consistent with this truth, that the expiation of Christ for sin expiation of infinite value and universal fitness should be held forth to the whole world, elect and non elect, as a manifestation of the benevolence of God’s nature. God here exhibits a provision which is so related to the sin of the race, that by it, all those obstacles to every sinner’s return to his love, which his guilt and the law presents, are ready to be taken out of the way. But in every sinner, another class of obstacles exists; those, namely, arising out of the sinner’s own depraved will. As to the elect, God takes these obstacles also out of the way, by His omnipotent calling, in pursuance of the covenant of redemption made with, and fulfilled for them by their Mediator. As to the non elect, God has judged it best not to take this class of obstacles out of the way, the men therefore go on to indulge their own will in neglecting or rejecting Christ.  Dabney, Lectures, 532-533. [Footnotes mine and underlining mine.]

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¹The view that ascribes to God a disposition of pity towards the lost.

²Here, for some reason, Dabney is misataken in that Calvin adopts the reading of these verses in line with Dabney’s. The idea that in Matthew 23:37, Christ merely as a man desires to gather the “children” of the city is foreign to Calvin. For Calvin on Matthew 23:37 see here. Dabney is correct, however, on identifying Turretin’s position on this.

Turretin:

FIFTH QUESTION
Does God concur with second causes not only by a particular and simultaneous, but also by a previous concourse? We affirm.

I. Since the question concerning the concourse (concursus) of God is one of the most difficult in theology (in the explanation of which, if anywhere else, great labor must be employed) and error is most dangerous, it demands a peculiar and accurate discussion.

Physical and
Moral concourse.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) One concourse is physical by which one concurs and acts after the manner of a physical cause, i.e., truly and efficaciously and really flows into the effect by a certain positive influx; another is moral by which he operates after the manner of a moral cause, i.e., by persuading or dissuading or by proposing or removing the objects and occasions. We do not treat here of moral, but of physical concourse.

Mediate and
immediate.

III. (2) One concourse is mediate; another immediate. For a cause can be said to act either mediately or immediately both as to the subsisting substance and as to virtue. That cause acts immediately by the immediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect no other singular subsisting substance (subsisting of itself) is interposed (which previously receives in itself the action of the agent, as water which washes and cools the hand). The other, on the contrary, acts mediately by the mediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect another subsisting substance falls (as the chisel between the artist and the statue). A cause acts immediately by the immediation of virtue which acts by a virtue or power proper to itself and not received from any other source (as fire warms by its own heat). A cause acts mediately, however, by the mediation of virtue which operates by a virtue not its own or proper to itself, but received and borrowed from another source (as when the moon by light borrowed from the sun illuminates the earth, she is said to illuminate mediately by a mediation of virtue, i.e., the virtue of the sun mediating). Now God concurs with second causes immediately by an immediation both of virtue (because he acts by his proper power not furnished from another source) and of subsisting substance (because by his own essence he attains the thing). Nor, if he uses second causes as means, does it follow that he does not act immediately also. For he uses them not with respect to the action of the creature and consequently of the effect itself (as if he did not reach it immediately), but inasmuch as he subordinates second causes to himself (by flowing into which he also reaches the effect itself immediately).

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