Durham:

1) Doctrine Two. We may consider Christ’s sufferings and death in the fruits of it, either as they respect common favors, and mercies, common gifts, and means of grace, which are not peculiar and saving, but common to believers with others, being bestowed upon professors in the visible Church; or as they are peculiar and saving, such as faith, justification, adoption, etc. Now when we say that Christ’s sufferings and death are a price for the sins of his people, we exclude not the reprobate simply from temporal and common favors and mercies that come by his death; they may have, and actually have, common gifts and works of the Spirit, the means of grace, which are some way effects and fruits of the same covenant. But we say, that the reprobate partake not of saving mercy and that Christ’s death is a satisfaction only for the elect, and that none others get pardon of sin, faith, repentance, etc. by it, but they only; it was intended for none others. And this we clear and confirm from, and by, these following grounds and arguments, which we will shortly hint at. James Durham, Christ Crucified: The Marrow of the Gospel in 72 Sermons on Isaiah 53 (Dallas, TX: Naphtali Press, 2001), 343-344. [Underlining mine.]

2)

Concerning the nature and difference of saving and common Grace

In this Epistle, there is a large commendation of this Angel’s practice: which is not only given to him in respect of the matter of his actions; but in respect of the qualifications of them: as, first, that he did not only suffer for, and have patience in, that which was materially right; but that he suffered for Christ’s Name sake: and that he did not

only hate the deeds of the Nicolaitans; but did it with a respect to Christ: which is here added, to difference the sincerity of these actions from others that are materially good also: for, no question, there may be much suffering, which is not commendable before Christ. And certainly many others, even among heathens, did hate these Nicolaitans, who yet cannot be thought to be alike comprehended under this commendation. This therefore that is added, for my Name’s sake, must be to show the sincerity and graciousness thereof, as that which did put a difference between their sufferings and patience, and the sufferings of others. And it doth imply, that this qualification, was that mainly, which made the Lord take notice thereof. It is therefore, the same on the matter with that, Matth. 5.11, of being persecuted for Christ’s sake, to which the promise is made, vers. 12. and the same, with that 1 Pet. 4.13. of being made partakers of Christ’s sufferings, and of being reproached for his Name: which being an evidence, and part of blessedness in these places, cannot be conceived but to imply sincerity; without which, suffering itself, even where the cause is good, would be of no weight as to that end. We do therefore conceive these words undoubtedly to be added, to point out that wherein their sincerity consisted, and wherewith the Lord was especially well pleased: from which we may gather these Doctrines.

First, That there is a great difference between an action morally or materially good, and that which is gracious, and as such acceptable to God. I t is not simply suffering and hatred, which the Lord commends here; but suffering and hatred so and so qualified. Hence we will find frequently in the Scripture, difference made between these, to do that which is good upon the matter, and to do it with a perfect heart. In actions therefore, there are these three to be distinctly considered, 1. The act itself, as it is natural, suppose an act of hatred, love, grief, etc. 2. As the act is moral, and is directed toward an object that is agreeable to the Law, that is, to love that which is good, and to hate that which is evil, and so forth: both which, in many respects, may be in hypocrites, who may do that which is materially good. 3. We are to consider an act as gracious, that is, when not only the thing for the matter is agreeable to the will of God, as suppose, one were acting, or suffering for a truth; but also when that is done in the manner that the Law requires, and with a suitableness thereunto: and so one suffers not only for a truth; but as a Christian he carries himself in his suffering for the same: it is this last which makes the difference, and which the Lord doth especially take notice of, and commend by this qualification, that it is done for his Name’s sake.

Secondly, We gather, that this difference, wherein the graciousness of the act doth consist, is not to be inquired for in any intense degree of the act itself, whether positive or comparative (at least only) but it is to be inquired for in the nature and kind thereof, to wit, in respect of positive qualifications concurring therewith, and having influence thereon: For, this commendation, is not given upon the degree; but from the nature of these acts: it is not commendable hatred, because it is in such an intense degree positively: nor comparatively, because it hates these errors more than it doth hate truth; but because in their hatred of these errors, they conform themselves to Christ’s hatred of them. And likewise by that commendation for Christ’s Name sake, is not holden forth any degree either of their labor, or patience simply, nor yet comparatively, that they labored more, or did suffer more for that which is materially good, than they did for any other thing; or, because their patience was for degree more than their impatience; but, that there was a peculiar respect to the Lord’s Name both in their labor and patience.

If it be asked, What this is, which beside the moral rectitude of the act, must concur for the making of it to be accounted gracious?

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The Death of Christ and Common Grace

1. James Durham (1622-1658) on The Death of Christ and Common Grace
2. Edward Leigh (1602-1671): “Christ Died for the Reprobate Five Ways”
3. Samuel Clarke (1599-1682) on Common Grace, General Mercies and the Death of Christ
4. Richard Baxter (1615-1691) on The Death of Christ and Common Grace
5. Thomas Beverley (d. 1702) on the Death of Christ and Common Grace
6. Thomas Ridgley, (1667?-1734) on The Death of Christ and Common Grace
7. John Brown of Broughton (1784–1858) on the General and Special Aspects of the Mediation of Christ
8. Robert L. Dabney (1820-1898) on The Death of Christ and Common Grace
9. Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) on the Death of Christ and Common Grace
10. R.C. Sproul (1939-) on the Death of Christ and Common Grace: Passing Comment

Hobson:

1) First, that he died for all, I shall prove it by Scripture, and then show you how; to prove this truth that Christ died for every man, I shall not prove it from these Scriptures, John 3:16, chap. 6:33, 2 Cor. 5:19, 1 John 2:2, 1 John 4:14, and my reason for it is, those Scriptures though they speak out the word [all] and the word [world] yet there is no safety to make positive conclusions upon doubtful expressions, I mean as to the nature and measure of the word [all] and [world] for sometimes the word [world] includes the whole, as Job 34:18, Psalm 24:1, Psalm 50:12, 98:7, or Her. 10:12, Acts 17:24.

Secondly, the world [world] is taken for a part as well as the whole, as in these Scriptures, John 13:1, chap. 14:17, chap. 15:18, 19, chap. 17:6, 9, Acts 17:6, Acts 19:27, Rev. 13:3.

Thirdly, as the world [world] does include sometimes a part, so sometimes of that part, it does intend properly the wicked of the world, as in Acts, 17:31, Rom. 12:2, 1 Cor. 3:19, chapt. 4:9, chap. 6:2, Hebr. 11:7, 2 Peter 2:5, 1 John 5:19. Again in other places is does also properly intend only the professors or believers in Christ, as in these Scriptures, John 12:19, Rom. 11:12, 15, John 17:21, 23. Now all that can be said or declared from these fore-mentioned Scriptures where the word [world] or [all] is expressed where the death of Christ is declared, or reconciliation by him is to you very doubtful, whether it be to every one, or only believers, and therefore seeing that a doubtful supposition is no foundation for infallibly conclusions, nor to the end any controversy in discourse, because supposition is as strong in the one as the other, and convinces none, but produces disputes in all, and therefore I shall in my Answer not positively conclude from, but set them aside in this discourse, and draw as my proof as I told you before, either from Scripture or reason that does arise no other way than from absolute necessity.

So now to my Affirmation, which is, that Christ died for every man, but not for all alike.

First, that he died for every man, for the proof of that see 1 Tim. 4: 10, he is the savior of every man, but especially, so there is a common salvation by Christ. This truth is also made good in 2 Pet. 2: 1, where he declares some men to be men of destruction, and tells them that they had denied the Lord that bought them; so that wicked men and men of destruction were comprehended in the purchase of Christ, further see Heb. 2: 9.

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Limited Atonement and the Falsification of the Sincere Offer of the Gospel¹

Table of Contents

I. The original argument
II. The counter-arguments
III. Assumptions
IV. The Issue and the Problem
V. What it means to make an offer
VI. The falsity of the conditional
VII. The “conditional” considered as a proposal of means
VIII. What is Harry to believe?
IX. The Objections
X. The truth of the conditional proves unlimited satisfaction
XI. Conclusion

I. The Original Argument²

Assumptions:

a) Let forgivable mean something like “able to have forgiveness conferred,” which I think is basic and sound.
b) Without a legal basis, no sin can be forgiven.

The following syllogism can be constructed:

1) Only those sins imputed to Christ are forgivable.
2) Only the sins of the elect are imputed to Christ.
3) Therefore only the sins of the elect are forgivable.

1) has to follow unless one wants to deny substitutionary atonement and claim that God can forgive sins for which Christ did not bear and suffer.

2) has to follow for the limited expiation/imputation of sin proponent.³ And so 3) is undeniable.

However, God offers forgiveness of sins to all mankind, or at least, to all whom the Gospel comes.⁴

Assumptions:

c) To offer forgiveness of sins, necessarily implies or presupposes that sins of the offeree are forgivable.
d) For a sincere offer to be sincere,⁵ one must be able to confer and have available what one offers.

The following basic syllogism can be constructed:

4) All sincere divine offers of forgiveness of sins, entails that sins of the offerees are forgivable.
5) God sincerely offers forgiveness of sins to all.⁶
6) Therefore the sins of all are forgivable.

4) has to be true because, one must have the ability to confer what one sincerely offers. God cannot make a pretense of sincerely offering what one does not have the ability to confer.

5) has to be true for any free-offer Calvinist.

6) therefore has to follow as High and Moderate Calvinists rightly maintain.

However,

1) Therefore only the sins of the elect are forgivable.

directly contradicts,

6) Therefore the sins of all are forgivable,

in the same sense and meaning.

II. The Counter-Arguments

I have proposed an argument that God cannot sincerely offer to forgive the non-died-for (NDF) because he is not able to confer forgiveness upon them, therefore, limited expiation and imputation of sin falsifies the sincere and free offer of forgiveness to all men.⁷ My argument is that given the proper and true definition of ‘offer,’⁸ God cannot sincerely, well-meaningly, genuinely, and legitimately offer to forgive a person for whom there is no basis of forgiveness available for that person. Thus, if God should offer forgiveness to someone for whom no forgiveness has been obtained or made possible by the death of Christ, such a divine offer would be insincere, disingenuous, illegitimate and ill-meant.⁹

The first serious response to our argument is that if the particularism of limited expiation and sin-bearing falsifies the free and sincere offer of the Gospel to all men, then so does the particularism of election and preterition. And so the argument unfolds: If the classic-moderate Calvinist can affirm that the particularism entailed in election (and preterition) does not falsify the free and sincere offer of the gospel to all men, then, likewise, he should not object that the particularism entailed in a limited satisfaction for sin falsifies the free and sincere offer of the gospel to all men. Our response to this is that the particularism in both election and limited satisfaction for sin do not bear a univocal relationship to the gospel offer. I argue that the particularism in election and preterition entails a divine willingness to save some and not to save others, and this particularism is located in the secret will. On the other hand, the particularism of limited satisfaction entails an inability to impart salvation, an inability to impart the very thing offered with regard to the NDF.¹⁰ The problem should be clear when one realizes that the legitimacy and genuineness the divine offer is directly indexed to the availability of the thing offered.¹¹ God cannot sincerely and genuinely offer what he knows he is not able to impart or which is not available for him to impart. Under the terms of limited satisfaction, forgiveness of sins with respect to the NDF is impossible, and so for God to make a pretense of sincerely offering forgiveness of sins to the NDF is insincere and a mockery.

This then leads to the second counter to our original argument. This second reply has two steps. The second objection first challenges the standard definition of the word "offer" by asserting that a simple statement of fact expressed in conditional form properly and rightly constitutes a legitimate and sincere offer.¹² Thus, the argument goes, even on the supposition that a specific hearer is NDF, the conditional statement, "if you believe, you will be saved" made to that hearer, itself, constitutes a legitimate offer of salvation.¹³

Then the argument further attempts to validate the sincerity of that statement to that specific hearer on the basis of the following counter-factual supposition that, ‘An offer that is made to a given NDF person is sincere in that had that person believed, he would have obtained the offered salvation, because it would have turned out that he was died-for¹⁴ all along.’

The background assumptions in this line of rebuttal is that an offer is only insincere in that were a person to embrace the thing offered only to find that the thing being offered does not exist or is not available to be imparted: then, and only then, would the offer be insincere. To further shore up this line of thought, with regard to the offer and the NDF, possible worlds logic is tacitly invoked, such that, upon embracing the thing offered, it would turn out that the offeree was died-for all along.¹⁵

The following is a response primarily to these counter-arguments.

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